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Felli, Leonardo

Overview
Works: 6 works in 61 publications in 2 languages and 356 library holdings
Roles: Author
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Leonardo Felli
Publications by Leonardo Felli
Most widely held works by Leonardo Felli
Endogenous lobbying by Leonardo Felli( Book )
17 editions published between 2000 and 2004 in 3 languages and held by 49 libraries worldwide
In this paper the authors endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. They find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always effects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An "extremist" candidate is elected and implements a "centrist" policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous
How to sell a (bankrupt) company by Francesca Cornelli( Book )
11 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 44 libraries worldwide
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by retaining the minority stake, creditors reduce to a minimum the rents that the sale of the company leaves in the hand of the buyer
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? by Luca Anderlini( Book )
14 editions published between 2003 and 2006 in English and held by 34 libraries worldwide
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the parties' welfare under a veil of ignorance. We study a buyer-seller multiple-widget model with risk-neutral agents, asymmetric information and ex-ante investments. The court must decide when to uphold a contract and when to void it. The parties know their private information at the time of contracting, and this drives a wedge between ex-ante and interim-efficient contracts. In particular, if the court enforces all contracts, pooling obtains in equilibrium. By voiding some contracts the court is able to induce them to separate, and hence improve ex-ante welfare. In some cases, an ambiguous court that voids and upholds both with positive probability may be able to increase welfare even further
Firm-specific training by Leonardo Felli( Book )
8 editions published between 2004 and 2018 in English and held by 25 libraries worldwide
This paper investigates the market provision of firm-specific training, and identifies the inefficiencies associated with it. Within a general stochastic learning-by-doing model, there is a potential inefficiency in the market provision of firm-specific training. In order to determine whether this inefficiency is in fact present, we analyze two special cases of the model: the accelerated productivity-enhancement model and the accelerated learning model. In both models, the inefficiency is indeed present. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key components of training, namely productivity enhancement and employee evaluation. In the accelerated productivity-enhancement model, training results in an increase in productivity enhancement but no change in employee evaluation, and training is overprovided by the market. In the accelerated learning model, training results in a proportionate increase in both productivity enhancement and employee evaluation, and training is underprovided by the market. In both cases, turnover is inefficiently low
Competition and trust : evidence from German car manufacturers by Leonardo Felli( Book )
9 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
We explore the determinants and effects of trust relationships between upstream suppliers and downstream producers. Using unique survey data on individual supplier-buyer relationships in the German automotive industry, we show, by means of different measures of supplier-buyer trust, that higher levels of trust mitigate relationship-specific underinvestment in a classical hold-up situation. Moreover, contrary to the extant literature, we show that higher levels of supplier's trust are reflected in the buyer's choice of a more competitive procurement strategy among potential suppliers
Relational contracts, competition and innovation : theory and evidence from German car manufacturers by Giacomo Calzolari( Book )
2 editions published in 2017 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Using unique data from buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry, we unveil a puzzle by which more trust in a relationship is associated with higher idiosyncratic investment, but also more competition. We develop a theoretical model of repeated procurement with non-contractible, buyer-specific investments rationalizing both observations. Against the idea that competition erodes rents needed to build trust and sustain relationships, we infer that trust and competition tend to go hand in hand. In our setting trust and rents from reduced supplier competition behave like substitutes, rather than complements as typically understood
 
Languages
English (58)
Italian (2)
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