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Felli, Leonardo

Overview
Works: 41 works in 63 publications in 2 languages and 215 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: HC10, 330
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Leonardo Felli
Publications by Leonardo Felli
Most widely held works by Leonardo Felli
Costly contingent contracts by Luca Anderlini( Book )
11 editions published between 1996 and 1998 in English and held by 33 libraries worldwide
How to sell a (bankrupt) company by Francesca Cornelli( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by retaining the minority stake, creditors reduce to a minimum the rents that the sale of the company leaves in the hand of the buyer
Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts by Luca Anderlini( Book )
5 editions published between 1996 and 2000 in English and held by 13 libraries worldwide
Endogenous lobbying by Leonardo Felli( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 13 libraries worldwide
In this paper the authors endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. They find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always effects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An "extremist" candidate is elected and implements a "centrist" policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous
Undescribable events by Nabil I Al-Najjar( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
We develop a model of undescribable events. Examples of events that are well understood by economic agents but are prohibitively difficult to describe in advance abound in real-life. This notion has also pervaded a substantial amount of economic literature. We put forth a model of such events using a simple co-insurance problem as backdrop. Undescribable events in our model are understood by economic agents - their consequences and probabilities are known - but are such that every finite description of such events necessarily leaves out relevant features that have a non-negligible impact on the parties expected utilities. We also show that two key ingredients of our model - probabilities that are finitely additive but fail countable additivity, and a state space that is small (discrete in our model) in a measure-theoretic sense -are necessary ingredients of any model of undescribable events that delivers our results
Technological innovations : slumps and booms by Leonardo Felli( Book )
5 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase theorem by Luca Anderlini( Book )
3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
Endogenous agency problems by Luca Anderlini( Book )
2 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Endogenous lobbying by Leonardo Felli( Article )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Child-adoption matching : preferences for gender and race by Mariagiovanna Baccara( Book )
2 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper uses a new data set on child-adoption matching to document the preferences of potential adoptive parents over U.S.-born and unborn children relinquished for adoption by their birth mothers. We show that adoptive parents exhibit significant preferences in favor of girls and against African- American children. A non-African-American child relinquished for adoption attracts the interest of potential adoptive parents with probability 11.5% if it is a girl and 7.9% if it is a boy. As for race, a non-African-American child has a probability of attracting the interest of an adopting parent at least seven times as high as the corresponding probability for an African-American child. In addition, we show that a child's desirability in the adoption process depends significantly on time to birth (increasing over the pregnancy, but decreasing after birth) and on adoption costs. We also document the attitudes toward children' characteristics across different categories of adoptive parents â?? heterosexual and same-sex couples, as well as single women and foreign couples. Finally, we consider several recently discussed policies excluding same-sex and foreign couples from the adoption process. In our data, such policies would reduce the number of adopted children by 6% and 33%, respectively, and have a disproportionate effect on African-American children
I doveri fiduciari come strumento di governo delle transazioni nell' impresa by Fabrizio Barca( Article )
1 edition published in 1994 in Italian and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? by Luca Anderlini( Book )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the parties' welfare under a veil of ignorance. We study a buyer-seller multiple-widget model with risk-neutral agents, asymmetric information and ex-ante investments. The court must decide when to uphold a contract and when to void it. The parties know their private information at the time of contracting, and this drives a wedge between ex-ante and interim-efficient contracts. In particular, if the court enforces all contracts, pooling obtains in equilibrium. By voiding some contracts the court is able to induce them to separate, and hence improve ex-ante welfare. In some cases, an ambiguous court that voids and upholds both with positive probability may be able to increase welfare even further
The economic journal : the journal of the Royal Economic Society ( Book )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Gender and racial biases : evidence from child adoption by Mariagiovanna Baccara( Book )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
This paper uses a new data set on domestic child adoption to document the preferences of potential adoptive parents over born and unborn babies relinquished for adoption by their birth mothers. We show that adoptive parents exhibit significant biases in favor of girls and against African-American babies. A non-African-American baby relinquished for adoption attracts the interest of potential adoptive parents with probability 11.5% if it is a girl and 7.9% if it is a boy. As for race, a non-African-American baby has a probability of attracting the interest of an adopting parent at least seven times as high as the corresponding probability for an African-American baby. In addition, we show that a child's desirability in the adoption process depends significantly on time to birth (increasing over the pregnancy, but decreasing after birth) and on adoption costs. We also document the attitudes toward babies' characteristics across different categories of adoptive parents - heterosexual and same-sex couples, as well as single women and foreign couples. Finally, we consider several recently discussed policies excluding same-sex and foreign couples from the adoption process. In our data, such policies would reduce the number of adopted babies by 6% and 33%, respectively
Legal institutions, innovation and growth by Luca Anderlini( Book )
2 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation and growth. We compare a rigid (law set ex-ante) legal system and a flexible one (law set after observing current technology). The flexible system dominates in terms of welfare, amount of innovation and output growth at intermediate stages of technological development - periods when legal change is needed. The rigid system is preferable at early stages of technological development, when (lack of) commitment problems are severe. For mature technologies the two legal systems are equivalent. We find that rigid legal systems may induce excessive (greater than first-best) R&D investment and output growth. -- legal system ; commitment ; flexibility ; innovation ; growth
Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature by Luca Anderlini( Article )
1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
 
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Languages
English (39)
Italian (1)
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