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Ok, Efe A.

Overview
Works: 32 works in 93 publications in 1 language and 609 library holdings
Genres: Academic theses 
Roles: Author
Classifications: HB135, 330.01519
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Efe A Ok
Publications by Efe A Ok
Most widely held works by Efe A Ok
Real analysis with economic applications by Efe A Ok( Book )
12 editions published between 2007 and 2013 in English and held by 332 libraries worldwide
"There are many mathematics textbooks on real analysis, but they focus on topics not readily helpful for studying economic theory or they are inaccessible to most graduate students of economics. Real Analysis with Economic Applications aims to fill this gap by providing an ideal textbook and reference on real analysis tailored specifically to the concerns of such students." "The emphasis throughout is on topics directly relevant to economic theory. In addition to addressing the usual topics of real analysis, this book discusses the elements of order theory, convex analysis, optimization, correspondences, linear and nonlinear functional analysis, fixed-point theory, dynamic programming, and calculus of variations. Efe Ok complements the mathematical development with applications that provide concise introductions to various topics from economic theory, including individual decision theory and games, welfare economics, information theory, general equilibrium and finance, and intertemporal economics. Moreover, apart from direct applications to economic theory, his book includes numerous fixed point theorems and applications to functional equations and optimization theory." "The book is rigorous, but accessible to those who are relatively new to the ways of real analysis. The formal exposition is accompanied by discussions that describe the basic ideas in relatively heuristic terms, and by more than 1,000 exercises of varying difficulty." "This book will be an indispensable resource in courses on mathematics for economists and as a reference for graduate students working on economic theory."--Jacket
Social mobility and the demand for redistribution : the POUM hypothesis by Roland Benabou( Book )
23 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 123 libraries worldwide
Even relatively poor people oppose high rates of redistribution because of the anticipation that they or their children may move up the income ladder. This hypothesis commonly advanced as an explanation of why most democracies do not engage in large-scale expropriation and highly progressive redistribution. But is it compatible with everyone -- especially the poor -- holding rational expectations that not everyone can simultaneously expect to end up richer than average? This paper establishes the formal basis for the POUM hypothesis. There is a range of incomes below the mean where agents oppose lasting redistributions if (and, in a sense, only if) tomorrow's expected income is increasing and concave in today's income. The laissez-faire coalition is larger, the more concave the transition function and the longer the policy horizon. We illustrate the general analysis with an example (calibrated to the U.S.) where, in every period, 3/4 of families are poorer than average, yet a 2/3 majority has expected future incomes above the mean, and therefore desires low tax rates for all future generations. We also analyze empirical mobility matrices from the PSID and find that the POUM effect is indeed a significant feature of the data
On opportunity inequality measurement by Efe A Ok( Book )
3 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Essays on games with non-standard decision makers by Sophie Bade( file )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
The first essay investigates Nash equilibrium under the possibility that preferences may be incomplete. I characterize the Nash-equilibrium-set of such a game as the union of the Nash-equilibrium-sets of certain derived games with complete preferences. These games with complete preferences can be derived from the original game by a simple linear procedure, provided that preferences admit a concave vector-representation. These theorems extend some results on finite games by Shapley and Aumann. The applicability of the theoretical results is illustrated with examples from oligopolistic theory, where firms are modelled to aim at maximizing both profits and sales (and thus have multiple objectives). Mixed strategy and trembling hand perfect equilibria are also discussed
Essays on Decision Theory by Leandro Nascimento( file )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the problem of aggregating preference orderings under subjective uncertainty. One of the primitives of the model is a collection of preference relations over Anscombe-Aumann acts that agree on the ranking of risky prospects, but are quite general because the perception of ambiguity and the attitude towards it are not specified. A convexity axiom reflects an ex-ante preference for randomization and characterizes a (collective) decision rule that can be interpreted as a compromise between the utilitarian and the Rawlsian criteria. The former is characterized by the independence axiom as in Harsanyi (1955). Existing results are special cases of our representation theorems, which also allow us to interpret Segal's (1987) two-stage approach to ambiguity as the ex-ante aggregation of (Bayesian) future selves' opinions
Essays on the positive theory of income taxation and redistribution by Esteban Fabian Klor( file )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
The third essay develops a positive theory of taxation in a federation of states. In a federal system, with overlapping income taxation, total productivity dispersion between the states determines the federal tax rate. In fact, there exists a positive relation between the productivity dispersion and the federal tax rate, even if the income of the decisive voter is above the mean income. When individuals' income is endogenous, because of incentive considerations, the higher the implemented federal tax rate is, the lower the resulting state tax rate will be, even if a relatively poor individual chooses this tax. Empirical evidence obtained from a new data set on nonlinear tax schedules at the state level supports the hypothesis of this study
Lorenz dominance and the variance of logarithms by Efe A Ok( Book )
4 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Essays on Framing Effects by Begum Guney( file )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Finally, in the last chapter, we concentrate on a different type of framing effect. Motivated by many real life situations in which a decision maker chooses from an ordered set of alternatives such as a menu, a ballot, a shelf in a store etc., we study choices that may be influenced by the order of alternatives. We first characterize a choice process according to which the decision maker chooses an alternative from a list by performing an iterative search that utilizes her mental constraint sets as well as the order of alternatives in the list. We then study circumstances in which the order of alternatives is unobservable by an external agent and we provide a result that enables such an outsider with limited information to understand whether or not the decision maker may be an iterative list chooser
Essays in Decision Theory by Stefania Minardi( file )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Well-known empirical and experimental evidence shows that individuals often exhibit behavioral traits which are inconsistent with the standard rationality tenets dictated by Savage's (1954) model and the self-interested utility maximization. The contribution of this dissertation is to provide axiomatic models of decision-making which accommodate some of these behavioral traits
Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems by Efe A Ok( Book )
3 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Interdependent preference formation by Efe A Ok( Book )
4 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Inequality averse collective choice by Efe A Ok( Book )
3 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Redefining rationality: Bridging theory and application by Yusufcan Masatlioglu( file )
1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
In the last chapter, I draw attention to the fact that indifference relations are not transitive because human mind is not necessarily capable of perfect discrimination. I extend the numerical representation that involves 'error'. The aim of this chapter is to explore two cases: In the first case, the error value decreases when the corresponding utility value increases. This case explains situations where alternatives with small utility values are considered to be similar. In contrast the second case analyzes situations where the error value of the alternative increases along with the corresponding utility value. This refers to cases where alternatives with high utilities are considered to be similar
Essays on preference formation and strategic delegation by Levent Kockesen( file )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
The other two essays of the dissertation are on strategic delegation under unobservable contracts. The second essay addresses this question within the context of two-person extensive form games, and identifies conditions under which the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the delegation game include outcomes that are not subgame perfect in the original game. In this chapter the analysis is limited to a less realistic but analytically important scenario in which only one of the principals has the option to delegate. It is shown that if there exists a Nash equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game in which the delegating principal receives a payoff strictly greater than her subgame perfect equilibrium payoff, and in which the outside party plays sequentially rationally, then the equilibrium outcome may indeed be different from that in the game where no player delegates. Furthermore, we show that, under the same conditions, the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the delegation game in which the principal does not delegate is not well-supported, in the sense that beliefs or actions of the outside party do not conform to any equilibrium in which the principal actually chooses to delegate
The Choquet bargaining solutions by Efe A Ok( Book )
3 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Popular support for progressive taxation in the presence of interdependent preferences by Efe A Ok( Book )
3 editions published between 1993 and 1997 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
The measurement of opportunity inequality; a cardinality-based approach by Efe A Ok( Book )
4 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Estudio sobre los modelos matématicos para medir la desigualdad de oportunidades económicas de acuerdo a los principios de Lorenz y Dalton
Bargaining, independence, and the rationality of fair division by Giuseppe Lopomo( Book )
3 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences by Levent Kockesen( Book )
3 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games by Levent Kockesen( Book )
3 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
A Ok, Efe
Ok, E. A.
Languages
English (78)
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