Benkard, C. Lanier
Overview
Works: 
25
works in
126
publications in
1
language and
645
library holdings

Roles: 
Author, Thesis advisor

Classifications: 
HB1,
330.072 
Most widely held works by
C. Lanier Benkard
Learning and forgetting : the dynamics of aircraft production by C. Lanier Benkard (
Book
)
13
editions published
in
1999
in
English
and held by
65
libraries
worldwide
This paper introduces a new cost dataset for a commercial aircraft firm and uses this data to analyze the dynamics of learning in commercial aircraft production. This dataset is found to be inconsistent with the simple learning hypothesis, and particularly the prediction that a firm's unit cost must decline with its cumulative production. Instead, strong support is found for the hypothesis of organizational forgetting, a more general learning model where unit costs are similarly dependent on a firm's past production experience, but where that experience depreciates over time. Additionally, it is found that some, but not all, of a firm's production experience transfers from one generation of an aircraft to the next. This evidence adds to our understanding of productivity in industries with learning and thus has implications to many fields of economics
Demand estimation with heterogeneous consumers and unobserved product characteristics : a hedonic approach by C. Lanier Benkard (
Book
)
21
editions published
between
2001
and
2004
in
English
and held by
63
libraries
worldwide
We study the identification and estimation of GormanLancaster style hedonic models of demand for differentiated products for the case when one product characteristic is not observed. Our identification and estimation strategy is a twostep approach in the spirit of Rosen (1974). Relative to Rosen's approach, we generalize the first stage estimation to allow for a single dimensional unobserved product characteristic, and also allow the hedonic pricing function to have a general, nonadditive structure. In the second stage, if the product space is continuous and the functional form of utility is known then there exists an inversion between the consumer's choices and her preference parameters. This inversion can be used to recover the distribution of random coefficients nonparametrically. For the more common case when the set of products is finite, we use the revealed preference conditions from the hedonic model to develop a Gibbs sampling estimator for the distribution of random coefficients. We apply our methods to estimating personal computer demand
A dynamic analysis of the market for widebodied commercial aircraft by C. Lanier Benkard (
Book
)
14
editions published
in
2000
in
English
and held by
61
libraries
worldwide
This paper develops a multiagent dynamic model of the commercial aircraft industry and then uses that model to analyze industry pricing, industry performance, and optimal industry policy. In the model, firms are differentiated in their products and cost structure, and entry, exit, prices, and quantity sold are endogenously determined in dynamic equilibrium. Re ecting the focus of the paper, demand and supply are modeled structurally, while investment is modeled in reduced form. The model utilizes a cost model of commercial aircraft production developed and estimated in a previous paper (Benkard (2000)), and a discrete choice model of commercial aircraft demand to determine static profits. I find that many unusual aspects of the aircraft data, such as high concentration and pricing below the level of static marginal cost, are explained by this model. The model also replicates the stochastic evolution of the industry well. Many of these properties could not be explained with a static model. These results provide support for the structural dynamic modeling approach in general. I also find that the unconstrained Markov perfect equilibrium is quite efficient from a social perspective, providing only 9% less welfare on average than a social planner would obtain, but that the Markov perfect equilibrium shifts a substantial amount of welfare from consumers to producers. Finally, I provide simulation evidence that an antitrust policy in the form of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing with high probability
House prices and consumer welfare by Patrick L Bajari (
Book
)
12
editions published
between
2003
and
2004
in
English
and held by
47
libraries
worldwide
We develop a new approach to measuring changes in consumer welfare due to changes in the price of owneroccupied housing. In our approach, an agent's welfare adjustment is defined as the transfer required to keep expected discounted utility constant given a change in current home prices. We demonstrate that, up to a firstorder approximation, there is no aggregate change in welfare due to price increases in the existing housing stock. This follows from a simple market clearing condition where capital gains experienced by sellers are exactly offset by welfare losses to buyers. Welfare losses can occur, however, from price increases in new construction and renovations. We show that this result holds (approximately) even in a model that accounts for changes in consumption and investment plans prompted by current price changes. We estimate the welfare cost of house price appreciation to be an average of $127 per household per year over the 19841998 period
Hedonic price indexes with unobserved product characteristics, and application to PC's by C. Lanier Benkard (
Book
)
12
editions published
in
2003
in
English
and held by
44
libraries
worldwide
We show that hedonic price indexes may be biased when not all product characteristics are observed. We derive two primary sources of bias. The first is a classical selection problem that arises due to changes over time in the values of unobserved characteristics. The second comes from changes in the implicit prices of unobserved characteristics. Next, we show that the bias can be corrected for under fairly general assumptions using extensions of factor analysis methods. We test our methods empirically using a new comprehensive monthly data set for desktop personal computer systems. For this data we find that the standard hedonic index has a slight upward bias of approximately 1.4% per year. We also find that omitting an important characteristic (CPU benchmark) causes a large bias in the index with standard methods, but that this bias is essentially eliminated when the proposed correction is applied
Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition by Patrick L Bajari (
Book
)
11
editions published
between
2004
and
2007
in
English
and held by
43
libraries
worldwide
We describe a twostep algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, including I.O. models with both discrete and continuous controls such as the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model. We test the algorithm on a class of dynamic discrete choice models with normally distributed errors, and a class of dynamic oligopoly models similar to that of Pakes and McGuire (1994)
Markov perfect industry dynamics with many firms by Gabriel Weintraub (
Book
)
12
editions published
between
2005
and
2007
in
English
and held by
34
libraries
worldwide
We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We develop a simple algorithm for computing an "oblivious equilibrium," in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states. We prove that, as the market becomes large, if the equilibrium distribution of firm states obeys a certain "lighttail'" condition, then oblivious equilibria closely approximate Markov perfect equilibria. We develop bounds that can be computed to assess the accuracy of the approximation for any given applied problem. Through computational experiments, we find that the method often generates useful approximations for industries with hundreds of firms and in some cases even tens of firms
Industry dynamics : foundations for models with an infinite number of firms by Gabriel Weintraub (
Book
)
6
editions published
in
2010
in
English
and held by
7
libraries
worldwide
Abstract: This paper explores the connection between three important threads of economic research offering different approaches to studying the dynamics of an industry with heterogeneous firms. Finite models of the form pioneered by Ericson and Pakes (1995) capture the dynamics of a finite number of heterogeneous firms as they compete in an industry, and are typically analyzed using the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). Infinite models of the form pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992), on the other hand, consider an infinite number of infinitesimal firms, and are typically analyzed using the concept of stationary equilibrium (SE). A third approach uses oblivious equilibrium (OE), which maintains the simplifying benefits of an infinite model but within the more realistic setting of a finite model. The paper relates these three approaches. The main result of the paper provides conditions under which SE of infinite models approximate MPE of finite models arbitrarily well in asymptotically large markets. Our conditions require that the distribution of firm states in SE obeys a certain lighttail" condition. In a second set of results, we show that the set of OE of a finite model approaches the set of SE of the infinite model in large markets under a similar lighttail condition
Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries by C. Lanier Benkard (
Book
)
5
editions published
in
2013
in
English
and held by
3
libraries
worldwide
This paper explores the application of oblivious equilibrium to concentrated industries. We define an extended notion of oblivious equilibrium that we call partially oblivious equilibrium (POE) that allows for there to be a set of "dominant firms'', whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that show that POE are often close to MPE in concentrated industries with characteristics similar to real world industries even when OE are not. We derive error bounds for evaluating the performance of POE when MPE cannot be computed. Finally, we demonstrate an important tradeoff facing empirical researchers between implementing an equilibrium concept that is computationally light in a richer economic model, and implementing MPE in a simpler one
An empirical dynamic analysis of learningbydoing and optimal policy in the commercial aircraft industry by C. Lanier Benkard (
Archival Material
)
2
editions published
in
1999
in
English
and held by
3
libraries
worldwide
Learning and forgetting : the dynamics of aircraft production by C. Lanier Benkard (
Article
)
2
editions published
in
2000
in
English
and held by
2
libraries
worldwide
Essays on horizontal mergers and antitrust by Przemyslaw Jeziorski (
file
)
1
edition published
in
2010
in
English
and held by
2
libraries
worldwide
This thesis contributes to understanding the economics of mergers and acquisitions. It provides new empirical techniques to study these processes, based on structural, game theoretical models. In particular, it makes two main contributions. In Chapter 2, I study the issues arising when mergers take place in a twosided market. In such markets, firms face two interrelated demand curves, which complicates the decision making process and makes standard merger models inapplicable. In Chapter 3, I provide a general framework to identify cost synergies from mergers without using cost data. The estimator is based on a dynamic model with endogenous mergers and product repositioning. Both chapters contain an abstract model that can be tailored to many markets, as well as a specific application to the merger wave in the U.S. radio industry
Markov perfect industry dynamics with many firms
(
Computer File
)
2
editions published
between
2005
and
2007
in
English
and held by
2
libraries
worldwide
Essays in political economics by Gregory John Martin (
file
)
1
edition published
in
2013
in
English
and held by
1
library
worldwide
This dissertation consists of three selfcontained but related chapters addressing topics in empirical political economy. Though the applications differ, the chapters share a common methodological approach: each chapter first develops a microeconomic model of behavior and then estimates the parameters of the model using observational data. The first chapter, "The Informational Content of Campaign Advertising, " examines alternative mechanisms for the influence of political advertising on voter behavior. Using a dataset of advertising exposures and election outcomes in statewide elections, I measure how much of advertising's effectiveness can be attributed to the provision of information to voters, and how much to noninformative or "persuasive" effects. I find small but nontrivial advertising effects, of which almost all can be attributed to the persuasive channel. The second chapter, "Dividing the Dollar with Formulas, " proposes a model of legislative bargaining in which legislators allocate a budget subject to the constraint that allocations must be conditioned on a set of district covariates of limited dimension. I discuss some implications for the structure of coalitions and the outcomes of distributive politics, and then estimate the degree to which this constraint binds in the allocation decisions of the US Congress. I find that formulaic allocation substantially reduces Congress' ability to target funds to politically marginal districts. The final chapter, "Testing Theories of CongressionalPresidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates, " uses data on vetooverride votes in Congress to test several gametheoretic models of interactions between the President and Congress. A version of this chapter appears in Political Analysis, vol. 20 (2012), pp. 501519
Gender segregation in the workforce and the role of worker preferences by Vivienne Groves (
file
)
1
edition published
in
2015
in
English
and held by
1
library
worldwide
We use matched employeremployee data from Census's Longitudinal EmployerHousehold Dynamics (LEHD) database to uncover substantial shifts in the distribution of gender shares across firms in the U.S. between 1992 and 2010. This is despite our finding that indices of gender segregation declined only slightly over this period. Systematic segregation (segregation above what would be expected from random allocations of workers to firms) is shown to exist. Most, but not all, of this is found to be attributable to sorting across industries. Estimates of systematic segregation are shown to be sensitive to the choice of reference group used to normalize segregation measures, demonstrating that the extent of systematic segregation may have been overestimated in previous studies. We also provide a model in which profit maximizing firms have an incentive to hire workforces with a gender balance that is desirable to future employees whom they would like to hire. An analysis of hiring and separations patterns suggests that firms hire and workers separate in such a way that a steady state share of workers is maintained, but that these steady states differ by firm. An examination of the probability with which individual workers separate uncovers the counterintuitive finding that the greater the share of one's own gender within the firm, the more likely men and women are to separate. Alternative theories to explain this finding are discussed
Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition
(
Computer File
)
1
edition published
in
2007
in
English
and held by
1
library
worldwide
Essays on the economics of social networks by Won Hee Park (
file
)
1
edition published
in
2016
in
English
and held by
1
library
worldwide
This dissertation consists of two projects, both concerned with how social networks form and how they affect economic decisions. In the first project, entitled Identifying Influential Agents in a Social Network, I define influence centrality, a new measure of influence which combines information on node and neighbor characteristics as well as information on the network structure, by building a model of friendship formation and peer effects and calculating the change in the equilibrium behavior of the network when one node changes its behavior. I apply the model to the context of smoking among middle and high school students and show that a targeted antismoking intervention in which a small number of influential smoking students are treated may be more efficient than a uniform program where every student in the school receives the same antismoking treatment. The second project, entitled Quantifying Spillovers in Network Formation Over Time, is a joint work with Sean Chu and Shankar Kalyanaraman at Facebook. The goal of the project is to separately identify and understand the relative importance of network effects and unobserved heterogeneity in a multiperiod network formation model. Here, we define network effects to be the effect of the number of mutual friends on the probability of friendship and assume that unobserved heterogeneity is timeconsistent. We estimate the model on a deidentified panel data set from a small group of users on Facebook and find that both network effects and unobserved heterogeneity are statistically and economically significant predictors of friendship formation on Facebook. We further reestimate the model first, without network effects and next, without unobserved heterogeneity. Comparing the results from these specifications, we find that network effects play a more important role than unobserved heterogeneity in network formation models on Facebook
more
fewer

Alternative Names
Benkard, Charles Lanier Benkard, Lanier Lanier Benkard, C.
Languages
