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Stanford University Department of Economics

Overview
Works: 182 works in 189 publications in 1 language and 266 library holdings
Genres: Periodicals  History 
Classifications: HD266.C2, 329.00973
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Stanford University
Publications by Stanford University
Most widely held works about Stanford University
 
Most widely held works by Stanford University
Licensing of real estate brokers as underwritten title insurance agents : a report to the State of California by Bruce M Owen( Book )
1 edition published in 1976 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
A field experiment to assess the impact of information provision on household electricity consumption by Matthew E Kahn( file )
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
An economic theory of government decision-making in a democracy by Anthony Downs( Book )
1 edition published in 1956 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Technical report by United States( serial )
in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
"Project SQUID is a cooperative program of basic research relating to jet propulsion."
Public versus private enforcement of law: an economic analysis by Bo Li( Book )
2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
A theoretical approach to authority by Stanford University( Book )
1 edition published in 1955 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Stanford economics journal ( serial )
in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Decentralization and computation in resource allocation by Kenneth Joseph Arrow( Book )
1 edition published in 1958 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Essays in the economics of deterrence : the theory of punitive damages and optimal penalties for repeat offenders by Darryl R Biggar( Book )
1 edition published in 1992 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
The economics of diversity on Broadcasting by Bruce M Owen( Book )
1 edition published in 1977 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Readings in price and income by Stanford University( Book )
2 editions published between 1945 and 1975 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Economies of scale and Western European integration by Stanford University( Book )
1 edition published in 1955 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Finance : risk and insurance ( Book )
2 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Selected chapters from: Principles of corporate finance / Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers; and: Integrated risk management / Neil A. Doherty
Japanese American economic achievement, 1900-1942 by Masao F Suzuki( Computer File )
2 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Three essays in empirical economics by Amalia R Miller( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
The law and economics of generic drug regulation by Christopher Scott Hemphill( file )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
This dissertation examines the law and economics of generic drug entry, and the problems that arise from specific U.S. regulatory arrangements that govern innovation and competition in the market for patented pharmaceuticals. As Chapter 1 explains, competitive entry by generic drug makers is limited by both patents and industry-specific regulation, which together provide the means for brand-name drug makers to avoid competition and thereby recoup large investments in research, development, and testing. At the same time, the complex rules of the Hatch-Waxman Act furnish a pathway by which generic drug makers may challenge the validity or scope of brand-name patents, with a view to entering the market with a competing product prior to patent expiration. The subsequent chapters examine several aspects of the competitive interaction between brand-name and generic drug makers. Chapter 2 analyzes settlements of patent litigation between brand-name and generic drug makers, in which the brand-name firm pays the generic firm in exchange for delayed market entry. Such pay-for-delay settlements are an important, unresolved question in U.S. antitrust policy. The analysis reveals that the pay-for-delay settlement problem is more severe than has been commonly understood. Several specific features of the Act--in particular, a 180-day bounty granted to certain generic drug makers as an incentive to pursue pre-expiration entry--widen the potential for anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay settlements, compared to the usual understanding. In addition, I show that settlements are "innovation inefficient" as a means of providing profits and hence ex ante innovation incentives to brand-name drug makers. To the extent that Congress established a preferred tradeoff between innovation and competition when it passed the Act, settlements that implement a different, less competition-protective tradeoff are particularly problematic from an antitrust standpoint. Chapter 3 synthesizes available public information about pay-for-delay settlements in order to offer a new account of the extent and evolution of settlement practice. The analysis draws upon a novel dataset of 143 such settlements. The analysis uncovers an evolution in the means by which a brand-name firm can pay a generic firm to delay entry, including a variety of complex "side deals" by which a brand-name firm can compensate a generic firm in a disguised fashion. It also reveals several novel forms of regulatory avoidance. The analysis in the chapter suggests that, as a matter of institutional choice, an expert agency is in a relatively good position to conduct the aggregate analysis needed to identify an optimal antitrust rule. Chapter 4 examines the co-evolution of increased brand-name patenting and increased generic pre-expiration challenges. It draws upon a second novel dataset of drug approvals, applications, patents, and other drug characteristics. Its first contribution is to chart the growth of patent portfolios and pre-expiration challenges. Over time, patenting has increased, measured by the number of patents per drug and the length of the nominal patent term. During the same period, challenges have increased as well, and drugs are challenged sooner, relative to brand-name approval. The analysis shows that brand-name sales, a proxy for the profitability of the drug, have a positive effect on the likelihood of generic challenge, consistent with the view that patents that later prove to be valuable receive greater ex post scrutiny. The likelihood of challenge also varies by patent type and timing of expiration. Conditional on sales and other drug characteristics, drugs with weaker patents, particularly those that expire later than a drug's basic compound patent, face a significantly higher likelihood of challenge. Though the welfare implications of Hatch-Waxman patent challenge provisions are complicated, these results suggest these challenges serve a useful purpose, in promoting scrutiny of low quality and late-expiring patents
Insights into policies that affect state government expenditures and revenues by Neva K Novarro( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Innovation-based analyses of pooling, bundling, and exclusion by Mikko Petri Ilmari Packalen( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Walras' tâtonnement in the theory of exchange by Hirofumi Uzawa( Book )
1 edition published in 1959 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
The pattern of Japanese growth, 1914-1954 by Hollis Burnley Chenery( Book )
in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
 
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controlled identity Stanford University

Stanford University. Dept. of Economics
Languages
English (29)
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