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Kőszegi, Botond

Overview
Works: 14 works in 50 publications in 2 languages and 284 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings 
Roles: Author
Classifications: RC533, 633.104911
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Botond Kőszegi
Publications by Botond Kőszegi
Most widely held works by Botond Kőszegi
Is addiction "rational"? : theory and evidence by Jonathan Gruber( Book )
13 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 71 libraries worldwide
Abstract: A standard model of addictive process is Becker and Murphy's rational addiction' model, which has the key empirical prediction that the current consumption of addictive goods should respond to future prices, and the key normative prediction that the optimal government regulation of addictive goods should depend only on their interpersonal externalities. While a variety of previous studies have supported this empirical contention, we demonstrate that these results are very fragile. We propose a new empirical test for the case of cigarettes, using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective, and monthly data on consumption. We find strong evidence that consumption drops when there are announced future tax increases, providing more robust support for the key empirical prediction of the Becker and Murphy model. But we also propose a new formulation of this model that makes only one change, albeit a major one: the incorporation of the inconsistent preferences which are likely to provide a much better platform for understanding the smoking decision. We find that with these preferences the model continues to yield the predictions for forward-looking behavior that have been tested by others and by ourselves. But it has strikingly different normative implications, as with these preferences optimal government policy should depend as well on the internalities' imposed by smokers on themselves. We estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should be at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case
A theory of government regulation of addictive bads : optimal tax levels and tax incidence for cigarette excise taxation by Jonathan Gruber( Book )
12 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 66 libraries worldwide
Abstract: The traditional normative analysis of government policy towards addictive bads is carried out in the context of a 'rational addiction' model, whereby the only role for government is in correcting the external costs of consumption of such goods. But available evidence is at least as consistent, if not more so, with an alternative where individuals are 'time inconsistent' about decisions such as smoking, having a higher discount rate between this period and the next than between future periods. We develop this time inconsistent model, and show that this alternative formulation delivers radically different implications for government policy towards smoking. Unlike the traditional model, our alternative implies that there is a role for government taxation of addictive bads even if there are no external costs; we estimate that the optimal tax on cigarettes is $1 or more higher than that implied by the traditional model. And we estimate that cigarette excise taxes are much less regressive than previously believed, and indeed for most parameter values are progressive, since lower income groups are much more price elastic and therefore benefit more from the commitment device provided by higher excise taxes
Zeitbombe Chemie : Strategien zur Entgiftung unserer Welt by Hanswerner Mackwitz( Book )
3 editions published in 1983 in German and held by 35 libraries worldwide
The impact of consumer loss aversion on pricing by Paul Heidhues( Book )
9 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
Regular prices and sales by Paul Heidhues( file )
1 edition published in 2010 in German and held by 12 libraries worldwide
A model of reference-dependent preferences by Botond Kőszegi( Book )
3 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement by Peter A Diamond( Book )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Cursed financial innovation by Péter Kondor( file )
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We analyze the welfare properties of derivative securities that profit-maximizing issuers offer to investors who have inferior information and neglect the information content of the offer. To capture the markets for structured securities and exotic exchange-traded funds, we assume that issuers can choose both the underlying asset and the form of the security. An issuer's optimal security induces investors to bet on unlikely market movements, creating both excess risk taking and undersaving. Giving more information to the issuer leads it to choose an underlying asset on which its information is more extreme, exacerbating both effects and hence lowering social welfare. Furthermore, providing inferior and noisy additional information to investors also lowers welfare because the security is then written on an underlying asset about which the information is misleading. If the issuer can base its security on a combination of underlying assets, it optimally creates a "custom-designed" index to maximize its informational advantage and minimize risk, minimizing investor and social welfare. Restricting the set of underlying assets - a kind of standardization - increases welfare by preventing the issuer from systematically selling a security with extreme or misleading information. Once this policy is adopted, increasing investor information becomes beneficial
Reference-dependent risk attitudes by Botond Kőszegi( Article )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Cereal Adaptation to Low Temperature Stress in Controlled Environments : Martonvásár phytotron 25th anniversary celebrations by International Symposium on Cereal Adaptation to Low Temperature Stress in Controlled Environments( Book )
1 edition published in 1997 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Health anxiety and patient behavior by Botond Kőszegi( Article )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Ambition and talent by Botond Kőszegi( file )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
We develop a career concerns model in which agents differ in taste for income in addition to ability, and derive basic implications of this framework. We argue that the model captures important aspects of ambition. Since ambitious agents are expected to work harder and therefore be paid more than unambitious ones, everyone might be induced to work hard to prove that they are ambitious. On the other hand, proving one s ambition can be detrimental, because past outputs will be taken by the principal to reflect lower ability. Thus, ambition-proving incentives are likely to increase effort early in the career and decrease it later. Over a long horizon, ambition-proving incentives have a tendency to bootstrap themselves, and, if this effect is strong enough, to create significant incentives with little else motivating the agent. Finally, we discuss in detail two consequences of our framework for organizational design. To maximize effort, the principal wants to cater incentives to the best-performing employees, and wants to observe a measure of the agent s effort (say, his hours) early, but not late, in the career
Mistakes in choice-based welfare analysis by Botond Kőszegi( Article )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Essays in behavioral economics by Botond Kőszegi( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Chapter 1: This chapter examines the logical consequences of the rather unsurprising notion that humans care about and manage their self-image, a notion long taken for granted by psychologists. I model this by assuming that decisionmakers derive utility from positive views about the self, holding constant standard utilitarian outcomes usually assumed relevant in economics. Other than this, agents are timeconsistent expected utility maximizers, are constrained in their updating by Bayes' rule, and can manipulate their beliefs only by controlling the flow of information that they receive. The motive to maintain a favorable self-image leads to a systematic rejection of free information about the self in certain states of the world and eventually to overconfident beliefs. Economically relevant decisions are affected by this overconfidence as well as the incentive to gather information about and make decisions so as to optimally manage beliefs. Agents might avoid informative actions when satisfied with their current beliefs ('self-image protection'), and seek out activities in which they can prove themselves when they are not ('self-image enhancement'), even if these choices are otherwise poor. These motives lead to a whole host of effects on behavior that other models have trouble explaining in a unified framework. The model can also make testable predictions on how these effects play themselves out across different categories of tasks and within a category of tasks over time. Applications to stock market participation, the choice between salaried and self-employment, career choice, manager behavior, and employee motivation are discussed. Chapter 2: This chapter starts from the same premise as the previous one, the assumption that agents care about their self-image, but examines its consequences in a different information structure. Agents can improve financial decisions by making subjective judgments about their payoffs, while they derive ego utility from their perceptions regarding this ability. If the agent has a self-image protection motive, she will as a result be averse to making a subjective judgment and reviewing it later, since this combination is informative about ability. The consequence could be a sluggishness in responding to new information, procrastination in making up one's mind, or the reliance on inferior objective information. Possible remedies and applications are discussed, with particular attention to anxiety about health. Chapter 3 (with Peter Diamond): There is overwhelming psychological evidence that some people run into self-control problems regularly, yet the effect of these findings on major life-cycle decisions hasn't been studied in detail. This paper extends Laibson's quasi-hyperbolic discounting savings model, in which each intertemporal self realizes that her time discount structure will lead to preference changes, and thus plays a game with her future selves. By making retirement endogenous, savings affect both consumption and work in the future. From earlier selves' points of view, the deciding self tends to retire too early, so it is possible that the self before saves less to induce her to work. However, still earlier selves think the pre-retirement self may do this too much, leading to possible higher saving on their part and eventual early retirement. Thus, the consumption path exhibits observational non-equivalence with exponential discounting. Observational non-equivalence also obtains on a number of comparative statics questions. For example, a self could have a negative marginal propensity to consume out of changes in future income. The outcome with naive agents, who fail to realize their self-control problem, is also briefly discussed. In that case, the deciding self's potential decision to retire despite earlier selves' plans results in a downward updating of available lifetime resources, and an empirically observed downward jump in the consumption path
 
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Alternative Names
Köszegi, B. 1973-
Köszegi, Botond 1973-
Languages
English (46)
German (4)
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