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Kőszegi, Botond

Works: 14 works in 48 publications in 2 languages and 241 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: RC533,
Publication Timeline
Publications about Botond Kőszegi
Publications by Botond Kőszegi
Most widely held works by Botond Kőszegi
Is addiction "rational"? : theory and evidence by Jonathan Gruber( Book )
13 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 68 libraries worldwide
Abstract: A standard model of addictive process is Becker and Murphy's rational addiction' model, which has the key empirical prediction that the current consumption of addictive goods should respond to future prices, and the key normative prediction that the optimal government regulation of addictive goods should depend only on their interpersonal externalities. While a variety of previous studies have supported this empirical contention, we demonstrate that these results are very fragile. We propose a new empirical test for the case of cigarettes, using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective, and monthly data on consumption. We find strong evidence that consumption drops when there are announced future tax increases, providing more robust support for the key empirical prediction of the Becker and Murphy model. But we also propose a new formulation of this model that makes only one change, albeit a major one: the incorporation of the inconsistent preferences which are likely to provide a much better platform for understanding the smoking decision. We find that with these preferences the model continues to yield the predictions for forward-looking behavior that have been tested by others and by ourselves. But it has strikingly different normative implications, as with these preferences optimal government policy should depend as well on the internalities' imposed by smokers on themselves. We estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should be at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case
A theory of government regulation of addictive bads : optimal tax levels and tax incidence for cigarette excise taxation by Jonathan Gruber( Book )
12 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 62 libraries worldwide
Abstract: The traditional normative analysis of government policy towards addictive bads is carried out in the context of a 'rational addiction' model, whereby the only role for government is in correcting the external costs of consumption of such goods. But available evidence is at least as consistent, if not more so, with an alternative where individuals are 'time inconsistent' about decisions such as smoking, having a higher discount rate between this period and the next than between future periods. We develop this time inconsistent model, and show that this alternative formulation delivers radically different implications for government policy towards smoking. Unlike the traditional model, our alternative implies that there is a role for government taxation of addictive bads even if there are no external costs; we estimate that the optimal tax on cigarettes is $1 or more higher than that implied by the traditional model. And we estimate that cigarette excise taxes are much less regressive than previously believed, and indeed for most parameter values are progressive, since lower income groups are much more price elastic and therefore benefit more from the commitment device provided by higher excise taxes
The impact of consumer loss aversion on pricing by Paul Heidhues( Book )
9 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
Regular prices and sales by Paul Heidhues( file )
1 edition published in 2010 in German and held by 12 libraries worldwide
A model of reference-dependent preferences by Botond Kőszegi( Book )
3 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement by Peter A Diamond( Book )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Mistakes in choice-based welfare analysis by Botond Kőszegi( Article )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Essays in behavioral economics by Botond Kőszegi( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Health anxiety and patient behavior by Botond Kőszegi( Article )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The unbalanced oxidoreduction state of the respiratory deficient mutant Schizosaccharomyces pombe ( Article )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Zeitbombe chemie by H Mackwitz( Book )
1 edition published in 1983 in German and held by 1 library worldwide
Reference-dependent risk attitudes by Botond Kőszegi( Article )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Cursed financial innovation by Péter Kondor( file )
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
We analyze the welfare properties of derivative securities that profit-maximizing issuers offer to investors who have inferior information and neglect the information content of the offer. To capture the markets for structured securities and exotic exchange-traded funds, we assume that issuers can choose both the underlying asset and the form of the security. An issuer's optimal security induces investors to bet on unlikely market movements, creating both excess risk taking and undersaving. Giving more information to the issuer leads it to choose an underlying asset on which its information is more extreme, exacerbating both effects and hence lowering social welfare. Furthermore, providing inferior and noisy additional information to investors also lowers welfare because the security is then written on an underlying asset about which the information is misleading. If the issuer can base its security on a combination of underlying assets, it optimally creates a "custom-designed" index to maximize its informational advantage and minimize risk, minimizing investor and social welfare. Restricting the set of underlying assets - a kind of standardization - increases welfare by preventing the issuer from systematically selling a security with extreme or misleading information. Once this policy is adopted, increasing investor information becomes beneficial
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Alternative Names
Köszegi, B. 1973-
Köszegi, Botond 1973-
English (46)
German (2)
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