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Rønde, Thomas

Overview
Works: 38 works in 134 publications in 2 languages and 323 library holdings
Classifications: HC10, 330
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Thomas Rønde
Publications by Thomas Rønde
Most widely held works by Thomas Rønde
Managing licensing in a market for technology by Ashish Arora( file )
9 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 41 libraries worldwide
Over the last decade, companies have paid greater attention to the management of their intellectual assets. We build a model that helps understand how licensing activity should be organized within large corporations. More specifically, we compare decentralization--where the business unit using the technology makes licensing decisions--to centralized licensing. The business unit has superior information about licensing opportunities but may not have the appropriate incentives because its rewards depend upon product market performance. If licensing is decentralized, the business unit forgoes valuable licensing opportunities since the rewards for licensing are (optimally) weaker than those for product market profits. This distortion is stronger when production-based incentives are more powerful, making centralization more attractive. Growth of technology markets favors centralization and drives higher licensing rates. Our model conforms to the existing evidence that reports heterogeneity across firms in both licensing propensity and organization of licensing
Cooperation in international banking supervision by Cornelia Holthausen( Book )
14 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 41 libraries worldwide
High-tech clusters, technology spillovers and trade secret laws by Andrea Fosfuri( Book )
16 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 35 libraries worldwide
Abstract We analyze firms' incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown that firms' incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following three conditions are met: 1) technological progress is rapid; 2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; 3) the probability of a single firm to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. We show that some trade secret protection is always beneficial for firms' profits and stimulates clustering. Excessive protection may impede technology spillovers and reduce firms' incentives to cluster. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L1, O32, O34. Keywords: Cumulative innovation, industrial districts, intellectual property rights, technology spillovers
Foreign direct investment and spillovers through workers' mobility by Massimo Motta( Book )
9 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 26 libraries worldwide
Labour pooling in R&D intensive industries by Heiko Gerlach( Book )
10 editions published between 2005 and 2008 in English and held by 26 libraries worldwide
Labor Mobility, Social Network Effects, and Innovative Activity by Ulrich Kaiser( file )
3 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 18 libraries worldwide
We study the mapping between labor mobility and industrial innovative activity for the population of R&D active Danish firms observed between 1999 and 2004. Our study documents a positive relationship between the number of workers who join a firm and the firm's innovative activity. This relationship is stronger if workers join from innovative firms. We also find evidence for positive feedback from workers who leave for an innovative firm, presumably because the worker who left stays in contact with their former colleagues. This implies that the positive feedback ("social network effects") that has been found by other studies not only exists but even outweighs the disruption and loss of knowledge occurring to the previous employer from the worker leaving. Summing up the effects of joining and leaving workers, we find ample evidence for mobility to be associated with an increase in total innovative activity of the new and the old employer
Trade secret laws, labour mobility and innovations by Massimo Motta( Book )
5 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
We show that when the researcher's (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces effort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment problem by forcing the firm to reward a successful researcher. However, if the firm's R&D investment mainly matters, including a CNC in the contract is optimal, as it ensures the firm's incentives to invest. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L14, O31, O34. Keywords: Innovation, intellectual property rights, labor contracts, poaching, relational contracts, start-ups
Regulating access to international large-value payment systems by Cornelia Holthausen( Book )
4 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion by Chiara Fumagalli( Computer File )
7 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier
Regulation of pharmaceutical prices evidence from a reference price reform in Denmark by Ulrich Kaiser( Book )
3 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
This paper studies the effects of a reference price reform in Denmark on price and demand for statins, products that reduce the blood cholesterol levels. Too high cholesterol levels may cause cardiovascular diseases. Reference pricing is a cost containment tool that is applied to reduce health expenditures in 19 European countries as well as Australia, British Columbia and New Zealand. Our paper is the first to combine price data and demand data to study reform effects. We produce estimates for changes in total government (health care) expenditures, patient expenditures, patient welfare and producer revenues. A main finding is that government and patients did indeed benefit in terms of price declines and declining total expenditures from the reform while producers incurred losses. There are, however, striking differences between products that were "cheap" before the reform and those that were "expensive" before the change. The benefits to patients and the government were primarily due to the initially expensive products. The reform effects were hence quite asymmetrically distributed across products (and thus patients). We also show that an empirical analysis of the reform effects that studies price changes only may lead to quite misleading implications for welfare analysis
And the winner is--acquired : entrepreneurship as a contest with acquisition as the prize by Joachim Henkel( Book )
5 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
R&D incentives of new entrants to a market may be shaped by the prospects of being acquired by an incumbent. In this paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage, firms compete to develop innovations of high quality. They do so by choosing, at equal cost, the success probability of their R&D approach, where a lower probability goes along with a higher value in case of success - that is, a more radical innovation. In the second stage, successful entrants bid to be acquired by the incumbent. We assume that entrants cannot survive on their own, so being acquired amounts to a 'prize' in a contest. We identify an equilibrium in which the incumbent chooses the least radical project. Entrants pick projects of pairwise different success probabilities, and the larger the number of entrants, the more radical the most radical project becomes. Under certain conditions, we can show uniqueness of this equilibrium and robustness to changes in the timing of the game. Generally, entrants tend to choose more radical R&D approaches than the incumbent and are more likely to generate the highest value innovation. Thus, the need of entrants to be acquired yields yet another explanation, beyond cannibalization and organizational issues, of why radical innovations tend to come from entrants rather than from incumbents. We illustrate our theoretical findings by a qualitative empirical study of the Electronic Design Automation Industry, and derive implications for research and management
Project choice and risk in R&D by Heiko Gerlach( Book )
5 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
A Danish view on software-related patents by Ulrich Kaiser( Book )
5 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Resting on laurels : a theory of inertia in organizations by Martin E Ruckes( Book )
4 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Labor pooling in R & D intensive industries ( file )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Market and technical risk in R&D by Heiko Gerlach( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Labor Mobility and Patenting Activity by Ulrich Kaiser( file )
3 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We measure the quantitative importance of labor mobility as a vehicle for the transmission of knowledge and skills across firms. For this purpose we create a unique data set that matches all applications of Danish firms at the European Patent Office to linked employer-employee register data for the years 1999-2002. The Danish workforce is split into "R&D workers", who hold a bachelor's or a master's degree in a technical field, and "non-R&D workers". We find that mobile R&D workers ("R&D joiners"') contribute more to patenting activity than immobile R&D workers. Furthermore, R&D workers who have previously been employed by a patenting firm ("patent exposed workers") have a larger effect on patenting activity than R&D workers without this experience. Patent exposed R&D joiners constitute the most productive group of workers: for firms that patented prior to 1999, one additional worker of this type relates to an increase in the number of patent applications of the new employer by 0.0646. This corresponds to a 14 percent increase in the mean number of yearly patent applications. We also find that mobility of R&D workers increases the joint patenting activity of the donor and recipient firms, confirming the importance of labor mobility for innovation in the economy
Patenting activity in Denmark by Ulrich Kaiser( file )
1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Dynamic incentives in organizations success and inertia by Martin Ruckes( file )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Discussion papers. Project choise and risk in R&D ( file )
in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Roende, Thomas
Rønde, T.
Ronde, Thomas
Languages
English (107)
German (1)
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