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Rønde, Thomas

Works: 50 works in 166 publications in 2 languages and 372 library holdings
Roles: Author
Publication Timeline
Publications about Thomas Rønde
Publications by Thomas Rønde
Most widely held works by Thomas Rønde
Cooperation in international banking supervision by Cornelia Holthausen( Book )
15 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 35 libraries worldwide
Foreign direct investment and spillovers through workers' mobility by Massimo Motta( Book )
13 editions published between 1997 and 1999 in English and held by 25 libraries worldwide
High-tech clusters, technology spillovers and trade secret laws by Andrea Fosfuri( Book )
12 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 23 libraries worldwide
Abstract We analyze firms' incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown that firms' incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following three conditions are met: 1) technological progress is rapid; 2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; 3) the probability of a single firm to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. We show that some trade secret protection is always beneficial for firms' profits and stimulates clustering. Excessive protection may impede technology spillovers and reduce firms' incentives to cluster. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L1, O32, O34. Keywords: Cumulative innovation, industrial districts, intellectual property rights, technology spillovers
Managing licensing in a market for technology by Ashish Arora( Book )
11 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 20 libraries worldwide
Over the last decade, companies have paid greater attention to the management of their intellectual assets. We build a model that helps understand how licensing activity should be organized within large corporations. More specifically, we compare decentralization - where the business unit using the technology makes licensing decisions - to centralized licensing. The business unit has superior information about licensing opportunities but may not have the appropriate incentives because its rewards depend upon product market performance. If licensing is decentralized, the business unit forgoes valuable licensing opportunities since the rewards for licensing are (optimally) weaker than those for product market profits. This distortion is stronger when production-based incentives are more powerful, making centralization more attractive. Growth of technology markets favors centralization and drives higher licensing rates. Our model conforms to the existing evidence that reports heterogeneity across firms in both licensing propensity and organization of licensing -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Labour pooling in R & D intensive industries by Heiko Gerlach( Book )
10 editions published between 2005 and 2008 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
Labor Mobility, Social Network Effects, and Innovative Activity by Ulrich Kaiser( file )
5 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 18 libraries worldwide
We study the mapping between labor mobility and industrial innovative activity for the population of R&D active Danish firms observed between 1999 and 2004. Our study documents a positive relationship between the number of workers who join a firm and the firm's innovative activity. This relationship is stronger if workers join from innovative firms. We also find evidence for positive feedback from workers who leave for an innovative firm, presumably because the worker who left stays in contact with their former colleagues. This implies that the positive feedback ("social network effects") that has been found by other studies not only exists but even outweighs the disruption and loss of knowledge occurring to the previous employer from the worker leaving. Summing up the effects of joining and leaving workers, we find ample evidence for mobility to be associated with an increase in total innovative activity of the new and the old employer
Market and technical risk in R & D by Heiko Gerlach( Book )
6 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
Trade secret laws, labour mobility and innovations by Massimo Motta( Book )
7 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
We show that when the researcher's (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces effort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment problem by forcing the firm to reward a successful researcher. However, if the firm's R&D investment mainly matters, including a CNC in the contract is optimal, as it ensures the firm's incentives to invest. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L14, O31, O34. Keywords: Innovation, intellectual property rights, labor contracts, poaching, relational contracts, start-ups
Regulation of pharmaceutical prices evidence from a reference price reform in Denmark by Ulrich Kaiser( file )
6 editions published between 2010 and 2013 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
Reference prices constitute a main determinant of patient health care reimbursement in many countries. We study the effects of a change from an "external" (based on a basket of prices in other countries) to an "internal" (based on comparable domestic products) reference price system. We find that while our estimated consumer compensating variation is small, the reform led to substantial reductions in list and reference prices as well as co-payments, and to sizeable decreases in overall producer revenues, health care expenditures, and co-payments. These effects differ markedly between branded drugs, generics, and parallel imports with health care expenditures and producer revenues decreasing and co-payments increasing most for branded drugs. The reform also induced consumers to substitute from branded drugs - for which they have strong preferences - to generics and parallel imports. This substitution also explains the small increase in consumer welfare despite a substantial decrease in expenditures. -- pharmaceutical markets ; regulation ; co-payments ; reference pricing ; welfare effects
And the winner is--acquired : entrepreneurship as a contest with acquisition as the prize by Joachim Henkel( Book )
5 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
R&D incentives of new entrants to a market may be shaped by the prospects of being acquired by an incumbent. In this paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage, firms compete to develop innovations of high quality. They do so by choosing, at equal cost, the success probability of their R&D approach, where a lower probability goes along with a higher value in case of success - that is, a more radical innovation. In the second stage, successful entrants bid to be acquired by the incumbent. We assume that entrants cannot survive on their own, so being acquired amounts to a 'prize' in a contest. We identify an equilibrium in which the incumbent chooses the least radical project. Entrants pick projects of pairwise different success probabilities, and the larger the number of entrants, the more radical the most radical project becomes. Under certain conditions, we can show uniqueness of this equilibrium and robustness to changes in the timing of the game. Generally, entrants tend to choose more radical R&D approaches than the incumbent and are more likely to generate the highest value innovation. Thus, the need of entrants to be acquired yields yet another explanation, beyond cannibalization and organizational issues, of why radical innovations tend to come from entrants rather than from incumbents. We illustrate our theoretical findings by a qualitative empirical study of the Electronic Design Automation Industry, and derive implications for research and management
A Danish view on software-related patents by Ulrich Kaiser( Book )
6 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion by Chiara Fumagalli( Book )
7 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED. -- Monopolization Practices ; Vertical Agreements
Regulating access to international large value payment systems by Cornelia Holthausen( Book )
5 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Resting on laurels : a theory of inertia in organizations by Martin E Ruckes( Book )
3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Does the mobility of R&D labor increase innovation? by Ulrich Kaiser( Book )
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Does the mobility of R&D labor increase innovation? by Ulrich Kaiser( file )
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We investigate the effect of mobility of R&D workers on the total patenting activity of their employers. Our study documents how mobile workers affect the patenting activity of the firm they join and the firm they leave. The effect of labor mobility is strongest if workers join from patent-active firms. We also find evidence of a positive feedback effect on the former employer's patenting from workers who have left for another patent-active firm. Summing up the effects of joining and leaving workers, we show that labor mobility increases the total innovative activity of the new and the old employer. Our study which is based on the population of R&D active Danish firms observed between 1999 and 2004 thus provides firm-level support for the notion that labor mobility stimulates overall innovation of a country or region due to knowledge transfer
Market and technical risk in RetD by Heiko Gerlach( Book )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
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Alternative Names
Roende, Thomas
Rønde, T.
Ronde, Thomas
English (114)
German (1)
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