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Heidhues, Paul

Overview
Works: 32 works in 85 publications in 2 languages and 253 library holdings
Roles: Author, Other
Classifications: HC10, 650
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Paul Heidhues
Publications by Paul Heidhues
Most widely held works by Paul Heidhues
Study on methods to analyse the impact of state aid on competition by Rainer Nitsche( Book )
13 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 32 libraries worldwide
On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control by Johan Lagerlöf( Book )
9 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 28 libraries worldwide
The impact of consumer loss aversion on pricing by Paul Heidhues( Book )
9 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
Equilibria in a dynamic global game : the role of cohort effects by Paul Heidhues( Book )
7 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy by Paul Heidhues( file )
2 editions published in 2010 in German and English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines by Andreas Blume( file )
2 editions published in 2011 in German and English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
Regular prices and sales by Paul Heidhues( file )
1 edition published in 2010 in German and held by 12 libraries worldwide
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions by Andreas Blume( Book )
2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Employers' associations, industry wide unions, and competition by Paul Heidhues( Book )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Nash bargaining solution with coalitions and the joint bargaining paradox by Suchan Chae( Book )
2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
The effects of downstream distributor chains on upstream producer entry : a bargaining perspective by Suchan Chae( Book )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
Hiding information in electoral competition by Paul Heidhues( Book )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Defaults and donations evidence from a field experiment by Steffen Altmann( file )
8 editions published between 2014 and 2015 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
We study how website defaults affect consumer behavior in the domain of charitable giving. In a field experiment that was conducted on a large platform for making charitable donations over the web, we exogenously vary the default options in two distinct choice dimensions. The first pertains to the primary donation decision, namely, how much to contribute to the charitable cause. The second relates to an "add-on" decision of how much to contribute to supporting the online platform itself. We find a strong impact of defaults on individual behavior: in each of our treatments, the modal positive contributions in both choice dimensions invariably correspond to the specified default amounts. Defaults, nevertheless, have no impact on aggregate donations. This is because defaults in the donation domain induce some people to donate more and others to donate less than they otherwise would have. In contrast, higher defaults in the secondary choice dimension unambiguously induce higher contributions to the online platform
Bargaining power of a coalition in parallel bargaining : advantage of multiple cable system operators by Suchan Chae( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Private monitoring in auctions by Andreas Blume( Book )
2 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Buyers' alliances for bargaining power by Suchan Chae( Book )
2 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs by Paul Heidhues( file )
4 editions published between 2012 and 2015 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider problem is so severe that the equilibrium number of experiments is at most one plus the number of experiments that a single agent would perform. When payoffs are private information and players can communicate via cheap talk, the socially optimal symmetric experimentation profile can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for sufficiently optimistic prior beliefs. These results generalize to more than two players whenever the success probability per period is not too high. In particular, this is the case when successes occur at the jump times of a Poisson process and the period length is sufficiently small
Comments on state aid reform : some implications of an effects-based approach by Paul Heidhues( file )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Screening and merger activity ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
All Nash equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction ( file )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum valuation. In this class, above a threshold value all bidders bid truthfully on all units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold; the other bidders bid zero in this range. In the second class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as there are units. The allocation of these bids is arbitrary across bidders. All the remaining bids equal zero. With any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes unique: Bidders bid truthfully on all units for which their valuation exceeds the reserve price
 
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Alternative Names
Heidhues, P.
Languages
English (70)
German (3)
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