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Heidhues, Paul

Overview
Works: 24 works in 65 publications in 2 languages and 199 library holdings
Classifications: HC10, 650
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Paul Heidhues
Publications by Paul Heidhues
Most widely held works by Paul Heidhues
Study on methods to analyse the impact of state aid on competition by Rainer Nitsche( Book )
9 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 32 libraries worldwide
On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control by Johan Lagerlöf( Book )
10 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 29 libraries worldwide
The impact of consumer loss aversion on pricing by Paul Heidhues( Book )
9 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 21 libraries worldwide
Equilibria in a dynamic global game : the role of cohort effects by Paul Heidhues( Book )
7 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy by Paul Heidhues( file )
2 editions published in 2010 in German and English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines by Andreas Blume( file )
2 editions published in 2011 in German and English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Regular prices and sales by Paul Heidhues( file )
1 edition published in 2010 in German and held by 10 libraries worldwide
Nash bargaining solution with coalitions and the joint bargaining paradox by Suchan Chae( Book )
2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions by Andreas Blume( Book )
2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Employers' associations, industry-wide unions, and competition by Paul Heidhues( Book )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
The effects of downstream distributor chains on upstream producer entry : a bargaining perspective by Suchan Chae( Book )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Hiding information in electoral competition by Paul Heidhues( Book )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Private monitoring in auctions by Andreas Blume( Book )
2 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Buyers' alliances for bargaining power by Suchan Chae( Book )
2 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Bargaining power of a coalition in parallel bargaining : advantage of multiple cable system operators by Suchan Chae( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Comments on state aid reform : some implications of an effects-based approach by Paul Heidhues( file )
2 editions published between 2006 and 2007 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Screening and merger activity ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium by Martin Dufwenberg( Book )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Experimental evidence stresses the importance of so-called social preferences for understanding economic behavior. Social preferences are defined over the entire allocation in a given economic environment, and not just over one's own consumption as is traditionally presumed. We study the implications for competitive market outcomes if agents have such preferences. First, we clarify under what conditions an agent behaves as if she was selfish - i.e. when her demand function is independent of others' behavior. An agent behaves as if selfish if and only if her preferences can be represented by a utility function that is separable between her own utility and the allocation of goods for all other agents. Next, we study equilibrium outcomes in economies where individual agents behave as if selfish. We how that one can identify a corresponding ego-economy such that the equilibria of the ego-economy coincide with the equilibria of the original economy. As a consequence, competitive equilibria exist and they are material efficient. In general, however, the First Welfare Theorem fails. We introduce the class of Bergsonian social utility functions, which are social utility functions that are completely separable in all agents' material utility. For such social preferences, the Second Welfare Theorem holds under a suitable growth condition. We also establish that in uncertain environments, agents with social preferences typically do not behave as if selfish. Furthermore, in the presence of public goods, both demand and equilibrium outcomes depend on social preferences. -- Competitive markets ; Other-regarding preferences ; Self-interest ; Welfare theorems
Employers' associations, industry-wide unions, and competition by Paul Heidhues( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
Dieser Beitrag untersucht die ökonomischen Auswirkungen von Industriegewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbänden in einer duopolistischen Industrie. Anhand eines effizienten Verhandlungsmodells zeigen wir, dass es sich für Arbeitnehmer lohnt, eine Industriegewerkschaft zu gründen, wenn die Unternehmen substituierbare Güter herstellen. Die Bildung einer Industriegewerkschaft ist aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht jedoch höchst bedenklich, da sie zu einer Monopolisierung des Produktmarktes führt . unabhängig davon, ob Lohnverhandlungen zentral oder dezentral durchgeführt werden. In unserem Modell ist es für die Unternehmen optimal, auf eine Industriegewerkschaft mit der Gründung eines Arbeitgeberverbandes zu reagieren, weil das die Verhandlungsmacht gegenüber der Gewerkschaft erhöht. Wenn die Produktivitätsunterschiede zwischen den Firmen relativ klein sind oder die Firmen sehr heterogene Produkte produzieren, beeinflussen Arbeitgeberverbände zwar die Verteilung, aber nicht die Höhe der Industrierente. Arbeitgeberverbände können die gesamtwirtschaftliche Wohlfahrt senken, wenn die Produktivitätsunterschiede zwischen den Unternehmen groß und die Produkte relativ homogen sind
 
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Alternative Names
Heidhues, P.
Languages
English (58)
German (3)
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