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Bolton, Patrick 1957-

Overview
Works: 124 works in 461 publications in 1 language and 2,796 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor, Redactor, Honoree
Classifications: K840, 346.0201
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Patrick Bolton
Publications by Patrick Bolton
Most widely held works by Patrick Bolton
Contract theory by Patrick Bolton( Book )
12 editions published between 2004 and 2007 in English and held by 502 libraries worldwide
A comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use by advanced undergraduate and graduate students, covering the areas of agency theory, information economics and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies, and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way
Credit markets for the poor ( Book )
6 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 396 libraries worldwide
"Credit Markets for the Poor demonstrates how weak credit markets are impeding the social and economic mobility of the needy. By detailing the many disadvantages that impoverished people face when seeking to borrow, this new volume highlights a significant national problem and offers solutions for the future."--Jacket
Sovereign wealth funds and long-term investing ( Book )
9 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and held by 128 libraries worldwide
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are state-owned investment funds with combined asset holdings that are fast approaching four trillion dollars. Recently emerging as a major force in global financial markets, SWFs have other distinctive features besides their state-owned status: they are mainly located in developing countries and are intimately tied to energy and commodities exports, and they carry virtually no liabilities and have little redemption risk, which allows them to take a longer-term investment outlook than most other institutional investors. Edited by a Nobel Laureate, a respected academic at the Columbia Business School, and a longtime international banker and asset manager, this volume examines the specificities of SWFs in greater detail and discusses the implications of their growing presence for the world economy. Based on essays delivered in 2011 at a major conference on SWFs held at Columbia University, this volume discusses the objectives and performance of SWFs, as well as their benchmarks and governance. What are the opportunities for SWFs as long-term investments? How do they fulfill their socially responsible mission? And what role can SWFs play in fostering sustainable development and greater global financial stability? These are some of the crucial questions addressed in this one-of-a-kind volume
Corporate governance and control by Marco Becht( Book )
13 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 49 libraries worldwide
Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: regulation of large shareholder intervention may provide better protection to small shareholders; but such regulations may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse
The economics of contracts ( Book )
6 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 49 libraries worldwide
Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt : the role of seniority by Patrick Bolton( Book )
15 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 48 libraries worldwide
In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure. We show within a simple model how competition for repayment between lenders may result in sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. Alleviating this inefficiency requires a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism that fulfills some of the functions of corporate bankruptcy regimes, in particular the enforcement of seniority and subordination clauses in debt contracts
Executive compensation and short-termist behavior in speculative markets by Patrick Bolton( Book )
11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 41 libraries worldwide
We present a multiperiod agency model of stock based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors are overconfident and stock prices may deviate from underlying fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. We show that optimal compensation contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance, at the expense of long run fundamental value, as an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a different perspective for the recent corporate crisis than the increasingly popular rent extraction view' of executive compensation
Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in banking by Patrick Bolton( Book )
12 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 39 libraries worldwide
In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyers regarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the under-provision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures, specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financial institution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, although conflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision for sufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategically to increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher prices than specialized banks, thus providing a new reason for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, if independent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and therefore market power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice
Relationship and transaction lending in a crisis by Patrick Bolton( Book )
19 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 30 libraries worldwide
We study how relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationship banks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them to provide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the services they provide, operating costs of relationship-banks are higher than those of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-banks compete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, but offer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transaction banks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit register information for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers' default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banks responded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationship banking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of the model that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response to the crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking
Thinking ahead : the decision problem by Patrick Bolton( Book )
10 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 28 libraries worldwide
We propose a model of bounded rationality based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision maker's thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time and let the decision maker "think ahead" about future decision problems in yet unrealized states of nature. By formulating an intertemporal, state-contingent, planning problem, which may involve costly deliberation in every state of nature, and by letting the decision-maker deliberate ahead of the realization of a state, we attempt to capture the basic idea that individuals generally do not think through a complete action-plan. Instead, individuals prioritize their thinking and leave deliberations on less important decisions to the time or event when they arise
Pay for short-term performance : executive compensation in speculative markets by Patrick Bolton( Book )
10 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 22 libraries worldwide
We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets
Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies by Patrick Bolton( Book )
12 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
We analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Under financial integration banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to minimize the costs with respect to an individual country's sovereign debt default. While diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post. We show that financial integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt. The safest governments inefficiently restrict the amount of high quality debt that could be used as collateral in the financial system and the riskiest governments issue too much debt, as they do not take account of the costs of contagion. Those inefficiencies can be removed by various forms of fiscal integration, but fiscal integration typically reduce the welfare of the country that provides the "safe-haven" asset below the autarky level
Optimal property rights in financial contracting by Kenneth Michael Ayotte( Book )
8 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Following recent contributions in the property law literature, we emphasize the distinction between contractual rights, that are only enforceable against the parties themselves, and property rights, that are also enforeceable against third parties outside the contract. Our analysis starts with the following question: which contractual agreements should the law allow parties to enforce as property rights? Our proposed answer to this question is shaped by the overall objective of minimizing due diligence (reading) costs and investment distortions that follow from the inability of third-party lenders to costlessly observe pre-existing rights in a borrower's property. Borrowers cannot reduce these costs without the law's help, due to an inability to commit to protecting third-parties from redistribution. We find that the law should take a more restrictive approach to enforcing rights against third-parties when these rights are i) more costly for third-parties to discover, ii) more likely to redistribute value from third-parties, and iii) less likely to increase efficiency. We find that these qualitative principles are often reflected in observed legal rules, including the enforceability of negative covenants; fraudulent conveyance; corporate veil-piercing; and limits on assignability
Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt : the role of a bankruptcy regime by Patrick Bolton( Book )
8 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring
The credit ratings game by Patrick Bolton( Book )
10 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has brought renewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We model both the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuer conflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine the effectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs are more prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the market who take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To the extent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk for CRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs are more likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due to issuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on the same equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both total ex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any rating produced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the conflicts of interest of both CRAs and issuers
Intracompany governance and innovation by Sharon Belenzon( Book )
8 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the relation between ownership, corporate form, and innovation for a cross-section of private and publicly traded innovating firms in the US and 15 European countries. A striking novel observation emerges from our analysis: while most innovating firms in the US are publicly traded conglomerates, a substantial fraction of innovation is concentrated in private firms and in business groups in continental European countries. We find virtually no variation across US industries in the corporate form of innovating firms, but a substantial variation across industries in continental European countries, where business groups tend to be concentrated in industries with a slower and more fundamental innovation cycle and where intellectual protection of innovators seems to be of paramount importance. Our findings suggest that innovative companies choose the corporate form most conducive to R&D, as predicted by the Coasian view of how firms form. This is especially true in Europe, where there are fewer regulatory hurdles to the formation of business groups and hybrid corporate forms. It is less the case in the US, where conglomerates are generally favored
Satisficing contracts by Patrick Bolton( Book )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time-costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable future transactions unspecified and instead specify which agent has the right to decide these transactions. Control rights allow the controlling agent to defer time-consuming deliberations on those transactions to a later date, making her less inclined to prolong negotiations over an initial incomplete contract. Still, agents tend to resolve conflicts up-front by writing more complete initial contracts. A more complete contract can take the form of either a finer adaptation to future contingencies, or greater coarseness. Either way, conflicts among contracting agents tend to result in excessively complete contracts in the sense that the maximization of joint payoffs would result in less up-front deliberation
Outside and inside liquidity by Patrick Bolton( Book )
6 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
We consider a model of liquidity demand arising from a possible maturity mismatch between asset revenues and consumption. This liquidity demand can be met with either cash reserves (inside liquidity) or via asset sales for cash (outside liquidity). The question we address is, what determines the mix of inside and outside liquidity in equilibrium? An important source of inefficiency in our model is the presence of asymmetric information about asset values, which increases the longer a liquidity trade is delayed. We establish existence of an immediate-trading equilibrium, in which asset trading occurs in anticipation of a liquidity shock, and sometimes also of a delayed-trading equilibrium, in which assets are traded in response to a liquidity shock. We show that, when it exists, the delayed-trading equilibrium is Pareto superior to the immediate-trading equilibrium, despite the presence of adverse selection. However, the presence of adverse selection may inefficiently accelerate asset liquidation. We also show that the delayed-trading equilibrium features more outside liquidity than the immediate-trading equilibrium although it is supplied in the presence of adverse selection. Finally, long term contracts do not always dominate the market provision of liquidity
Credit default swaps and the empty creditor problem by Patrick Bolton( Book )
7 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Commentators have raised concerns about the empty creditor problem that arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. We analyze this problem from an ex-ante and ex-post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without credit default swaps (CDS). We show that CDS, and the empty creditors they give rise to, have important ex-ante commitment benefits: By strengthening creditors' bargaining power they raise the debtor's pledgeable income and help reduce the incidence of strategic default. However, we also show that lenders will over-insure in equilibrium, giving rise to an inefficiently high incidence of costly bankruptcy. We discuss a number of remedies that have been proposed to overcome the inefficiency resulting from excess insurance
Should Derivatives be Privileged in Bankruptcy? by Patrick Bolton( Book )
6 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Derivative contracts, swaps, and repos enjoy "super-senior" status in bankruptcy: they are exempt from the automatic stay on debt and collateral collection that applies to virtually all other claims. We propose a simple corporate finance model to assess the effect of this exemption on firms' cost of borrowing and incentives to engage in swaps and derivatives transactions. Our model shows that while derivatives are value-enhancing risk management tools, super-seniority for derivatives can lead to inefficiencies: collateralization and effective seniority of derivatives shifts credit risk to the firm's creditors, even though this risk could be borne more efficiently by derivative counterparties. In addition, because super-senior derivatives dilute existing creditors, they may lead firms to take on derivative positions that are too large from a social perspective. Hence, derivatives markets may grow inefficiently large in equilibrium -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
 
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Alternative Names
Bolton, P. 1957-
Languages
English (196)
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