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Spiegel, Yossi

Overview
Works: 41 works in 80 publications in 1 language and 167 library holdings
Genres: Conference proceedings  History 
Roles: Editor
Classifications: HC10, 338.6048
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Yossi Spiegel
Publications by Yossi Spiegel
Most widely held works by Yossi Spiegel
The choice of exchange rate regime and speculative attacks by Alex Cukierman( Book )
7 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 29 libraries worldwide
Optimal state-contingent regulation under limited liability by Robert Gary-Bobo( Book )
6 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
What to maximize if you must by Aviad Heifetz( Book )
5 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 13 libraries worldwide
Investment and capital structure of partially private regulated firms by Carlo Cambini( Book )
4 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily independent. Among other things, we show that firms invest more, issue more debt, and are allowed to charge higher prices when they are more privatized and when the regulator is more independent and more pro-firm
The analysis of competition policy and sectoral regulation ( file )
2 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Public disclosure of patent applications, R & D, and welfare by Reiko Aoki( Book )
2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
On the evolutionary emergence of optimism by Aviad Heifetz( Book )
5 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Tweaking and the Horndal effect by Igal Hendel( Book )
4 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
When do representative and direct democracies lead to similar policy choices? by Alex Cukierman( Book )
3 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Backward integration, forward integration, and vertical foreclosure by Yossi Spiegel( file )
2 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
I show that partial vertical integration may either alleviates or exacerbate the concern for vertical foreclosure relative to full vertical integration and I examine its implications for consumer welfare
Industry structure and pricing over the business cycle by Yossi Spiegel( file )
3 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
We consider the interaction between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, and examine how this interaction is affected by demand fluctuations. Our model gives rise to procyclical entry, prices, and price-cost margins, although the average price in the market can be countercyclical if the entrant is the first mover, and capacity utilization can be either pro- or countercyclical if the incumbent is the first mover. Moreover, our results show that entry deterrence by the incumbent firm can either amplify or dampen the effect of demand fluctuations on prices, price-cost margins, and capacity utilization
Noisy leadership an experimental approach by Werner Güth( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
The Organization of the Oil Industry, Past and Present by Charles F Mason( Book )
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
What to maximize if you must ( Computer File )
3 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a central tenet in economics. This assumption is often justied either formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we show that in almost every game and for almost every family of distortions of a player’s actual payoÞs, some degree of this distortion is benecial to the player because of the resulting eÞect on opponents’ play. Consequently, such distortions will not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payoÞ-monotonic selection dynamics, in which agents with higher actual payoÞs proliferate at the expense of less successful agents. In particular, under any such selection dynamics, the population will not converge to payoÞ-maximizing behavior. We also show that payoÞ-maximizing behavior need not prevail even when preferences are imperfectly observed
Network interconnection with competitive transit by David Gilo( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion by David Gilo( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Auctions with costly information acquisition ( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2004 and 2007 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We consider auction environments in which bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations and study the optimal selling mechanisms in such environments. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce buyers to both acquire and to reveal truthfully their valuations. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general full extraction of the surplusʺ result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the buyers’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases
The choice of exchange rate bands balancing credibility and flexibility by Alex Cukierman( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Optimal state-contingent regulation under limited liability ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Licensing interim R&D knowledge ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
This paper considers three firms that engage in an R&D contest to develop a new profitable technology. For a broad range of parameters, the firm that leads the contest (i.e., has the highest probability of success) is better-off licensing or selling its superior interim knowledge to one of the two lagging firms or to both rather than holding on to its lead. Although transferring interim R&D knowledge to the lagging firms erodes the technological lead of the leading firm, it allows it to extract rents from its rivals and can possibly create value by increasing the chance that the licensee(s) will develop the new technology when the leading firm fails. -- Interim R&D knowledge ; exclusive and nonexclusive licensing ; transfer of knowledge ; cross-licensing
 
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Alternative Names
Spiegel, Y. 1960-
Spiegel, Yossef 1960-
Languages
English (57)
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