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Oechssler, Jörg

Overview
Works: 78 works in 159 publications in 3 languages and 301 library holdings
Roles: Author, Honoree
Classifications: HC10, 330
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Jörg Oechssler
Publications by Jörg Oechssler
Most widely held works by Jörg Oechssler
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases by Jörg Oechssler( file )
5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 21 libraries worldwide
Imitation - theory and experimental evidence by José Alpesteguia( Book )
8 editions published between 2003 and 2007 in English and Spanish and held by 19 libraries worldwide
Overbidding in fixed rate tenders - an empirical assessment of alternative explanations ( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
This paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged. JEL - Klassifikation: D44 , E32
Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces by Jörg Oechssler( Book )
7 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and German and held by 11 libraries worldwide
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for the stability of rest points. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies. -- replicator dynamics ; evolutionary stability ; continuous strategy spaces ; oligopoly
Cooling-off in negotiations : does it work? by Jörg Oechssler( Book )
6 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Herding with and without payoff externalities : an Internet experiment by Mathias Drehmann( Book )
4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
Loss of commitment? an evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example by Jörg Oechssler( Book )
3 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Imitation and the evolution of walrasian behavior theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust by Jose Apesteguia( Book )
7 editions published between 2007 and 2010 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper, we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior
The repo auctions of the European Central Bank and the vanishing quota puzzle by Jörg Oechssler( Book )
2 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Through trial & error to collusion by Steffen Huck( Book )
3 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Learning in Cournot oligopoly an experiment by Steffen Huck( Book )
3 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Imitation under stress by Magdalena Buckert( file )
4 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Imitating the best strategy from the previous period has been shown to be an important heuristic, in particular in relatively complex environments. In this experiment we test whether subjects are more likely to use imitation if they are under stress. Subjects play a repeated Cournot oligopoly. Treatments are time pressure within the task and distractions through a second task (a Stroop-task) that has to be performed as well and influences payment. We measure stress levels through salivary cortisol and heart rate. Our main findings are that time pressure and distraction can indeed raise physiological stress levels of subjects within our task. More importantly from an economic perspective, we can also observe a corresponding behavioral change that is indicative of imitation
On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models by Jörg Oechssler( Book )
4 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Rage against the machines how subjects learn to play against computers ( Computer File )
4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment
Asset bubbles without dividends : an experiment by Jörg Oechssler( Book )
4 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Imitation theory and experimental evidence by Jose Apestgeguia( Computer File )
3 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals' propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences
Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers ( Book )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Sick pay provision in experimental labor markets by Peter Dürsch( Book )
3 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence by Damian S Damianov( Book )
3 editions published between 2007 and 2010 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Finitely repeated games with social preferences by Jörg Oechssler( Computer File )
4 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Jörg Oechssler economist (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)
Jörg Oechssler Wirtschaftswissenschaftler (Tätig an der Columbia Univ., New York, USA)
Oechssle, Jorg
Oechssler, J.
Oechssler, Jorg
Languages
English (79)
Spanish (1)
German (1)
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