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Snyder, Christopher (Christopher Mark)

Overview
Works: 24 works in 132 publications in 1 language and 739 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author
Classifications: HB172, 338.5
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Christopher Snyder
Publications by Christopher Snyder
Most widely held works by Christopher Snyder
Microeconomic theory : basic principles and extensions by Walter Nicholson( Book )
53 editions published between 2007 and 2017 in English and Undetermined and held by 451 libraries worldwide
Delivers economic models, theoretical tools, real-world applications, and the developments in the study of microeconomics. This title features insightful graphic presentations that help visual learners see the connections between the calculus and the algebra/geometry of the same material as it applies to microeconomic theory
Why are drugs more profitable than vaccines? by Michael Kremer( Book )
11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 50 libraries worldwide
In a simple representative consumer model, vaccines and drug treatments yield the same revenue for a pharmaceutical manufacturer, implying that the firm would have the same incentive to develop either ceteris paribus. We provide more realistic models in which the revenue equivalence breaks down for two reasons. First, drug treatments are sold after the firm has learned who has contracted the disease; in the case of heterogeneous consumers who vary with respect to the probability of contracting the disease, there is less asymmetric information to prevent the firm from extracting consumer surplus with drug treatments than with vaccines. We prove that, due to this aspect of pharmaceutical pricing, the ratio of drug-treatment to vaccine revenue can be arbitrarily high; we calculate that the ratio is about two to one for empirical distributions of HIV risk. The second reason for the breakdown of revenue equivalence is that vaccines are more likely to interfere with the spread of the disease than are drug treatments, thus reducing demand for the product. By embedding an economic model within a standard dynamic epidemiological model, we show that the steady-state flow of revenue is greater for drug treatments than for vaccines
Information sharing and competition in the motor vehicle industry by Maura P Doyle( Book )
8 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
When is prevention more profitable than cure? : the impact of time-varying consumer heterogeneity by Michael Kremer( Book )
8 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
We argue that in pharmaceutical markets, variation in the arrival time of consumer heterogeneity creates differences between a producer's ability to extract consumer surplus with preventives and treatments, potentially distorting R & D decisions. If consumers vary only in disease risk, revenue from treatments-sold after the disease is contracted, when disease risk is no longer a source of private information-always exceeds revenue from preventives. The revenue ratio can be arbitrarily high for sufficiently skewed distributions of disease risk. Under some circumstances, heterogeneity in harm from a disease, learned after a disease is contracted, can lead revenue from a treatment to exceed revenue from a preventative. Calibrations suggest that skewness in the U.S. distribution of HIV risk would lead firms to earn only half the revenue from a vaccine as from a drug. Empirical tests are consistent with the predictions of the model that vaccines are less likely to be developed for diseases with substantial disease-risk heterogeneity
Property rights and incomplete contracts : dealing with nuisance by Rohan Pitchford( Book )
4 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Property rights, incomplete contracts, and social harm by Rohan Pitchford( Book )
4 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
Model study of a hydraulic breakwater over a submerged barrier by Christopher M Snyder( Book )
5 editions published in 1957 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
Preventives versus treatments by Michael Kremer( Book )
6 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Preventives are sold ex ante, before disease status is realized, while treatments are sold ex post. Even if the mean of the ex ante distribution of consumer values is the same as that ex post, the shape of the distributions may differ, generating a difference between the surplus each product can extract. If, for example, consumers differ only in ex ante disease risk, then a monopolist would have more difficulty extracting surplus with a preventive than with a treatment because treatment consumers, having contracted the disease, no longer differ in disease risk. We show that the ratio of preventive to treatment producer surplus can be arbitrarily small, in particular when the distribution of consumer values has a Zipf shape and the disease is rare. The firm's bias toward treatments can be reversed, for example, if the source of private information is disease severity learned ex post. The difference between the producer surplus earned from the products can result in distorted R&D incentives; the deadweight loss from this distortion can be as large as the entire producer-surplus difference. Calibrations for HIV and heart attacks based on risk factors in the U.S. population suggest that the distribution of disease risk is sufficiently Zipf-similar to generate substantial differences between producer surplus from preventives and treatments. Empirically, we find that proxies for the Zipf-similarity of the disease-risk distribution are associated a significantly lower likelihood of vaccine development but not drug development
Vaccines vs. preventives by Michael Kremer( Book )
4 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Preventives are sold ex ante, before disease status is realized, while treatments are sold ex post. Even if the mean of the ex ante distribution of consumer values is the same as that ex post, the shape of the distributions may differ, generating a difference between the surplus each product can extract. If, for example, consumers differ only in ex ante disease risk, then a monpolist would have more difficulty extracting surplus with a preventive than with a treatment because treatment consumers, having contracted the disease, no longer differ in disease risk. We show that the ratio of preventive to treatment producer surplus can be arbitrarily small, in particular when the distribution of consumer values has a Zipf shape and the disease is rare. The firm's bias toward treatments can be reversed, for example, if the source of private information is disease severity learned ex post. The difference between the producer surplus earned from the products can result in distorted R&D incentives; the deadweight loss from this distortion can be as large as the entire producer-surplus difference. Calibrations for HIV and heart attacks based on risk factors in the U.S. population suggest that the distribution of disease risk is sufficiently Zipf-similar to generate substantial differences between producer surplus from preventives and treatments. Empirically, we find that proxies for the Zipf-similarity of the disease-risk distribution are associated a significantly lower likelihood of vaccine development but not drug development
Model hydraulic breakwater studies : preliminary report by Christopher M Snyder( Book )
4 editions published in 1957 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Communication in vertical markets experimental evidence by Claudia Möllers( Book )
5 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstream firms, it may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the upstream firm to chat privately with each downstream firm reduces total offered quantity from near the Cournot level (observed in the absence of communication) halfway toward the monopoly level. Allowing all three firms to chat together openly results in complete monopolization. Downstream firms obtain such a bargaining advantage from open communication that all of the gains from monopolizing the market accrue to them. A simple structural model of Nash bargaining fits the pattern of shifting surpluses well. We conclude with a discussion of the antitrust implications of open communication in vertical markets
An empirical study of pricing strategies in an online market with high-frequency price information by Sara Fisher Ellison( Book )
6 editions published between 2011 and 2014 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We study competition among a score of firms participating in an online market for a commodity computer component. Firms were able to adjust prices continuously; prices determined how the firms were ranked and listed (lowest price listed first), with better ranks contributing to firms’ sales. Using a year’s worth of hourly data for individual firms, we estimate a model of price adjustment, characterizing the factors driving price changes and measuring how much these factors differ across firms (i.e., strategy heterogeneity). We find evidence of managerial inattention as a cause of the price inertia observed in the market. Using separate estimates of the pricing model for groups of related firms, we simulate counterfactuals involving different mixes of these groups
Countervailing power in wholesale pharmaceuticals ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Why is there no AIDS vaccine? ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Special issue: Papers presented at the Second International Industrial Organization Conference held at the Northwestern University in Chicago, Illinois, April 23 - 24, 2004 by International Industrial Organization Conference( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
An empirical study of pricing strategies in an online market with high frequency price information by Sara Fisher Ellison( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
History of Fowler Presbyterian Church by Christopher M Snyder( Book )
1 edition published in 1923 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
"The following interesting story of the Fowler Presbyterian church was ready by Mrs. C. M. Snyder at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the congregation. The article not only tells of the foundation and growth of the Fowler church but gives some interesting early history of Fowler."
Open access as a crude solution to a hold-up problem in the two-sided market for academic journals by Mark J McCabe( Book )
3 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The move from traditional to open-access journals-which charge no subscription fees, only submission fees-is gaining support in academia. We analyze a two-sided-market model in which journals cannot commit to subscription fees when authors (who prefer low subscription fees because this boosts readership) make submission decisions. This leads to a hold-up problem, manifested as excessive subscription fees. Open access is a crude attempt to avoid hold up by eliminating subscription fees. We compare the efficiency and profitability of traditional versus open access under various market structures (monopoly, Bertrand competition) and extensions (non-profit journals, bundling, hybrid pricing), using our theoretical findings to understand the evolution of the market for academic journals in the Internet age
Costs of managerial attention and activity as a source of sticky prices : structural estimates from an online market by Sara Fisher Ellison( Book )
1 edition published in 2016 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
We study price dynamics for computer components sold on a price-comparison website. Our fine-grained data -- a year of hourly price data for scores of rival retailers -- allow us to estimate a dynamic model of competition, backing out structural estimates of managerial frictions. The estimated frictions are substantial, concentrated in the act of monitoring market conditions rather than entering a new price. We use our model to simulate the counterfactual gains from automated price setting and other managerial changes. Coupled with supporting reduced-form statistical evidence, our analysis provides a window into the process of managerial price setting and the microfoundation of pricing inertia, issues of growing interest in industrial organization and macroeconomics. Keywords: sticky prices; managerial costs; dynamic structural estimation; ecommerce, JEL Codes: L11, C73, D21, L81
 
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Alternative Names
Snyder, C. M.
Snyder, Christopher
Languages
English (127)
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