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Moser, Petra

Overview
Works: 23 works in 36 publications in 2 languages and 163 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author, Thesis advisor, Editor
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Petra Moser
Publications by Petra Moser
Most widely held works by Petra Moser
Do patent pools encourage innovation? : evidence from the 19th-century sewing machine industry by Ryan L Lampe( Book )
7 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Members of a patent pool agree to use a set of patents as if they were jointly owned by all members and license them as a package to other firms. Regulators favor pools as a means to encourage innovation: Pools are expected to reduce litigation risks for their members and lower license fees and transactions costs for other firms. This paper uses the example of the first patent pool in U.S. history, the Sewing Machine Combination (1856-1877) to perform the first empirical test of the effects of a patent pool on innovation. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the sewing machine pool appears to have discouraged patenting and innovation, in particular for the members of the pool. Data on stitches per minute, as an objectively quantifiable measure of innovation, confirm these findings. Innovation for both members and outside firms slowed as soon as the pool had been established and resumed only after it had dissolved
Zeitlich hochaufgelöste emissionsspektroskopische Untersuchung des Verbrennungsvorgangs im Otto-Motor by Petra Möser( Book )
1 edition published in 1995 in German and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Regeneration and utilization of Faidherbia albida and Acacia erioloba along ephemeral rivers of Namibia by Petra Moser( Book )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from 20 U.S. Industries under the New Deal by Ryan L Lampe( Book )
4 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Patent pools, which allow competing firms to combine their patents, have emerged as a prominent mechanism to resolve litigation when multiple firms own patents for the same technology. This paper takes advantage of a window of regulatory tolerance under the New Deal to investigate the effects of pools on innovation within 20 industries. Difference-in-differences regressions imply a 16 percent decline in patenting in response to the creation of a pool. This decline is driven by technology fields in which a pool combined patents for substitute technologies by competing firms, suggesting that unregulated pools may discourage innovation by weakening competition to improve substitutes -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Patent Laws and Innovation Evidence from Economic History by Petra Moser( Book )
4 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
What is the optimal system of intellectual property rights to encourage innovation? Empirical evidence from economic history can help to inform important policy questions that have been difficult to answer with modern data: 1) Does the existence of strong patent laws encourage innovation? And 2) May patent laws influence the direction - as opposed to the rate - of technical change? Economic history can also help to shed light on the effectiveness of policy tools that are intended to address problems with the current patent system: 3) How do patent pools, as a mechanism to mitigate litigation risks, influence the creation of new technologies? 4) Will compulsory licensing, as a mechanism to improve access to essential innovations in developing countries, discourage innovation in the developing countries? This essay summarizes results of existing research and highlights promising areas for future research -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Prinzessin (N)Immerfroh : [ein Erlebnismärchen] ( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in German and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Taste-based discrimination : empirical evidence from a shock to preferences during WWI by Petra Moser( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Kritik der Kindheit Eine Apologie des 'pädagogischen Eros' by Gustav Wyneken( Book )
1 edition published in 2015 in German and held by 2 libraries worldwide
The law and economics of generic drug regulation by Christopher Scott Hemphill( file )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
This dissertation examines the law and economics of generic drug entry, and the problems that arise from specific U.S. regulatory arrangements that govern innovation and competition in the market for patented pharmaceuticals. As Chapter 1 explains, competitive entry by generic drug makers is limited by both patents and industry-specific regulation, which together provide the means for brand-name drug makers to avoid competition and thereby recoup large investments in research, development, and testing. At the same time, the complex rules of the Hatch-Waxman Act furnish a pathway by which generic drug makers may challenge the validity or scope of brand-name patents, with a view to entering the market with a competing product prior to patent expiration. The subsequent chapters examine several aspects of the competitive interaction between brand-name and generic drug makers. Chapter 2 analyzes settlements of patent litigation between brand-name and generic drug makers, in which the brand-name firm pays the generic firm in exchange for delayed market entry. Such pay-for-delay settlements are an important, unresolved question in U.S. antitrust policy. The analysis reveals that the pay-for-delay settlement problem is more severe than has been commonly understood. Several specific features of the Act--in particular, a 180-day bounty granted to certain generic drug makers as an incentive to pursue pre-expiration entry--widen the potential for anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay settlements, compared to the usual understanding. In addition, I show that settlements are "innovation inefficient" as a means of providing profits and hence ex ante innovation incentives to brand-name drug makers. To the extent that Congress established a preferred tradeoff between innovation and competition when it passed the Act, settlements that implement a different, less competition-protective tradeoff are particularly problematic from an antitrust standpoint. Chapter 3 synthesizes available public information about pay-for-delay settlements in order to offer a new account of the extent and evolution of settlement practice. The analysis draws upon a novel dataset of 143 such settlements. The analysis uncovers an evolution in the means by which a brand-name firm can pay a generic firm to delay entry, including a variety of complex "side deals" by which a brand-name firm can compensate a generic firm in a disguised fashion. It also reveals several novel forms of regulatory avoidance. The analysis in the chapter suggests that, as a matter of institutional choice, an expert agency is in a relatively good position to conduct the aggregate analysis needed to identify an optimal antitrust rule. Chapter 4 examines the co-evolution of increased brand-name patenting and increased generic pre-expiration challenges. It draws upon a second novel dataset of drug approvals, applications, patents, and other drug characteristics. Its first contribution is to chart the growth of patent portfolios and pre-expiration challenges. Over time, patenting has increased, measured by the number of patents per drug and the length of the nominal patent term. During the same period, challenges have increased as well, and drugs are challenged sooner, relative to brand-name approval. The analysis shows that brand-name sales, a proxy for the profitability of the drug, have a positive effect on the likelihood of generic challenge, consistent with the view that patents that later prove to be valuable receive greater ex post scrutiny. The likelihood of challenge also varies by patent type and timing of expiration. Conditional on sales and other drug characteristics, drugs with weaker patents, particularly those that expire later than a drug's basic compound patent, face a significantly higher likelihood of challenge. Though the welfare implications of Hatch-Waxman patent challenge provisions are complicated, these results suggest these challenges serve a useful purpose, in promoting scrutiny of low quality and late-expiring patents
Patent pools licensing strategies in the absence of regulation by Ryan Lampe( Article )
1 edition published in 2012 in Undetermined and held by 1 library worldwide
Essays in health economics and industrial organization by Paul Evan Wong( file )
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
This dissertation presents three essays in health economics and industrial organization. In the first essay, titled "Entry and Long-Run Market Structure in Nongroup Health Insurance, " I examine why there are many highly concentrated markets for nongroup (individual) health insurance in the United States. I do this by estimating a static model of entry, with which I show two results. First, incumbent insurers attract disproportionately high market share but do not get a disproportionate share of the most profitable consumers via underwriting (screening). Due to their high market share, they partially deter entry by other more marginal insurers, contributing to high market concentration. Second, rural areas have low population, unprofitable demographics (low-income, high disease incidence), and higher fixed costs of entry (isolated, few physicians). All three confluent factors at once cause rural areas to face significantly more market concentration than others. I use the estimated model to simulate the long-run changes in market concentration under the Affordable Care Act. Most urban areas face a decline in market concentration, but most rural areas - which were already highly concentrated - face an increase in market concentration. In the second essay, titled "Competition and Innovation: Did Monsanto's Entry Encourage Innovation in GMO Crops?, " I examine the relationship between competition and innovation using Monsanto's entry into agricultural biotechnology. In 1996, Monsanto - then a chemical firm - bought a plant breeder that had developed a new corn hybrid, which could withstand Monsanto's powerful herbicide Roundup. Due to the pre-existing structure of the US plant-breeding industry, this acquisition and Monsanto's acquisition of five other corn breeders meant that Monsanto had also entered soy breeding, in addition to corn. As a result, the market structure of soy breeding shifted from a quasi monopoly (by Pioneer Hi-Bred) to a duopoly with a competitive fringe. At the same time, Monsanto's acquisitions created no significant change in the market structure for other crops, such as wheat or cotton. Using new data on field trials, I study the effects of these changes on innovation. These data indicate that Pioneer and the competitive fringe innovated less in response to Monsanto's entry. Data on patent applications, however, indicate that Pioneer and the competitive fringe patented more after Monsanto entered. In the third essay, titled "Studying State-Level Variation in Nongroup Health Insurance Regulation: Insurers' Incentives to Screen Consumers, " I compare different state-level regulations for nongroup (individual) health insurance, and I use the comparison to show how regulation may affect insurers' incentives to screen and reject high-cost consumers. The study is possible because of historical variation in regulation - various states instituted high-risk pool (HRP), community rating (CR), and guaranteed issue (GI) regulation in the 1990s. I compare rejections of individual insurance applications across the different regulatory regimes. Rejections do not decline under HRP regulation. Historically, HRPs have generated little change to demand for private nongroup insurance among high-cost consumers, leaving underwriting (i.e. screening) unchanged. CR by itself (without GI) increases rejections. Insurers have a stronger incentive to underwrite when it is allowed but pricing is restricted. GI (with CR) decreases rejections, but they are not fully eliminated - a non-zero fraction of consumers are still rejected. Insurers face substantial incentive to screen consumers, which may outweigh the implicit cost of screening that regulation imposes. In light of insurers' behavior under these three regulations, future policy should decrease insurers' incentives to screen consumers. This reduces wasted resources devoted to underwriting
Pflege von Menschen mit Hemiplegie ( visu )
1 edition published in 1988 in Undetermined and held by 1 library worldwide
Fremdwährungskredite : Quo Vadis? by Petra Moser( Book )
1 edition published in 2007 in German and held by 1 library worldwide
Essays in the economics of education and innovation by Nicola Bianchi( file )
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
This dissertation contains three essays on the economics of education and innovation. In the first essay, I study the effects of increased access to higher education by examining a dramatic 1961 Italian reform that increased university enrollment in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields by more than 200 percent in a few years. The peculiar features of the reform allow me to identify students who were unaffected, directly affected, and indirectly affected. They also allow me to identify key channels through which the effects ran. Using data I collected from tax returns and hand-written transcripts on more than 27,000 students, I show that the direct effects of the reform were as intended: many more students enrolled and many more obtained degrees. However, I also find that those induced to enroll earned no more than students in earlier cohorts who were denied access to university. I reconcile these surprising results by showing that the education expansion reduced returns to skill and lowered university learning through congestion and peer effects. I also demonstrate that apparently inframarginal students were significantly affected: the most able of them abandoned STEM majors rather than accept lower returns and lower human capital. The promotion of STEM education, realized by inducing more students to enroll in university STEM majors, might have large positive externalities by fostering the production of innovation. In the second essay (joint work with Michela Giorcelli), we use the 1961 Italian reform of college admissions as a positive shock to the amount of STEM workers in the economy. We isolate the effect of the policy on invention using a variety of techniques. At the individual level, we link the school and income data of students that were in school around the policy implementation with information on each Italian patent that they owned or developed. At the national level, we exploit differential increases of STEM skills in municipalities that were at varying distance from a STEM school. In both cases, we do not find strong evidence that easier access to university STEM majors led to higher level of patenting. In the third essay (joint work with Joerg Baten and Petra Moser), we investigate whether compulsory licensing - which allows governments to license patents with- out the consent of patent-owners - discourages invention. Our analysis exploits new historical data on German patents to examine the effects of compulsory licensing under the US Trading-with-the-Enemy Act on invention in Germany. We find that compulsory licensing was associated with a 28 percent increase in invention. Historical evidence indicates that, as a result of war-related demands, fields with licensing were negatively selected, so that OLS estimates may underestimate the positive effects of compulsory licensing on future inventions
Freiraumgestaltung der Vogelmühle bei Waiblingen by Petra Moser( Book )
1 edition published in 1988 in German and held by 1 library worldwide
Prizes and the publication of ideas by Petra Moser( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
We examine whether prizes encourage innovation and, if so, how. We compare changes in U.S. patents per year for technology areas where U.S. inventors won prizes for exceptional innovations at the World's Fair in London in 1851 with technology areas where U.S. inventors exhibited but did not win a prize. We also compare changes in technology areas for inventions that were advertised in 1851 as lead articles in the Scientific American, a major science journal of the time. We find comparable increases in invention after 1851 through prizes and publication relative to other U.S. technologies. Since the signaling component of a World's Fair prize was replicated through publication of an invention in the Scientific American, our results suggest that publicity for promising research fields is an important mechanism by which prizes encourage innovation
Lokale Agenda 21 Stadt Esslingen, Untersuchung zu den Fahrradparkmöglichkeiten am Esslinger Bahnhof by Anne Faßbender( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in German and held by 1 library worldwide
Essays in public and labor economics by Frédéric Panier( file )
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
This thesis is composed of three empirical papers in the field of labor and public economics. The first paper uses historical data from the New-York Stock Exchange to investigate the importance of ethnic discrimination, ethnic networks and ethnic homophily in the field of finance. The second paper studies the role of parental insurance on the job search behavior of new entrants in the labor market. It also uses parental shocks around the time of the child's entry into the labor force as an instrument to test for the existence of persistent effects from a temporary increase in job search effort at the beginning of a worker's career. The third paper takes advantage of an important tax reform that took place in Belgium in 2006 to answer a longstanding question in the field of public economics and corporate finance: what is the role of corporate taxes in determining the observed levels of leverage among incorporated firms
Essays on international and innovation economics by Lisa Kamran Bilir( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
This dissertation examines the influence of intellectual property institutions on cross-border economic activity. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the investment strategies of multinational firms in the presence of intellectual property risk. Chapter 3 examines the impact of patent treaties on international technology transfer. In Chapter 1, I develop a theoretical model of multinational firms' location and production decisions in the presence of cross-country differences in intellectual property rights and cross-sector differences in the length of product lifecycles. I show that patent reforms are irrelevant to firms' sourcing decisions in industries with rapid product turnover. By contrast, strong patent laws attract affiliate activity in industries with longer product lifecycles, because products in these industries are more likely to be imitated prior to obsolescence and are thus more reliant on patent enforcement to protect revenues. These effects are more pronounced for less-productive firms. Using comprehensive panel data on the sales, assets, and employment of U.S. multinationals and their affiliates abroad and a new measure of product obsolescence, I find robust empirical support for these predictions. Effects are significant along all margins of multinational activity, including multinational presence by country and sector, total affiliate sales conditional on presence, the number of affiliates, and affiliate-level sales. In addition, I find that stronger patent rights tilt the balance of cross-border activity away from exports and toward multinational activity. Finally, my identification strategy allows me to isolate the causal effect of patent reforms on multinational operations, which the prior literature has struggled to establish because of concurrent policy reforms. In Chapter 2, I develop a theory of global supply chains in the presence of imitation risk, where sectors vary in fragmentation costs and product obsolescence rates. The model provides detailed predictions regarding the sensitivity of multinationals' offshoring decisions to intellectual property rights abroad. In particular, when intellectual property rights abroad are strengthened, firms are found to increase the technology intensity and level of offshoring, with the largest effects in sectors with high fragmentation costs. Similar to Chapter 1, these effects are also larger in sectors with long product lifecycles. In addition, the model predicts that each firm determines the number of offshore countries involved in its supply chain based on a simple trade-off: on one hand, fragmentation allows the firm to better protect its intellectual property, but on the other hand, fragmentation generates increasing coordination costs. Chapter 3 examines the influence of the Paris Convention of 1883, the first international patent treaty, on the flow of patented technologies across countries; this chapter is co-authored with Petra Moser. U.S. accession to the Convention in 1887 strengthened patent protection for nationals from current treaty members, but had no effect on the patent rights of non-members. Data on over 86,000 U.S. patents granted between 1865 and 1914 indicate that strengthened intellectual property rights encouraged inventors from member countries to increase patenting in the United States, relative to inventors from non-member countries. The data also reveal that stronger intellectual property rights had the most significant effects on technology transfer from member countries with high pre-treaty levels of education and per-capita income. In addition, responsiveness to the Paris Convention was higher in industries that were more dependent on patent protection compared with industries that were less dependent on patents
Spatial Errors in Count Data Regressions by Marinho Bertanha( file )
2 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
Count data regressions are an important tool for empirical analyses ranging from analyses of patent counts to measures of health and unemployment. Along with negative binomial, Poisson panel regressions are a preferred method of analysis because the Poisson conditional fixed effects maximum likelihood estimator (PCFE) and its sandwich variance estimator are consistent even if the data are not Poisson-distributed, or if the data are correlated over time. Analyses of counts may be affected by correlation in the cross-section. For example, patent counts or publications may increase across related research fields in response to common shocks. This paper shows that the PCFE and its sandwich variance estimator are consistent in the presence of such dependence in the cross-section - as long as spatial dependence is time-invariant. In addition to the PCFE, this result also applies to the commonly used Logit model of panel data with fixed effects. We develop a test for time-invariant spatial dependence and provide code in STATA and MATLAB to implement the test
 
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English (25)
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