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Schipper, Burkhard C.

Overview
Works: 63 works in 111 publications in 1 language and 151 library holdings
Roles: Author
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Publications about Burkhard C Schipper
Publications by Burkhard C Schipper
Most widely held works by Burkhard C Schipper
Bounded perception in economic interactions by Burkhard C Schipper( Book )
5 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 38 libraries worldwide
Ambiguity and social interaction by Jürgen Eichberger( Book )
13 editions published between 2003 and 2007 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements
Imitators and optimizers in cournot oligopoly by Burkhard C Schipper( Computer File )
6 editions published between 2002 and 2005 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output. Firms are allowed to make mistakes and deviate from the decision rules with a small probability. Applying stochastic stability analysis, we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better off than are optimizers. This finding appears to be robust even when optimizers are more sophisticated. It suggests that imitators drive optimizers out of the market contradicting a fundamental conjecture by Friedman (1953)
A canonical model for interactive unawareness by Aviad Heifetz( file )
8 editions published between 2003 and 2007 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2005) introduced a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of knowledge. We show that this generalized state-space model arises naturally if states consist of maximally consistent sets of formulas in an appropriate logical formulation
Rage against the machines how subjects learn to play against computers ( Computer File )
4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment
Unawareness, beliefs and games by Aviad Heifetz( Computer File )
3 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized 'No-trade' theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the 'No-agreeing-to-disagree' theorem
Unbeatable imitation by Peter Duersch( Computer File )
3 editions published between 2010 and 2012 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent. -- Imitate-the-best ; learning ; symmetric games ; relative payoffs ; zero-sum games ; rock-paper-scissors ; finite population ESS ; potential games ; quasisubmodular games ; quasisupermodular games ; quasiconcave games ; aggregative games
Interactive unawareness and speculative trade ( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Speculative trade under unawareness : the infinite case by Martin Meier( file )
3 editions published between 2010 and 2014 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We generalize the ``No-speculative-trade" theorem for finite unawareness belief structures in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) to the infinite case
Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers ( Book )
3 editions published between 2005 and 2010 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Can you guess the game you're playing? By Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper by Jörg Oechssler( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism and complete ignorance by Burkhard C Schipper( file )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility. Our Choquet expected utility model allows for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist (resp. pessimist) overweights good (resp. bad) outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents' change of actions. With qualifications we show that optimistic (resp. pessimistic) complete ignorance is evolutionary stable / yields a strategic advantage in submodular (resp. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of games
Sex hormones and competitive bidding by Burkhard Schipper( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2012 and 2014 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We correlate competitive bidding and profits in symmetric independent private value first-price auctions with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol in more than 200 subjects. Females bid significantly higher and earn significantly lower profits than males. Moreover, females on hormonal contraceptives bid significantly higher and earn significantly lower profits than males. Bids are significantly positively correlated and profits are significantly negatively correlated with salivary progesterone when controlling for gender, the use of hormonal contraceptives, and demographics. This also applies to the female but not to the male subsamples separately. It especially applies to naturally cycling females not using hormonal contraceptives and to females in the luteal phase of their natural menstrual cycle when progesterone usually peaks. Surprisingly, we have null findings for testosterone as well as estradiol and cortisol. Controlling for risk aversion does not diminish our positive finding for progesterone. Yet, we show that our finding may be due to subjects with imprudent bidding behavior (i.e., weakly dominated bids). -- Hormones ; Testosterone ; Estradiol ; Progesterone ; Cortisol ; Steroids ; Auctions ; Gender ; Competition ; Aggression ; Dominance ; Risk-taking ; Endocrinological economics
Unawareness, beliefs and speculative trade by Aviad Heifetz( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2009 and 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized "No-trade" theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the "No-agreeing-to-disagree" theorem. -- Unawareness ; awareness ; zero probability ; type-space ; common prior ; agreement ; speculative trade ; interactive epistemology
Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection by Martin Meier( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2012 and 2013 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness
Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior by Aviad Heifetz( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2009 and 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance. -- Unawareness ; extensive-form games ; extensive-form rationalizability ; prudent rationalizability ; iterative conditional dominance
Pure saddle points and symmetric relative payoff games by Peter Duersch( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further suffiient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies. -- Symmetric two-player games ; zero-sum games ; Rock-Paper-Scissors ; single-peakedness ; quasiconcavity ; finite population evolutionary stable strategy ; increasing differences ; decreasing differences ; potentials ; additive separability
Granny versus game theorst : ambiguity in experimental games ( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions
Cournot competition between teams : an experimental study ( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2004 and 2007 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that team-firms and individual firms are behaviorally equivalent. This provides a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments, which is in contrast to experimental results on price competition
 
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Alternative Names
Schipper, B. C. 1973-
Schipper, Burkhard C. 1973-
Languages
English (67)
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