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Schipper, Burkhard

Overview
Works: 49 works in 77 publications in 1 language and 111 library holdings
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Burkhard Schipper
Publications by Burkhard Schipper
Most widely held works by Burkhard Schipper
Bounded perception in economic interactions by Burkhard C Schipper( Book )
5 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 34 libraries worldwide
Ambiguity and social interaction by Jürgen Eichberger( Book )
7 editions published between 2003 and 2007 in English and held by 13 libraries worldwide
Ambiguity and social interaction ( Computer File )
5 editions published between 2003 and 2007 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers ( Book )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Unbeatable imitation by Peter Duersch( Computer File )
3 editions published between 2010 and 2012 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent. -- Imitate-the-best ; learning ; symmetric games ; relative payoffs ; zero-sum games ; rock-paper-scissors ; finite population ESS ; potential games ; quasisubmodular games ; quasisupermodular games ; quasiconcave games ; aggregative games
Interactive unawareness by Aviad Heifetz( Book )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers ( Computer File )
3 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment
Cournot competition between teams : an experimental study ( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2004 and 2007 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that team-firms and individual firms are behaviorally equivalent. This provides a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments, which is in contrast to experimental results on price competition
Unawareness, Beliefs and Games by Aviad Heifetz( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized No-tradeʺ theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the No-agreeing-to-disagreeʺ theorem
Once beaten, never again: imitation in two-player potential games by Peter Dürsch( file )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Pure saddle points and symmetric relative payoff games by Peter Duersch( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further suffiient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies. -- Symmetric two-player games ; zero-sum games ; Rock-Paper-Scissors ; single-peakedness ; quasiconcavity ; finite population evolutionary stable strategy ; increasing differences ; decreasing differences ; potentials ; additive separability
Can you guess the game you're playing? By Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper by Jörg Oechssler( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding by Matthew Pearson( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2009 and 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles. We find that women bid significantly higher than men in their menstrual and premenstrual phase but do not bid significantly different in other phases of the menstrual cycle. We suggest an evolutionary hypothesis according to which women are genetically predisposed by hormones to generally behave more riskily during their fertile phase of their menstrual cycle in order to increase the probability of conception, quality of offspring, and genetic variety. It is in contrast to results by Chen, Katuscak and Ozdenoren (2005, 2009). -- Hormones ; menstrual cycle ; gender ; likelihood of conception ; first price auction ; risk behavior ; competition ; bidding ; endocrinological economics
Unawareness, beliefs and speculative trade by Aviad Heifetz( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2009 and 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized "No-trade" theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the "No-agreeing-to-disagree" theorem. -- Unawareness ; awareness ; zero probability ; type-space ; common prior ; agreement ; speculative trade ; interactive epistemology
A canonical model for interactive unawareness ( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2005) introduced a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of knowledge. We show that this generalized state-space model arises naturally if states consist of maximally consistent sets of formulas in an appropriate logical formulation
Granny versus game theorst : ambiguity in experimental games ( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions
Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior by Aviad Heifetz( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2009 and 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance. -- Unawareness ; extensive-form games ; extensive-form rationalizability ; prudent rationalizability ; iterative conditional dominance
Once beaten, never again : imitation in two-player potential games by Peter Duersch( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. -- Imitate-the-best ; learning ; exact potential games ; symmetric games ; relative payoffs ; zero-sum games
How mindless is standard economics really? by Burkhard C Schipper( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Contrary to claims by Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), I show that standard economics makes use of non-choice evidence in a meaningful way. This is because standard economics solely grounded in the theory of choice is "incomplete". That is, it has content that can not be revealed with any general choice procedure. -- Revealed preference ; theory of choice ; neuroeconomics ; non-choice evidence ; machines
Imitators and optimizers in cournot oligopoly ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Schipper, B. C. 1973-
Schipper, Burkhard C. 1973-
Languages
English (48)
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