| Contents: |
The importance of the initial failures in grand strategy and strategic assessment: the background to the effort to create effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces -- The growth and character of the insurgent threat -- Coalition training and equipment efforts: the failures of 2003 -- Failing to deliver and adequate training and equipment program through the tenure of the CPA and mid-2004 -- The fall of 2004: the effort to train Iraqi military, security, and police forces slowly begins to gather momentum -- The status of Iraqi forces in November 2004 -- End of 2004 as a benchmark: trends in the progress of Iraqi security and military forces in December 2004 -- The run up to elections: Iraqi security and military forces in January 2005 -- Iraqi military and security forces in the spring and summer of 2005 -- The Iraqi view of Iraq's emerging forces -- The evolving nature of the insurgency and the risk of sectarian and ethnic conflict -- Building the future -- Chronology of events involving Iraqi security forces. |
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