Selten, Reinhard

Overview

Works:	388 works in 891 publications in 5 languages and 7,440 library holdings
Genres:	Conference papers and proceedings Academic theses
Roles:	Author, Editor, Honoree, Contributor, Collector, Other, Translator, Author of introduction, Creator, Interviewee
Classifications:	H61, 519.3

Publication Timeline

Most widely held works about Reinhard Selten

Nobel Laureate John Harsanyi : from Budapest to Berkeley, 1920-2000 by John C Harsanyi( Book )
John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., Reinhard Selten, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling( )
Ehrenpromotion des Herrn Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Reinhard Selten der Universität Bonn zum Doktor der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften( Book )
The Selten school of behavioral economics a collection of essays in honor of Reinhard Selten by Abdolkarim Sadrieh( Book )
Witness Seminar on Experimental Economics records by Andrej Svorenčik( )

Eight get the call to Stockholm by Robert Pool( Book )
Three essays on equilibrium selection in games by Jeong Hun Oh( )

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Most widely held works by Reinhard Selten

Bounded rationality : the adaptive toolbox by Reinhard Selten( )

30 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in 3 languages and held by 2,071 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Report of the 84th Dahlem Workshop on Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, Berlin, March 14-19, 1999"--Page ii. Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Economics lab : an intensive course in experimental economics by Daniel Friedman( )

18 editions published between 2004 and 2009 in English and held by 604 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The new field of experimental economics has come of age, as signaled by the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics. Laboratory experiments with human subjects now provide crucial data in most fields of economics. This textbook introduces the world of experimental economics. Contributors including Reinhard Selten and Axel Leijonhufvud add to a book that sketches the history of experimental economics before moving on to describe how to set up an economics experiment and to survey selected applications and the latest methods. This user-friendly book demonstrates how students can use the lessons to conduct original research. With their freeflowing, discursive yet precise style Friedman and Cassar have created a book that will be essential to students of experimental economics across the world. On account of its authoritative content, Economics Lab will also find its way onto the bookshelves of leading researchers in all fields of economics"--Back cover

A general theory of equilibrium selection in games by John C Harsanyi( Book )

28 editions published between 1982 and 2003 in 3 languages and held by 510 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

General equilibrium with price-making firms by Thomas A Marschak( Book )

19 editions published in 1974 in English and German and held by 406 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Motivation. That elegant fiction the competitive equilibrium seems still to dominate the frontiers of theoretical microeconomics. We may think of it in a general way as a state of affairs wherein economic agents, responding "rationally" to annoWlced prices, make choices which are consistent and feasible. The prices may also be described as "taken": for one reason or another the agents who respond to them consider them as given. The existence of such a state, its optimality, its robustness against free bargaining among agents when there are many of them, its Wliqueness, its stability when price displacements evoke specified adjustments--all these issues have been studied, and continue to be studied in a variety of settings. Slowly the equilibrium investigated begins to incorporate public goods, externalities of certain kinds, differences in agents' information, and infinitely many time periods. The appeal of such results need not be belabored: the equilibrium studied may sustain an optimal resource allocation, and when it does it sus tains it in a manner that appears to be informationally efficient and to accord well with individual incentives. Therefore it is important to extend the circumstances under which an equilibrium exists, under which it sustains opti mality, and under which it survives displacements as well as free bargaining among agents

Models of strategic rationality by Reinhard Selten( Book )

21 editions published between 1987 and 2016 in 3 languages and held by 299 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The papers collected in this volume relate to game theory. They aim at the elaboration and discussion of basic con cepts, at the analysis of specific applied models and at the evaluation of experimental evidence. A game is a mathematical model of a situation where several actors with different goals are engaged in strategic inter action. Game theory explores the nature and the consequence. s of rational behavior in games. With respect to several papers in this volume, it seems to be appropriate to comment on later developments. A list of some important references is given at the end of the intro duction. References already included in the collected pa pers are not repeated here. In casual conversation colleagues sometimes observe that the author on the one hand goes to extremes in the elabora tion of the consequences of Bayesian rationality and on the other hand strongly emphasizes the limited rationality of actual decision behavior. This seeming discrepancy is also expressed in the collection presented here. The author thinks that a sharp distinction should be made between nor ~ative and descriptive game theory. This position of "methodological dualism" has been expressed in a comment to Aumann's paper "What is game theory trying to accomplish?" (Aumann, 1985, Selten 1985) Normative game theory has the important task to explore the nature and the consequences of idealized full rationality in strategic interaction. This requires a thorough discuss ion of first principles. Empirical arguments are irrelevant here

Rational interaction : essays in honor of John C. Harsanyi by Reinhard Selten( Book )

13 editions published between 1992 and 2010 in English and German and held by 263 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The unifying theme of the 23 contributions to this book is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John C. Harsanyi on game theory, social choice, and the philosophy of science finds an echo in these essays. Contributions by well known game theorists and economists present a great variety of stimulating theoretical investigations. Part I contains six papers on non-cooperative game theory written by Maschler, Owen, Myerson, Peleg, Rosenmüller, Hart and Mas-Collel. Part II with three contributions by Kalei, Samet, van Damme, d'Aspremont, and Gérard-Varet is devoted to the use of non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of problems of mechanism design. Basic questions of non-cooperative game theory are discussed in three essays by Güth, Hardin, and Sugden in Part III. Applied game models are discussed in three papers by Friedman, Selten, and Shubik in Part IV. Problems of social choice are investigated in Part V which deals with utilitarianism and related topics in five contributions by Hammond, Binmore, Arrow, Roemer, and Broome. Finally, Part VI contains three papers: an interdisciplinary comparison of physics and economics by Samuelson, a methodological essay by Brock, and an appraisal of the work of John C. Harsanyi

Bounded rational behavior in experimental games and markets : proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, Bielefeld, West Germany, September 21-25, 1986 by Reinhard Tietz( Book )

14 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 247 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The book reports on recent experimental research on expectations and decision making in bargaining, markets, auctions, or coalition formation situations. The investi- gated topics deliver building stones for a bounded rational theory as an approach to explain behavior and interpersonal interactions in economic and social relationships

Game theory and economic behaviour : selected essays by Reinhard Selten( Book )

25 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 231 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Understanding strategic interaction : essays in honor of Reinhard Selten by Wulf Albers( Book )

11 editions published between 1996 and 2013 in English and German and held by 213 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten

Preispolitik der Mehrproduktenunternehmung in der statischen Theorie by Reinhard Selten( Book )

16 editions published in 1970 in 3 languages and held by 209 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

An dieser Stelle mochte ich Herrn Professor Dr. Heinz Sauermann, der mich zu der Abfassung dieser Arbeit ermun tert hat, fUr die mir erwiesene Forderung herzlich danken. Mein Dank gilt auch der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, die mich durch die Gewahrung eines Habilitationsstipendiums unterstiitzt hat. Ich bin Herrn Dr. Otwin Becker, Herrn Rein hard Tietz und Herrn Michael Klose dafUr zu Dank verpflich tet, daB sie das Manuskript vor seiner Veroffentlichung noch einmal durchgesehen haben. Ihnen und Herrn Professor Dr. Waldemar Wittmann verdanke ich einige wertvolle Hinweise. Nicht zuletzt gilt mein Dank auch meiner Frau, deren techni sche Hilfe mir unentbehrlich ist. Berlin, den 12. 1. 1970 REINHARD SELTEN Inhalt Einleitung. ... Grundlagen der Theorie des Mehrproduktenmonopols 12 1. 1 Das Grundmodell ... . 12 1. 2 Existenz und Eindeutigkeit des Optimums ... 13 1. 3 Nicht zunehmender Bi'mdelgrenzertrag und Kostenkonvexitat . 19 1. 4 Uberwiegen der unmittelbaren Preiswirkungen und eindeutige U mke- barkeit des Nachfragezusammenhangs 23 1. 5 Umsatzkonvexitat. ... 30 1. 6 Konvexitat des Mengenbereichs ... 32 2 Substitutionalitat und Komplementaritat 34 2. 1 Direkte Substitutionalitat und Komplementaritat der Nachfrage . 34 2. 2 Inverse Substitutionalitat und Komplementaritat der Nachfrage. 37 2. 3 Substitutionalitat und Komplementaritat der Kostenverbundenheit 40 3 Die Marginalbedingungen ... 43 3. 1 Die Marginalbedingungen zweiter Ordnung 43 3. 2 Das Problem des Randoptimums 45 3. 3 Die Marginalbedingungen erster Ordnung . 46 3. 4 Folgerungen aus den Marginalbedingungen erster Ordnung 49 3. 5 Zwei Zahlenbeispiele ... 52 4 Das linear-quadratische Modell 59 4. 1 Die Taylor-Interpretation des Modells 59 4

Human behaviour and traffic networks by Michael Schreckenberg( Book )

12 editions published between 2004 and 2011 in English and held by 188 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How do people behave in different traffic situations? Are there general laws for mathematical modelling of decision dynamics? The answers, given at the first international workshop on "Human Behaviour in Traffic Networks", are presented in this volume. In 13 articles, well-known experts report about their current work on experiments and modelling in this area. The topics range from psychological behaviour in traffic situations, traffic simulations of various aspects and market analysis to experiments with human participants used in experimental economics. The articles filled with many illustrations are aimed at interested students as well as experts in this field

Game theory and related approaches to social behavior : selections by Martin Shubik( Book )

7 editions published between 1964 and 1965 in German and held by 124 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Game equilibrium models by Reinhard Selten( Book )

20 editions published between 1991 and 2011 in English and Undetermined and held by 113 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored

Game equilibrium models by Reinhard Selten( )

19 editions published between 1991 and 2011 in 3 languages and held by 97 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi relatively predictable. No one could operate a stare, if potential consumers did not purcha. se, rather than stea!, the commodities offered to the public. No one would ma. ke a. ny investments other than those tha. t would be made by a solitary individual in an isolated setting (the cla. ssic Robinson Crusoe situation). One of the ways that individuals achieve predictability in social arrangements is to a. gree to follow a set of normative prescriptions a. bout what they must, must not, or may do. Agreeing to a set of prescriptions is relatively easy. Actually following those prescriptions over time when temptations arise offering potentially high payoffs, is not at all easy. In natural settings, individUala follow agreed upon prescriptions to a greater or lesser extent depending on enforcement levels. A frequent assumption made by policy ana. lysts a. nd game theorists is tha. t enforcement is externa! to the situa. tion under analysis. That a

Game equilibrium models by Reinhard Selten( Book )

14 editions published between 1991 and 2011 in English and Undetermined and held by 89 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed

Handwörterbuch der mathematischen Wirtschaftswissenschaften by Martin J Beckmann( Book )

9 editions published in 1979 in German and Multiple languages and held by 83 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Selten school of behavioral economics a collection of essays in honor of Reinhard Selten by Abdolkarim Sadrieh( Book )

4 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 80 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Reinhard Selten, to date the only German Nobel Prize laureate in economics, celebrates his 80th birthday in 2010. While his contributions to game theory are well-known, the behavioral side of his scientific work has received less public exposure, even though he has been committed to experimental research during his entire career, publishing more experimental than theoretical papers in top-tier journals. This Festschrift is dedicated to Reinhard Selten's exceptional influence on behavioral and experimental economics. In this collection of academic highlight papers, a number of his students are joined by leading scholars in experimental research to document the historical role of the "Meister" in the development of the research methodology and of several sub-fields of behavioral economics. Next to the academic insight in these highly active fields of experimental research, the papers also provide a glance at Reinhard Selten's academic and personal interaction with his students and peers"--Publisher

Game equilibrium models by Reinhard Selten( Book )

15 editions published in 1991 in 3 languages and held by 64 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games

Bewertung von n-Personenspielen by Reinhard Selten( )

8 editions published in 1961 in German and held by 62 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Entscheidungen in kleinen Gruppen by Wulf Albers( Book )

5 editions published in 1979 in German and held by 56 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

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