WorldCat Identities

Holmström, Bengt

Works: 37 works in 169 publications in 3 languages and 2,485 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author, Editor
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Bengt Holmström
Inside and outside liquidity by Bengt Holmström( )

20 editions published between 2011 and 2013 in English and Spanish and held by 1,764 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Why do financial institutions, industrial companies, and households hold low-yielding money balances, Treasury bills, and other liquid assets? When and to what extent can the state and international financial markets make up for a shortage of liquid assets, allowing agents to save and share risk more effectively? These questions are at the center of all financial crises, including the current global one. In Inside and Outside Liquidity, leading economists Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole offer an original, unified perspective on these questions drawing on insights from modern corporate finance. In a slight, but important departure from the standard theory of finance, they show how imperfect pledgeability of corporate income leads to a demand for as well as a shortage of liquidity with interesting implications for the pricing of assets, investment decisions, and liquidity management. The government has an active role to play in improving risk-sharing between consumers with limited commitment power and firms dealing with the high costs of potential liquidity shortages. In this perspective, private risk sharing is always imperfect and may lead to financial crises that can be alleviated through government interventions. In an epilogue, Holmstrom and Tirole show how their theory can be used to understand some aspects of the recent financial crisis"--Jacket
LAPM : a liquidity-based asset pricing model by Bengt Holmström( Book )

15 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 121 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The intertemporal CAPM predicts that an asset's price is equal to the expectation of the product of the asset's payoff and a representative consum substitution. This paper develops an alternative approach to asset pricing based on industrial and financial corporations' desire to hoard liquidity to fulfill future cash needs. Our corporate finance a determinants of asset prices such as the distribution of wealth within the corporate sector and between the corporate sector and the consumers. Also, leverage ratios, capital adequacy requirements, and the composition of savings affect the corporate demand for li The paper first sets up a general model of corporate demand for liquid assets, and obtains an explicit formula for the associated liquidity permia. It then derives some implications of corporate liquidity demand for the equity premium puzzle, for the yield curve, and for the state-contingent volatility of asset prices. Finally, the paper looks at some macroeconomic implications of the theory. It shows that government may be able to boost aggregate liquidity and enhance economic efficiency by promoting job and asset price stability. On the liability side, long-term deposits and equity investments, which depend on the consumers' endogenously determined liquidity needs, contribute to creating a feedback effect between employment prospects and equity-like investments. On the asset side, orderly sales of real estate by liquidity-squeezed institutions may generate a Pareto improvement
Managerial incentive problems--a dynamic perspective by Bengt Holmström( Book )

14 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 106 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The paper studies how a person's concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job. In the model, the person's productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance. There are no explicit output contingent contracts, but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability, an implicit contact' links today's performance to future wages. An incentive problem arises from the person's ability and desire to influence the learning process, and therefore the wage process, by taking unobserved actions that affect today's performance. The fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual's concern for human capital returns and the firm's concern for financial returns. The two need to be only weakly related. It is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental, depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned
Private and public supply of liquidity by Bengt Holmström( Book )

16 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 104 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper addresses a basic yet unresolved question: Do claims on private assets provide sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of the productive sector? Or does the State have a role in creating liquidity and regulating it either through adjustments in the stock of government securities or by other means? In our model, firms can meet future liquidity needs in three ways: by issuing new claims and diluting old ones, by obtaining a credit credit line from a financial intermediary, and by holding claims on other firms. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, we show that these instruments are sufficient for attaining the socially optimal (second-best) contract between investors and firms. Such a contract imposes both a maximum leverage ratio and a liquidity constraint on firms. Intermediaries coordinate the use of liquidity. Without intermediation, scarce liquidity may be wasted and the social optimum may not be attainable. When there is only aggregate uncertainty the private sector is no longer self-sufficient with regard to liquidity. The government can improve liquidity by issuing bonds that commit future consumer income. Government bonds command a liquidity premium over private claims. The supply of liquidity can be managed by loosening liquidity (boosting the value of its securities) when the aggregate liquidity shock is high and tightening liquidity when the shock is low. The paper thus provides a microeconomic example of government supplied liquidity as well as of the possibility of active government policy
Corporate governance and merger activity in the U.S. : making sense of the 1980s and 1990s by Bengt Holmström( Book )

14 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 96 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper describes and considers explanations for changes in corporate governance and merger activity in the United States since 1980. Corporate governance in the 1980s was dominated by intense merger activity distinguished by the prevalence of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and hostility. After a brief decline in the early 1990s, substantial merger activity resumed in the second half of the decade, while LBOs and hostility did not. Instead, internal corporate governance mechanisms appear to have played a larger role in the 1990s. We conclude by considering whether these changes and the movement toward shareholder value are likely to be permanent
The state of U.S. corporate governance : what's right and what's wrong by Bengt Holmström( Book )

11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 95 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The U.S. corporate governance system has recently been heavily criticized, largely as a result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some other prominent companies. Those failures and criticisms, in turn, have served as catalysts for legislative change (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and regulatory change (new governance guidelines from the NYSE and NASDAQ). In this paper, we consider two questions. First, is it clear that the U.S. system has performed that poorly; is it really that bad? Second, will the changes lead to an improved U.S. corporate governance system? We first note that the broad evidence is not consistent with a failed U.S. system. The U.S. economy and stock market have performed well both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over the past two decades. And the U.S. stock market has continued to outperform other broad indices since the scandals broke. Our interpretation of the evidence is that while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system failed under the exceptional strain of the 1990s, the overall system, which includes oversight by the public and the government, reacted quickly to address the problems. We then consider the effects that the legislative, regulatory, and market responses are likely to have in the near future. Our assessment is that they are likely to make a good system better, though there is a danger of overreacting to extreme events
A theory of firm scope by Oliver D Hart( )

10 editions published between 2002 and 2008 in English and held by 59 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The existing literature on firms, based on incomplete contracts and property rights, emphasizes that the ownership of assets - and thereby firm boundaries - is determined in such a way as to encourage relationship-specific investments by the appropriate parties. It is generally accepted that this approach applies to owner-managed firms better than to large companies. In this paper, we attempt to broaden the scope of the property rights approach by developing a simple model with three key ingredients: (a) decision rights can be transferred ex ante through ownership, (b) managers (and possibly workers) enjoy private benefits that are non-transferable, and (c) owners can divert a firm's profit. In our basic model decisions are ex post non-contractible; in an extension we use the idea that contracts are reference points to relax this assumption. We show that firm boundaries matter. Nonintegrated firms fail to account for the external effects that their decisions have on other firms. An integrated firm can internalize such externalities, but it does not put enough weight on the private benefits of managers and workers. We explore this tradeoff in a model that focuses on the difficulties companies face in cooperating through the market if the benefits from cooperation are unevenly divided; therefore, they may sometimes end up merging. We show that the assumption that contracts are reference points introduces a friction that permits an analysis of delegation
Banks as secret keepers by Tri Vi Dang( )

5 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 37 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Banks are optimally opaque institutions. They produce debt for use as a transaction medium (bank money), which requires that information about the backing assets -- loans -- not be revealed, so that bank money does not fluctuate in value, reducing the efficiency of trade. This need for opacity conflicts with the production of information about investment projects, needed for allocative efficiency. Intermediaries exist to hide such information, so banks select portfolios of information-insensitive assets. For the economy as a whole, firms endogenously separate into bank finance and capital market/stock market finance depending on the cost of producing information about their projects
Understanding the role of debt in the financial system by Bengt Holmström( Book )

6 editions published between 2014 and 2015 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Money markets are fundamentally different from stock markets. Stock markets are about price discovery for the purpose of allocating risk efficiently. Money markets are about obviating the need for price discovery using over-collateralised debt to reduce the cost of lending. Yet, attempts to reform credit markets in the wake of the recent financial crisis often draw on insights grounded in our understanding of stock markets. This can be very misleading. The paper presents a perspective on the logic of credit markets and the structure of debt contracts that highlights the information insensitivity of debt. This perspective explains among other things why opacity often enhances liquidity in credit markets and therefore why all financial panics involve debt. These basic insights into the nature of debt and credit markets are simple but important for thinking about policies on transparency, on capital buffers and other regulatory issues concerning banking and money markets."--Abstract
On incentives and control in organizations by Bengt Holmström( )

11 editions published between 1977 and 1993 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Design of incentive schemes and the new Soviet incentive model by Bengt Holmström( Book )

4 editions published in 1979 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The investment banking contract and new issues by David P Baron( Book )

3 editions published in 1979 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Multi task principal-agent analyses : incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design by Bengt Holmström( Book )

4 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Palkkojen jäykkyyden ja työttömyyden sopimusteoreettinen perusta by Bengt Holmström( Book )

3 editions published in 1979 in Finnish and Undetermined and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Managerial incentives, investment, and aggregate implication by Bengt Holmström( Book )

2 editions published in 1983 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Game theory in the tradition of Bob Wilson( Book )

2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A liquidity based asset pricing model by Bengt Holmström( Book )

3 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The theory of contracts by Oliver D Hart( Book )

2 editions published in 1986 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The theory of the firm by Bengt Holmström( )

in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The investment banking contract and new issues by David P Baron( Book )

2 editions published in 1979 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

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Audience level: 0.26 (from 0.07 for Inside and ... to 0.98 for The theory ...)

Inside and outside liquidity
Alternative Names
Bengt Holmström finnischer Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und Hochschullehrer für Wirtschaftswissenschaften am Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Bengt Holmström Finnish economist and Nobel laureate

Bengt Holmström finsk ekonom

Bengt Holmström finsk økonom

Bengt Holmström finský ekonom

Bengt Holmström suomalainen Nobel-palkittu ekonomisti

Bengt R. Holmström economista finlandese

Bengt R. Holmström économiste finlandais

Bengt R. Holmström finn közgazdász

Bengt R. Holmström Finnish economist

Bengt R. Holmström Finnish economist and Nobel laureate

Bengt R. Holmström Fins econoom

Bengt Robert Holmström

Benqt Holmström

Holmström, Bengt

Holmstrom, Bengt 1949-

Holmström, Bengt R.

Holmström, Bengt R. 1949-

Holmström, Bengt Robert.

Holmström, Bengt Robert 1949-

Бенгт Гольстрем

Бенгт Холмстрем фински економист и нобеловец

Бенгт Холмстрьом

Хольмстрём, Бенгт

Բենգթ Հոլմսթրյոմ

بنگٹ ہومسٹروم

بنیت هولمستروم اقتصاددان فنلاندی

بينغت هولمستروم

বেংগেট ৰবাৰ্ট হল্মষ্টৰ্ম

বেংট হল্‌মস্ত্রম

பென் ஹொம்ஸ்சுடொரோம்

ബെങ് ആർ. ഹോംസ്റ്റ്രോം

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English (145)

Finnish (2)

Spanish (1)