WorldCat Identities

Persson, Torsten

Overview
Works: 130 works in 1,025 publications in 4 languages and 8,809 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings  Biography  Cross-cultural studies 
Roles: Author, Editor, Other, Contributor, Honoree
Publication Timeline
.
Most widely held works by Torsten Persson
Political economics : explaining economic policy by Torsten Persson( Book )

24 editions published between 2000 and 2005 in English and held by 621 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

What determines the size and form of redistributive programmes, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis
Monetary and fiscal policy by Torsten Persson( Book )

34 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and Undetermined and held by 463 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How will the private sector react to different government policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? The two volumes of Monetary and Fiscal Policy bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible -- topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address. This volume examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy
Economic sciences, 1991-1995( Book )

24 editions published between 1997 and 2006 in English and Chinese and held by 377 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A collection of the Nobel lectures delivered by the prizewinners in the economic sciences, together with their biographies, portraits and the presentation speeches at the award ceremonies for the period 1996-2000. Each lecture is based on the work for which the laureate was awarded the prize
Pillars of prosperity : the political economics of development clusters by Timothy Besley( Book )

18 editions published between 2011 and 2016 in English and held by 351 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters--places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes. To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law. The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity.--Provided by publisher
Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics by Torsten Persson( Book )

27 editions published between 1990 and 2012 in English and Dutch and held by 284 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Uses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches
Advances in economics and econometrics : theory and applications, ninth World Congress by Econometric Society( Book )

10 editions published between 2005 and 2006 in English and held by 238 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This is the first of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at invited symposium sessions of the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers summarise and interpret key developments, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics in economics and econometrics. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline
Debt, cash flow and inflation incentives : a Swedish example by Mats Persson( Book )

25 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 118 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The fiscal gains from, and hence the political incentives to, an increase in inflation rate of ten percentage points may be substantial: with Swedish data from 1994, these gains would have been an annual real flow of 3-4 percent of GDP, or a capitalized value of nearly 100 percent of GDP. They would mainly have arisen from the nominalistic features of the tax and transfer systems rather than from the traditional sources: seignorage and real depreciation of the public debt. The welfare costs of such an inflation increase would have been even larger, however, and would thus have reduced net welfare. Possible institutional reforms, aimed at making the political costs of inflation more equal to the social costs, are presented and discussed
The size and scope of government : comparative politics with rational politicians by Torsten Persson( Book )

21 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 117 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional -- elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential -- as opposed to parliamentary -- regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods
Electoral rules and corruption by Torsten Persson( Book )

28 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 109 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems iné0141uence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to dierent features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust
Monetary cohabitation in Europe by Torsten Persson( Book )

22 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 105 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How can monetary policy in stage III of European Monetary Union be coordinated between the ìns' and the òuts'? This paper compares alternative institutional mechanisms, and concludes that a generalized system of inflation targets at the European level has several merits. It strengthens domestic credibility of monetary policy. It rules out deliberate attempts to gain competitiveness through devaluations. It forces monetary policy to respond automatically to various macroeconomic shocks which is stabilizing for the real exchange rate. It distributes these shocks symmetrically across countries. On the basis of a simple theoretical model of policy coordination, the paper shows that a system of inflation targets approximates an optimal policy of international cooperation. Preliminary empirical evidence supports these theoretical results
Political economics and macroeconomic policy by Torsten Persson( Book )

31 editions published between 1997 and 2000 in English and held by 105 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simply Phillips curve model: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy
Political economics and public finance by Torsten Persson( Book )

20 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 102 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an explicitly specified political process. We divide the material into three parts. In Part I, we focus on median-voter equilibria that apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. We thus study the general redistributive programs which are typical of the modern welfare state: redistribution between rich and poor, young and old, employed and unemployed, resident of different regions, and labor and capital. In Part II we study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multi-dimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these different forms of political activity. Finally, Part III deals with a set of questions that can be brought under the label of comparative politics. Here we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions; we model the rationale for separation of powers and contrast the stylized features of congressional and parliamentary political systems, focusing on their implications for rent extraction by politicians, redistribution and public goods provision
Is inequality harmful for growth? : theory and evidence by Torsten Persson( Book )

30 editions published between 1991 and 1993 in English and held by 90 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is. To summarize our main argument: in a society where distributional conflict is more important, political decisions are more likely to produce economic policies that allow private individuals to appropriate less of the returns to growth promoting activities, such as accumulation of capital and productive knowledge. In the paper we first formulate a theoretical model that formally captures this idea. The model has a politico-economic equilibrium, which determines a sequence of growth rates depending on structural parameters, political institutions, and initial conditions. We then confront the testable empirical implications with two sets of data. A first data set pools historical evidence-which goes back to the mid 19th century-from the US and eight European countries. A second data set contains post-war evidence from a broad cross-section of developed and less developed countries. In both samples we find a statistically significant and quantitatively important negative relation between inequality and growth. After a comprehensive sensitivity analysis, we conclude that our findings are not distorted by measurement error, reverse causation, hetroskedasticity, or other econometric problems
How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? by Torsten Persson( Book )

24 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 88 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending
Lobbying and legislative bargaining by Elhanan Helpman( Book )

14 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 76 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between policies that would result from pure lobbying or from pure legislative bargaining. Second, we show that in congressional systems the resulting policies are strongly skewed in favor of the agenda-setter. In parliamentary systems they are skewed in favor of the coalition, but within the coalition there are many possible outcomes (there are multiple equilibria) with the agenda-setter having no particular advantage. Third, we show that equilibrium contributions are very small, despite the fact that lobbying has a marked effect on policies
Do political institutions shape economic policy? by Torsten Persson( Book )

12 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 67 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic eects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. And results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such eect are indeed present in international panel data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare-state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events is clearly institution-dependent, as is the timing and nature of the electoral cycle
Democracy and development : the devil in the details by Torsten Persson( Book )

23 editions published in 2006 in English and German and held by 61 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Does democracy promote economic development? This paper reviews recent attempts to address this question that exploited within-country variation. It shows that the answer is largely positive, but also depends on the details of democratic reforms. First, the sequence of economic vs political reforms matters: countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better. Second, different forms of democratic government lead to different economic policies, and this might explain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth than parliamentary democracy. Third, it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms. Taking expectations of regime change into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy
Forms of democracy, policy and economic development by Torsten Persson( Book )

17 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 56 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The paper combines insights from the recent research programs on constitutions and economic policy, and on history, institutions and growth. Drawing on cross-sectional as well as panel data, it presents new empirical results showing that the form of democracy (rather than democracy vs. non-democracy) has important consequences for the adoption of structural polices that promote long-run economic performance. Reforms into parliamentary (as opposed to presidential), proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) and permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracy appear to produce the most growth-promoting policies
Political competition and economic performance : theory and evidence from the United States by Timothy Besley( Book )

15 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 53 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance economic performance and uses the United States as a testing ground for the model's implications. It finds statistically robust evidence that political competition has quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and the quality of Governors
Monetary and fiscal policy by Torsten Persson( Book )

11 editions published in 1994 in English and Undetermined and held by 39 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How will the private sector react to different government policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? The two volumes of Monetary and Fiscal Policy bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible -- topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address. This volume examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy
 
moreShow More Titles
fewerShow Fewer Titles
Audience Level
0
Audience Level
1
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.59 (from 0.02 for Monetary a ... to 0.76 for Electoral ...)

Political economics : explaining economic policy
Alternative Names
Persson, T. 1954-

Persson, Tryggve

Torsten Persson economista sueco

Torsten Persson économiste suédois

Torsten Persson schwedischer Ökonom

Torsten Persson svensk ekonom

Torsten Persson svensk økonom

Torsten Persson Swedish economist

Torsten Persson Zweeds econoom

تورستن بيرسون عالم اقتصاد سويدي

Languages
English (424)

Chinese (2)

Dutch (1)

German (1)

Covers
Monetary and fiscal policyEconomic sciences, 1991-1995Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politicsAdvances in economics and econometrics : theory and applications, ninth World CongressMonetary and fiscal policy