WorldCat Identities

Ray, Debraj

Works: 142 works in 300 publications in 3 languages and 1,959 library holdings
Genres: Drama  Film adaptations 
Roles: Author, Editor, Honoree
Classifications: HD75, 338.9
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Debraj Ray
Development economics by Debraj Ray( Book )

26 editions published between 1998 and 2011 in English and Spanish and held by 742 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Debraj Ray, one of the most accomplished theorists in development economics today, presents in this book a synthesis of recent and older literature in the field and raises important questions that will help to set the agenda for future research. He covers such vital subjects as theories of economic growth, economic inequality, poverty and undernutrition, population growth, trade policy, and the markets for land, labor, and credit." "The book takes the position that there is no single cause for economic progress, but that a combination of factors - among them the improvement of physical and human capital, the reduction of inequality, and institutions that enable the background flow of information essential to market performance - consistently favor development. Ray supports his arguments throughout with examples from around the world. The book assumes a knowledge of only introductory economics and explains sophisticated concepts in simple, direct language, keeping the use of mathematics to a minimum."--Jacket
A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation by Debraj Ray( Book )

14 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 232 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods
Readings in the theory of economic development( Book )

8 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 220 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Contemporary macroeconomics( Book )

11 editions published between 2000 and 2003 in English and held by 159 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Contributed articles
Adapting to undernourishment : the clinical evidence and its implications by Partha Dasgupta( Book )

10 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement by Kfir Eliaz( Book )

8 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Dynamic equilibria with unemployment due to undernourishment by Debraj Ray( Book )

2 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A decision-theoretic basis for choice shifts in groups by Kfir Eliaz( Book )

5 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Kalakātā 71 Calcutta 71 by Mrinal Sen( Visual )

2 editions published in 2002 in Bengali and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Film recounts three famous Bengali stories and two contemporary episodes, each presenting an aspect of poverty and exploitation
Game-theoretic perspectives on coalition formation by Debraj Ray( Book )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Extensions of a measure of polarization, with an application to the income distribution of five OECD countries by Joan Esteban( Book )

6 editions published in 1999 in English and Spanish and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Cooperation in community interaction without information flows by Parikshit Ghosh( Book )

7 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Inequality, malnutrition and unemployment : a critique of the competitive market mechanism by Partha Dasgupta( Book )

4 editions published between 1984 and 1985 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Wealth constraints, lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation by Joan Esteban( Book )

3 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Social decision rules are not immune to conflict by Joan Esteban Marquillas( Book )

3 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict by Joan Esteban( Book )

4 editions published between 2001 and 2007 in English and Spanish and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Poverty and Self-Control by B. Douglas Bernheim( Book )

4 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The absence of self-control is often viewed as an important correlate of persistent poverty. Using a standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints faced by an individual with quasi- hyperbolic preferences, we argue that poverty damages the ability to exercise self-control. Our theory invokes George Ainslie's notion of ?personal rules,? interpreted as subgame-perfect equilibria of an intrapersonal game played by a time-inconsistent decision maker. Our main result pertains to situations in which the individual is neither so patient that accumulation is possible from every asset level, nor so impatient that decumulation is unavoidable from every asset level. Such cases always possess a threshold level of assets above which personal rules support unbounded accumulation, and a second threshold below which there is a ?poverty trap?: no personal rule permits the individual to avoid depleting all liquid wealth. In short, poverty perpetuates itself by undermining the ability to exercise self-control. Thus even temporary policies designed to help the poor accumulate assets may be highly effective. We also explore the implications for saving with easier access to credit, the demand for commitment devices, the design of accounts to promote saving, and the variation of the marginal propensity to consume across classes of resource claims -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict Hindu-Muslim Violence in India by Anirban Mitra( Book )

5 editions published between 2010 and 2013 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study inter-group conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are 'low', increasing group incomes raises violence against that group, and lowers violence generated by it. These predicted relationships demonstrate the complex connections between economic growth and violence, and in particular serve as tests for group aggression or victimization, which we apply to Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per-capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict. An increase in Hindu expenditures has negative or no effect. This robust empirical finding, combined with the theory, has direct implications for the origins of Hindu-Muslim violence in post-Independence India -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Productivity response to a contract change by Rajshri Jayaraman( Book )

6 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies the productivity impact of a contract change for tea pluckers in an Indian plantation. The contract, implemented at the end of a three-year cycle in which contracts are generally revised, was (a) the joint outcome of negotiations between twenty unions and plantations, (b) mandated to respect a state government notification stipulating a new minimum wage for plantation workers statewide, and (c) applicable equally to all the plantations in the local region. The contract raised the baseline wage by 30% but lowered marginal incentives, by shifting the existing piece rates to higher minimum thresholds and eliminating an existing penalty per unit for low output. In the one month following the contract change, output increased by a factor between 30-60%, the exact number depending on the choice of counterfactual and the set of controls applied. This large and contrarian response to a flattening of marginal incentives is at odds with the standard model, including one that incorporates dynamic incentives, and it can only be partly accounted for by higher supervisory effort. We conclude that the increase is a "behavioral" response. Yet in subsequent months, the increase is comprehensively reversed. In fact, an entirely standard model with no behavioral or dynamic features that we estimate off the pre-change data, fits the observations four months after the contract change remarkably well. While not an unequivocal indictment of the recent emphasis on "behavioral economics," the findings suggest that non-standard responses may be ephemeral, especially in employment contexts in which the baseline relationship is delineated by financial considerations in the first place. From an empirical perspective, therefore, it is ideal to examine responses to a contract change over an substantial period of time
Aspirations and inequality by Garance Genicot( Book )

4 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This paper develops a theory in which society-wide economic outcomes shape individual aspirations, which affect the investment incentives of individuals. Through its impact on investments, aspirations in turn affect ambient social outcomes. We explore this two-way link. A central feature is that aspirations that are moderately above an individual's current standard of living tend to encourage investment, while still higher aspirations may lead to frustration and lower investment. When integrated with the feedback effect from investment, we are led to a theory in which aspirations and income evolve jointly, and the social determinants of preferences play an important role. We examine conditions under which growth is compatible with long-run equality in the distribution of income. More generally, we describe steady state income distributions, which are typically clustered around local poles. Finally, the theory has predictions for the growth rates along the cross-section of income. We use these predictions to calibrate the model so that it fits growth data by income percentile for 43 countries, and back out the implicit aspirations-formation process that underlies these observations
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Audience level: 0.63 (from 0.59 for Readings i ... to 0.96 for Polarizati ...)

Development economics
Alternative Names
Рэй, Дебраж

English (124)

Spanish (7)

Bengali (2)

A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formationReadings in the theory of economic developmentContemporary macroeconomicsGame-theoretic perspectives on coalition formation