WorldCat Identities

Scotchmer, Suzanne

Works: 140 works in 348 publications in 2 languages and 2,185 library holdings
Genres: Case studies 
Roles: Author, Honoree, Other
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Suzanne Scotchmer
Innovation and incentives by Suzanne Scotchmer( Book )

24 editions published between 2004 and 2008 in English and Japanese and held by 804 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Interest in intellectual property and other institutions that promote innovation exploded during the 1990s. Innovation and Incentives provides a clear and wide-ranging introduction to the economics of innovation, suitable for teaching at both the advanced undergraduate and graduate levels. It will also be useful to legal and economics professionals. Written by an expert on intellectual property and industrial organization, the book archieves a balanced mix of institutional details, examples, and theory. Analytical, empirical, or institutional factors can be given different emphases at different levels of study."--Jacket
The political economy of intellectual property treaties by Suzanne Scotchmer( )

13 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 112 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I address the positive question of when countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as domestic inventors, and how their incentive to do so depends on reciprocity. I also investigate an equilibrium in which regional policy makers choose IP policies that serve regional interests, conditional on each other's policies. I compare these policies with a notion of what is optimal, and argue that harmonization will involve stronger IP protection than independent choices. Harmonization can either enhance or reduce global welfare. Levels of public and private R & D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R & D spending confers on other countries. The more extensive protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy
Affirmative action in hierarchies by Suzanne Scotchmer( )

12 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 106 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

If promotion in a hierarchy is based on a random signal of ability, rates of promotion will be affected by risk-taking. Further, the numbers and abilities of risk-takers and non-risk-takers will be different at each stage of the hierarchy, and the ratio will be changing. I show that, under mild conditions, more risk-takers than non-risk-takers will survive at early stages, but they will have lower ability. At later stages, this will be reversed: Fewer risk-takers than non-risk-takers survive, but they will have higher ability. I give several interpretations for how these theorems relate to affirmative action, in light of considerable evidence that males are more risk-taking than females
Damages and injunctions in the protection of proprietary research tools by Mark Schankerman( Book )

13 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 105 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Profit on proprietary research tools is determined partly by the remedies for infringement, such as damages and injunctions. We investigate how damages under a liability rule and the opportunity for injunctions under a property rule can affect the incentives to develop research tools. We show that the prevailing legal doctrine of damages under liability rule, called lost profit or reasonable royalty, suffers from a logical circularity which leads to an indeterminacy in permissible damages. This can create insufficient incentives to develop research tools. Incentives can be improved either by a property rule with injunctions or by a liability rule under the doctrine of unjust enrichment
Profit neutrality in licensing : the boundary between antitrust law and patent law by Stephen M Maurer( )

13 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 101 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

For over a century, courts and commentators have struggled to find principles that reconcile patent and antitrust law, especially as to patent licensing. We interpret case law and commentary to arrive at three unifying principles for acceptable terms of license. Profit neutrality' holds that patent rewards should not depend on the rightholder's ability to work the patent himself. Derived reward' holds that the patent holder's profits should be earned, if at all, from the social value created by the invention. Minimalism' holds that licensing contracts should not contain more restrictions than are necessary to achieve neutrality. We argue that these principles largely rationalize important decisions of the twentieth century. They also justify the Supreme Court's controversial General Electric decision, which holds that patentholders can set prices charged by their licensees
Procuring knowledge by Stephen M Maurer( Book )

12 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 90 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There is growing public interest in alternatives to intellectual property including, but not limited to, prizes and government grants. We argue that there is no single best mechanism for supporting research. Rather, mechanisms can only be compared within specific creative environments. We collect various historical and contemporary examples of alternative incentives, and relate them to models of the creative process. We give an explanation for why federally funded R & D has moved from an intramural activity to largely a grant process. Finally, we observe that much research is supported by a hybrid system of public and private sponsorship, and explain why this makes sense in some circumstances
Digital rights management and the pricing of digital products by Yooki Park( )

11 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 88 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

As it becomes cheaper to copy and share digital content, vendors are turning to technical protections such as encryption. We argue that if protection is nevertheless imperfect, this transition will generally lower the prices of content relative to perfect legal enforcement. However, the effect on prices depends on whether the content providers use independent protection standards or a shared one, and if shared, on the governance of the system. Even if a shared system permits content providers to set their prices independently, the equilibrium prices will depend on how the vendors share the costs. We show that demand-based cost sharing generally leads to higher prices than revenue-based cost sharing. Users, vendors and the antitrust authorities will typically have different views on what capabilities the DRM system should have. We argue that, when a DRM system is implemented as an industry standard, there is a potential for "collusion through technology."
Open source software : the new intellectual property paradigm by Stephen M Maurer( )

11 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 76 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Open source methods for creating software rely on developers who voluntarily reveal code in the expectation that other developers will reciprocate. Open source incentives are distinct from earlier uses of intellectual property, leading to different types of inefficiencies and different biases in R & D investment. Open source style of software development remedies a defect of intellectual property protection, namely, that it does not generally require or encourage disclosure of source code. We review a considerable body of survey evidence and theory that seeks to explain why developers participate in open source collaborations instead of keeping their code proprietary, and evaluates the extent to which open source may improve welfare compared to proprietary development
Risk taking and gender in hierarchies by Suzanne Scotchmer( )

9 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 64 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of information about the candidates. I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking than females, and its implications for rates of promotion and abilities of survivors. I define promotion hierarchies with and without memory, where memory means that promotion depends on the entire history of success. In both types of hierarchies, the surviving risk takers will have lower average ability whenever they have a higher survival rate. Further, even if more risk takers than non risk takers are promoted in the beginning of the hierarchy, that will be reversed over time. The risk takers will eventually have a lower survival rate, but higher ability. As a consequence of these differences, the various requirements of employment law cannot simultaneously be satisfied. Further, if promotion standards are chosen to maximize profit, the standards will reflect gender in ways that are difficult to distinguish from discriminatory intent
Randomness in tax enforcement by Suzanne Scotchmer( )

6 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 57 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

For most parameter values, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess leads to higher reported income and more revenue, When reducing randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable Income. Even if reducing randomness g costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated, so that the government a revenue stays fixed. These results do not rely on the presence of a distortion in labor supply
Scarcity of ideas and R & D options : use it, lose it or bank it by Nisvan Erkal( )

6 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 57 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We investigate rewards to R & D in a model where substitute ideas for innovation arrive to random recipients at random times. By foregoing investment in a current idea, society as a whole preserves an option to invest in a better idea for the same market niche, but with delay. Because successive ideas may occur to different people, there is a conflict between private and social optimality. We characterize the welfare-maximizing reward structure when the social planner learns over time about the arrival rate of ideas, and when private recipients of ideas can bank their ideas for future use. We argue that private incentives to create socially valuable options can be achieved by giving higher rewards where "ideas are scarce."
Patents in the university : priming the pump and crowding out by Suzanne Scotchmer( )

5 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 49 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to exploit patents on their federally sponsored research. University laboratories therefore have two sources of funds: direct grants from sponsors and income from licensing. Tax credits for private R & D also contribute, because they increase the profitability of licensing. Because Bayh-Dole profits are a source of funds, the question arises how subsidies and Bayh-Dole profits fit together. I show that subsidies to the university can either "prime the pump" for spending out of Bayh-Dole funds, or can crowd it out. Because of crowding out, if the sponsor wants to increase university spending beyond the university's own target, it will end up funding the entire research bill, just as if there were no profit opportunities under the Bayh-Dole Act. A subsidy system that requires university matching can mitigate this problem
Damages and injunctions in protecting proprietary research tools by Mark Schankerman( Book )

9 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 37 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The locational and economic patterns of California's biotech industry : a preliminary report by Edward J Blakely( Book )

2 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 20 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On the shoulders of giants : colleagues remember Suzanne Scotchmer's contributions to economics( )

5 editions published in 2017 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This book presents eleven classic papers by the late Professor Suzanne Scotchmer with introductions by leading economists and legal scholars. This book introduces Scotchmer's life and work; analyses her pioneering contributions to the economics of patents and innovation incentives, with a special focus on the modern theory of cumulative innovation; and describes her pioneering work on law and economics, evolutionary game theory, and general equilibrium/club theory. This book also provides a self-contained introduction to students who want to learn more about the various fields that Professor Scotchmer worked in, with a particular focus on patent incentives and cumulative innovation
The implications of space for competition by Suzanne Scotchmer( Book )

3 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The role of local government in the regulation of biotechnology by Maria Rea( Book )

2 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Intellectual property : when is it the best incentive system? by Nancy Theresa Gallini( )

3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The core and the hedonic core : equivalence and comparative statics by Greg Engl( )

2 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Externality pricing in club economies by Suzanne Scotchmer( )

2 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

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Audience level: 0.56 (from 0.37 for Innovation ... to 0.81 for The implic ...)

Innovation and incentives
Alternative Names
Scotchmer, S.

Scotchmer, S. 1950-2014

Scotchmer, Suzanne

스코치머, 수잔네 1950-2014

スコッチマー, スザンヌ

スコッチマー, スザンヌ 1950-2014



English (163)

Japanese (2)