WorldCat Identities

Vlahu, Razvan E. 1977-

Overview
Works: 15 works in 53 publications in 2 languages and 759 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: K1375, 346.0821
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Razvan E Vlahu
The economics of bank bankruptcy law by Matej Marinc( )

19 editions published between 2011 and 2014 in English and German and held by 497 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This book shows that a special bank bankruptcy regime is desirable for the efficient restructuring and/or liquidation of distressed banks. It explores in detail both the principal features of corporate bankruptcy law and the specific characteristics of banks including the importance of public confidence, negative externalities of bank failures, fragmented regulatory framework, bank opaqueness, and the related asset-substitution problem and liquidity provision. These features distinguish banks from other corporations and are largely neglected in corporate bankruptcy law. The authors, an assistant professor for money and finance and a research economist at the Dutch Central Bank, propose changes in both prudential regulation and reorganization policies that should allow regulators and banking authorities to better mitigate disruptions in the financial system and minimize the social costs of bank failures. Their recommendations are complemented by a discussion of bank failures from the 2007-2009 financial crisis
Capital regulation and tail risk by Enrico Camillo Perotti( )

13 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 126 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context when banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. When capital raising is costly, poorly capitalized banks may limit risk to avoid breaching the minimal capital ratio. A bank with higher capital has lesschance of breaching the ratio, so may actually take more risk. As a result, banks which have access to tail risk projects may take greater risk when highly capitalized.The results are consistent with stylized facts about pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation
Bank profitability and risk-taking by Natalya Martynova( )

2 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 111 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky 'side activities'(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis. --Abstract
Bank profitability, leverage constraints, and risk-taking by Natalya Martynova( Book )

3 editions published in 2019 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model's predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis
Understanding bank-run contagion by Martin Brown( )

2 editions published between 2014 and 2016 in German and English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Contagious bank runs experimental evidence by Martin Brown( )

2 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Understanding bank-run contagion by Martin Brown( )

1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The authors study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels, and under which information conditions, a panic-based depositor-run at one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor-run at another bank. They find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players' beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdraw as well. Importantly though, observed withdrawals affect depositors' beliefs, and are thus contagious, only when depositors know that there are economic linkages between their bank and the observed bank."--Abstract
Bank instability interbank linkages and the role of disclosure by Christian König-Kersting( )

2 editions published in 2020 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study the impact of disclosure about bank fundamentals on depositors' behavior in the presence (and absence) of economic linkages between financial institutions. Using a controlled laboratory environment, we identify under which conditions disclosure is conducive to bank stability. We find that bank deposits are sensitive to perceived bank performance. While banks with strong fundamentals benefit from more precise disclosure, an opposing effect is present for solvent banks with weaker fundamentals. Depositors take information about economic linkages into account and correctly identify when disclosure about one institution conveys meaningful information for others. Our findings highlight both the costs and benefits of bank transparency and suggest that disclosure is not always stability enhancing
Three essays on banking by Razvan E Vlahu( Book )

3 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This dissertation consists of three essays on banking and concentrates on two topics. The first two essays deal with strategic behavior of borrowers. The third essay explores the relation between bank capital and risk-taking. The first essay, "Collective Strategic Defaults: Bailouts and Repayment Incentives", studies a global game model of debtor runs on a bank and the role of a lender of last resort in mitigating strategic debtor behavior and bank moral hazard. The second essay, "Strategic Loan Defaults and Coordination: An Experimental Analysis" investigates the impact of uncertainty about bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. These two sources of uncertainty are natural proxies for the regulatory rules for transparency and disclosure, and for the state of the economy. The third essay, "Capital Regulation and Tail Risks", analyses bank's risk-taking behavior in the presence of tail risk projects, and shows that it can take unintuitive non-linear forms, with incentives to take excessive risk increasing in capital."--Omslag
Strategic loan defaults and coordination : an experimental analysis by Stefan T Trautmann( Book )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Corporate governance of banks a survey by Jakob de Haan( Book )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The economic perspective of bank bankruptcy law by Matej Marinc( Book )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Franchise value and risk-taking in modern banks by Natalya Martynova( Book )

1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Understanding bank-run contagion( Book )

1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels, and under which information conditions, a panic-based depositor-run at one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor-run at another bank. We find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players’ beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdraw as well. Importantly though, observed withdrawals affect depositors’ beliefs, and are thus contagious, only when depositors know that there are economic linkages between their bank and the observed bank
The Economics of Bank Bankruptcy Law( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

 
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The economics of bank bankruptcy law
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Alternative Names
Vlahu, Razvan.

Vlahu, Razvan 1977-

Vlahu, Razvan E. 1977-

Vlahu, Razvan Eduard

Vlahu, Razvan Eduard 1977-

Languages
English (51)

German (2)