Making Votes Count : Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on cons
1 online resource (358 pages).
9781316143247, 1316143244
1055474097
Cover
Frontmatter
Contents
List of tables and figures
Series Editors' Preface
Preface
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Duverger's propositions
STRATEGIC VOTING
On electoral systems
Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems
Strategic voting in multimember districts
Strategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems
Some concluding comments on strategic voting
STRATEGIC ENTRY
Strategic voting, party labels, and entry
Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan. ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL
Putting the constituencies together
Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties
COORDINATION FAILURES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE
Coordination failures and representation
Coordination failures and dominant parties
Coordination failures and realignments
CONCLUSION
Conclusion
Formulaic structures in 77 democracies, circa 1992
Notation and proofs for Chapter 6
Data and sources for Chapter 11
References
Subject Index
Author Index