Governing the Commons : the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

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Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright; Contents; Series editors' preface; Preface; Chapter1 Reflections on the Commons; Three influentialmodels; The tragedy of the commons; The prisoner's dilemma game; The logic of collective action; The metaphorical useof models; Currentpolicy prescripitons; Leviathan as the ""only"" way; Privatization as the ""only"" way; The ""only"" way?; An alternative solution; An empirical alternative; Policy prescriptions as metaphors; Policies based on metaphors can be harmful; A Challenge. Chapter 2 An Institutional Approach to the Study of Self-Organization and Aelf-Governance in CPRSituationsThe CPRsituation; CPRs and resource units; Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations; Interdependence, independent action, and collectiveaction; The theory of the firm; The theory of the state; Three puzzles: supply, commitment, andmonitoring; The problem of supply; The problem of credible commitment; The problem of mutual monitoring; Framinginquiry; Appropriation and provision problems; Multiple levels of analysis; Studying institutions in fieldsetings. Chapter 3 Analyzing Long-Enduring, Self-Organized, and Self-GovernedCPRsCommunal tenure in high mountain meadowsand forests; Tarbel, Switzerland; Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan; Huerta irrigationinstitutions; Valencia; Murcia andOrihuela; Alicante; Zanjera irrigation communites in thephilippines; Similarities among enduring, self-governingCPR institutions; Clearlydefined boundaries; Congruence between appropriation and provision rules andlocal conditions; Collective-choice arrangements; Monitoring; Graduated sanctions; Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Minimal recognition of rights to organizeNested enterprises; Chapter 4 AnalyzingInstitutional Change; The competitive pumping race; The setting; The logic of the water-rights game; The litigation game; The Raymond Basin negotiations; The West Basin negotiations; The Central Basin litigation; Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements; The entrepreneurship game; Reasons for forming a district to include both basins; Reasons against forming a district to include both basins; The polycentric public-enterprise game; The analysis of institutional supply. Incremental, sequential, and self-transforming institutional change in a facilitative political regimeReformulating the analysis of institutional change; Chapter 5 Analyzing Institutional Failures andFragilities; Two Turkish inshore fisheries with continuing CPR problems; California groundwater basins with continuing CPR problems; A Sri Lankan fishery; Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka; The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries; Lessons to be learned from comparing the cases in this study; Chapter 6 A Framework for Analysis of Self-Organizing and Self-GoverningCPRs