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Attention manipulation and information overload

Author: Petra Persson; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 23823.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Limits on consumer attention give firms incentives to manipulate prospective buyers' allocation of attention. This paper models such attention manipulation and shows that it limits the ability of disclosure regulation to improve consumer welfare. Competitive information supply, from firms competing for attention, can reduce consumers' knowledge by causing information overload. A single firm subjected to a disclosure  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Petra Persson; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 1005670285
Notes: "September 2017"
Description: 1 online resource (49 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 23823.
Responsibility: Petra Persson.

Abstract:

Limits on consumer attention give firms incentives to manipulate prospective buyers' allocation of attention. This paper models such attention manipulation and shows that it limits the ability of disclosure regulation to improve consumer welfare. Competitive information supply, from firms competing for attention, can reduce consumers' knowledge by causing information overload. A single firm subjected to a disclosure mandate may deliberately induce such information overload to obfuscate financially relevant information, or engage in product complexification to bound consumers' financial literacy. Thus, disclosure rules that would improve welfare for agents without attention limitations can prove ineffective for consumers with limited attention. Obfuscation suggests a role for rules that mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure; however, even rules that mandate "easy-to-understand" formats can be ineffective against complexification, which may call for regulation of product design.

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