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The basic public finance of public-private partnerships

Author: Eduardo Engel; Ronald D Fischer; Alexander Galetovic P; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13284.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Eduardo Engel; Ronald D Fischer; Alexander Galetovic P; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 162631703
Description: 1 online resource (1 volume).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13284.
Responsibility: Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer, Alexander Galetovic.

Abstract:

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization.

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