skip to content
CEO Pay and Firm Performance : Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

CEO Pay and Firm Performance : Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures

Author: Paul L Joskow; Nancy L Rose
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1994.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w4976.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Paul L Joskow; Nancy L Rose
OCLC Number: 1027279993
Notes: December 1994.
Description: 1 online resource.
Details: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w4976.
Responsibility: Paul L. Joskow, Nancy L. Rose.

Abstract:

This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1027279993> # CEO Pay and Firm Performance Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures
    a schema:Book, schema:CreativeWork, schema:MediaObject ;
    library:oclcnum "1027279993" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Place/cambridge_mass> ; # Cambridge, Mass.
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/chief_executive_officers_salaries_etc_econometric_models> ; # Chief executive officers--Salaries, etc.--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/competition_united_states> ; # Competition--United States
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/g3_corporate_finance_and_governance> ; # G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/j3_wages_compensation_and_labor_costs> ; # J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/competition> ; # Competition
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Place/united_states> ; # United States.
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:contributor <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Person/rose_nancy_l> ; # Nancy L. Rose
    schema:creator <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Person/joskow_paul_l> ; # Paul L. Joskow
    schema:datePublished "1994" ;
    schema:description "This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/7832269> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:name "CEO Pay and Firm Performance Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures"@en ;
    schema:productID "1027279993" ;
    schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/1027279993#PublicationEvent/cambridge_mass_national_bureau_of_economic_research1994> ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
    schema:url <http://www.nber.org/papers/w4976> ;
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w4976> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/1027279993> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Person/joskow_paul_l> # Paul L. Joskow
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Joskow" ;
    schema:givenName "Paul L." ;
    schema:name "Paul L. Joskow" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Person/rose_nancy_l> # Nancy L. Rose
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Rose" ;
    schema:givenName "Nancy L." ;
    schema:name "Nancy L. Rose" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Place/cambridge_mass> # Cambridge, Mass.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "Cambridge, Mass." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Place/united_states> # United States.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "United States." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1027279993> ; # CEO Pay and Firm Performance Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures
    schema:name "NBER working paper series" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1027279993> ; # CEO Pay and Firm Performance Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/chief_executive_officers_salaries_etc_econometric_models> # Chief executive officers--Salaries, etc.--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Chief executive officers--Salaries, etc.--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/competition_united_states> # Competition--United States
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Competition--United States"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/g3_corporate_finance_and_governance> # G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7832269#Topic/j3_wages_compensation_and_labor_costs> # J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs"@en ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/1027279993>
    a genont:InformationResource, genont:ContentTypeGenericResource ;
    schema:about <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1027279993> ; # CEO Pay and Firm Performance Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures
    schema:dateModified "2019-12-07" ;
    void:inDataset <http://purl.oclc.org/dataset/WorldCat> ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.