Cooperative species : human reciprocity and its evolution (Book, 2013) [WorldCat.org]
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Cooperative species : human reciprocity and its evolution
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Cooperative species : human reciprocity and its evolution

Author: Samuel Bowles; Herbert Gintis
Publisher: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2013.
Edition/Format:   Print book : English : 3rd printing, and 1st paperback printingView all editions and formats
Summary:

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded  Read more...

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Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Samuel Bowles; Herbert Gintis
ISBN: 0691158169 9780691158167
OCLC Number: 946586559
Notes: Publié originalement: 2011.
Description: xii, 262 p. : ill., carte ; 26 cm
Contents: A cooperative species --
The evolution of altruism in humans. Preferences, beliefs, and constraints ; Social preferences and social dilemmas ; Genes, culture, groups, and institutions --
Social preferences. Strong reciprocity is common ; Free-riders undermine cooperation ; Altruistic punishment sustains cooperation ; Effective punishment depends on legitimacy ; Purely symbolic punishment is effective ; People punish those who hurt others ; Social preferences are not irrational ; Culture and institutions matter ; Behavior is conditioned on group membership ; People enjoy cooperating and punishing free-riders ; Social preferences in laboratory and natural settings ; Competing explanations --
The sociobiology of human cooperation. Inclusive fitness and human cooperation ; Modeling multi-level selection ; Equilibrium selection ; Reciprocal altruism ; Reciprocal altruism in large groups ; Reputation : indirect reciprocity ; Altruism as a signal of quality ; Positive assortment ; Mechanisms and motives --
Cooperative Homo economicus. Folk theorems and evolutionary dynamics ; The folk theorem with imperfect public information ; The folk theorem with private information ; Evolutionarily irrelevant equilibria ; Social norms and correlated equilibria ; The missing choreographer --
Ancestral human society. Cosmopolitan ancestors ; Genetic evidence ; Prehistoric warfare ; The foundations of social order ; The crucible of cooperation --
The coevolution of institutions and behaviors. Selective extinction ; Reproductive leveling ; Genetic differentiation between groups ; Deme extinction and the evolution of altruism ; The Australian laboratory ; The coevolution of institutions and altruism ; Simulating gene-culture coevolution ; Levelers and warriors --
Parochialism, altruism, and war. Parochial altruism and war ; The emergence of parochial altruism and war ; Simulated and experimental parochial altruism ; The legacy of a past "red in tooth and claw" --
The evolution of strong reciprocity. Coordinated punishment ; Altruistic punishment in a realistic demography ; The emergence of strong reciprocity ; Why coordinated punishment succeeds ; A decentralized social order --
Socialization. Cultural transmission ; Socialization and the survival of fitness-reducing norms ; Genes, culture, and the internalization of norms ; The internalized norm as hitchhiker ; The gene-culture coevolution of a fitness-reducing norm ; How can internalized norms be altruistic? ; The programmable brain --
Social emotions. Reciprocity, shame, and punishment ; The evolution of social emotions ; The "great captains of our lives" --
Human cooperation and its evolution. The origins of human cooperation ; The future of cooperation --
Appendixes. Altruism defined ; Agent-based models ; Game theory ; Dynamical systems ; The replicator dynamic ; Continuation probability and time discount factor ; Alternatives to the standing model ; The prisoner's dilemma with public and private signals ; Student and nonstudent experimental subjects ; The price equation ; Weak multi-level selection ; Cooperation andpunishment with quorum sensing.
Responsibility: SamuelBowles and Herbert Gintis.

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"The achievement of Bowles and Gintis is to have put together from the many disparate sources of evidence a story as plausible as any we're likely to get in the present state of behavioural sciences Read more...

 
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