skip to content
Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment

Author: John Pittard
Publisher: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2020] ©2020
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This book contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: John Pittard
ISBN: 9780190051815 0190051817
OCLC Number: 1101984233
Description: xiii, 339 pages ; 25 cm
Contents: Disagreement-motivated religious skepticism and the commitment to impartiality --
De-motivating reasons impartiality --
From impartiality to instrumentalism --
Partisan justification and religious belief --
Affective rationalism and religious insight --
Elusive impartiality --
Unpalatable conclusions and deliberative vertigo.
Responsibility: John Pittard.

Abstract:

"The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This book contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement. Part One argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing highly sanguine approaches to disagreement that allow for an unproblematic privileging of one's first-person perspective. According to the position defended in Part One, justified confidence in the face of religious disagreement is likely to require that one have rational insight into reasons that favor one's outlook. It is argued that many of the rational insights that are crucial to assessing religious outlooks are not achievable through analytical reasoning, but only through having the right sort of emotional experiences. Part Two considers the implications for religious commitment of accepting the impartiality requirement favored by 'disagreement skeptics.' Challenges are raised to the assumption that a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality rules out confident religious belief. But it is further argued that such a commitment would likely make it irrational to pursue one's favored form of religious life and might lead to normative uncertainty that would prevent rational engagement in any religious or irreligious way of life whatsoever"--

Reviews

Editorial reviews

Publisher Synopsis

John Pittard's book focuses on religious commitment, but his volume is also an impressive examination of the broader epistemological issues in play. It is the most thorough scholarly treatment yet of Read more...

 
User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


\n\n

Primary Entity<\/h3>\n
<http:\/\/www.worldcat.org\/oclc\/1101984233<\/a>> # Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:CreativeWork<\/a>, schema:Book<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nlibrary:oclcnum<\/a> \"1101984233<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nlibrary:placeOfPublication<\/a> <http:\/\/id.loc.gov\/vocabulary\/countries\/nyu<\/a>> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/religion_philosophy<\/a>> ; # Religion--Philosophy<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/glaubenszweifel<\/a>> ; # Glaubenszweifel<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/skepticism<\/a>> ; # Skepticism<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/knowledge_theory_of_religion<\/a>> ; # Knowledge, Theory of (Religion)<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/id.loc.gov\/authorities\/classification\/BD215<\/a>> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/belief_and_doubt<\/a>> ; # Belief and doubt<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/dewey.info\/class\/218\/e23\/<\/a>> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/skeptizismus<\/a>> ; # Skeptizismus<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/glaube<\/a>> ; # Glaube<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:about<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/theologische_erkenntnistheorie<\/a>> ; # Theologische Erkenntnistheorie<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:author<\/a> <http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Person\/pittard_john<\/a>> ; # John Pittard<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:bookFormat<\/a> bgn:PrintBook<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:copyrightYear<\/a> \"2020<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:datePublished<\/a> \"2020<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:description<\/a> \"\"The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This book contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement. Part One argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing highly sanguine approaches to disagreement that allow for an unproblematic privileging of one\'s first-person perspective. According to the position defended in Part One, justified confidence in the face of religious disagreement is likely to require that one have rational insight into reasons that favor one\'s outlook. It is argued that many of the rational insights that are crucial to assessing religious outlooks are not achievable through analytical reasoning, but only through having the right sort of emotional experiences. Part Two considers the implications for religious commitment of accepting the impartiality requirement favored by \'disagreement skeptics.\' Challenges are raised to the assumption that a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality rules out confident religious belief. But it is further argued that such a commitment would likely make it irrational to pursue one\'s favored form of religious life and might lead to normative uncertainty that would prevent rational engagement in any religious or irreligious way of life whatsoever\"--<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:description<\/a> \"Disagreement-motivated religious skepticism and the commitment to impartiality -- De-motivating reasons impartiality -- From impartiality to instrumentalism -- Partisan justification and religious belief -- Affective rationalism and religious insight -- Elusive impartiality -- Unpalatable conclusions and deliberative vertigo.<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:exampleOfWork<\/a> <http:\/\/worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/id\/9120550461<\/a>> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:inLanguage<\/a> \"en<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:productID<\/a> \"1101984233<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:workExample<\/a> <http:\/\/worldcat.org\/isbn\/9780190051815<\/a>> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\numbel:isLike<\/a> <http:\/\/bnb.data.bl.uk\/id\/resource\/GBB9H0114<\/a>> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nwdrs:describedby<\/a> <http:\/\/www.worldcat.org\/title\/-\/oclc\/1101984233<\/a>> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n

Related Entities<\/h3>\n
<http:\/\/dewey.info\/class\/218\/e23\/<\/a>>\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Person\/pittard_john<\/a>> # John Pittard<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Person<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:familyName<\/a> \"Pittard<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:givenName<\/a> \"John<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"John Pittard<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/belief_and_doubt<\/a>> # Belief and doubt<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Belief and doubt<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/glaube<\/a>> # Glaube<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Glaube<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/glaubenszweifel<\/a>> # Glaubenszweifel<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Glaubenszweifel<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/knowledge_theory_of_religion<\/a>> # Knowledge, Theory of (Religion)<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Knowledge, Theory of (Religion)<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/religion_philosophy<\/a>> # Religion--Philosophy<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Religion--Philosophy<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/skepticism<\/a>> # Skepticism<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Skepticism<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/skeptizismus<\/a>> # Skeptizismus<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Skeptizismus<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/9120550461#Topic\/theologische_erkenntnistheorie<\/a>> # Theologische Erkenntnistheorie<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Theologische Erkenntnistheorie<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/id.loc.gov\/authorities\/classification\/BD215<\/a>>\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/id.loc.gov\/vocabulary\/countries\/nyu<\/a>>\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Place<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\ndcterms:identifier<\/a> \"nyu<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
<http:\/\/worldcat.org\/isbn\/9780190051815<\/a>>\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:ProductModel<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:isbn<\/a> \"0190051817<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:isbn<\/a> \"9780190051815<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n