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Durable Coalitions and Communication : Public versus Private Negotiations

Author: David P Baron; Renee Bowen; Salvatore Nunnari; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w22821.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We present a laboratory experiment to study the effect of communication on durable coalitions - coalitions that support the same allocation from one period to the next. We study a bargaining setting where the status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period. Our main experimental treatment is the opportunity for subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap-talk  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: David P Baron; Renee Bowen; Salvatore Nunnari; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 1008871535
Notes: November 2016.
Description: 1 online resource
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w22821.
Responsibility: David P. Baron, Renee Bowen, Salvatore Nunnari.

Abstract:

We present a laboratory experiment to study the effect of communication on durable coalitions - coalitions that support the same allocation from one period to the next. We study a bargaining setting where the status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period. Our main experimental treatment is the opportunity for subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is made and comes to a vote. We compare committees with no communication, committees where communication is public and messages are observed by all committee members, and committees where communication is private and any committee member can send private messages to any other committee member. We find that the opportunity to communicate has a significant impact on outcomes and coalitions. When communication is public, there are more universal coalitions and fewer majoritarian coalitions. With private communication, there are more majoritarian coalitions and fewer universal coalitions. With either type of communication coalitions occur more frequently and last longer than with no communication. The content of communication is correlated with coalition type and with the formation and dissolution of durable coalitions. These findings suggest a coordination role for communication that varies with the mode of communication.

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