skip to content
A Dynamic Model of Political Party Equilibrium : the evolution of ENP in Canada, 1870-2011 Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

A Dynamic Model of Political Party Equilibrium : the evolution of ENP in Canada, 1870-2011

Author: J Stephen Ferris; Stanley L Winer; Derek E H Olmstead; Carleton University. Department of Economics,
Publisher: Ottawa, Ontario, Canada : Carleton University, Department of Economics, 2018.
Series: Carleton economic papers, 2018-04.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : English
Summary:
The effective number of political parties (ENP) in a first-past-the-post single member (SMP) electoral system is analyzed as a dynamic process whereby the tournament nature of the election contest induces excessive entry and sunk entry costs promote persistence even as Duverger-Demsetz type political competition works to winnow unsuccessful minor candidates and parties. The result is a fringe of ever changing  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Links to this item

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Genre/Form: Electronic books
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: J Stephen Ferris; Stanley L Winer; Derek E H Olmstead; Carleton University. Department of Economics,
OCLC Number: 1059225692
Notes: "February 15, 2018."
Title from PDF web page, (viewed May 24, 2018).
Description: 1 online resource
Series Title: Carleton economic papers, 2018-04.
Responsibility: J.S. Ferris (J. Stephen), S.L. Winer (Stanley) and D.E.H. Olmstead (Derek E.H.).

Abstract:

The effective number of political parties (ENP) in a first-past-the-post single member (SMP) electoral system is analyzed as a dynamic process whereby the tournament nature of the election contest induces excessive entry and sunk entry costs promote persistence even as Duverger-Demsetz type political competition works to winnow unsuccessful minor candidates and parties. The result is a fringe of ever changing marginal parties circulating in long run equilibrium. The factors hypothesized to affect the entry and exit of candidates and parties are analyzed first using an auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model whose advantage is that it allows the separation of an evolving long run equilibrium from short run variations in response to transitory changes in conditioning variables and the process of converging back to the long run equilibrium. The possibility that the short run adjustment process is asymmetric either for parties or candidates is tested using panel estimation techniques. The results are consistent with an observed time path that incorporates slower adjustment to positive as opposed to negative shocks. Variations in the size and trend of both the long and short run are then examined for ENP's ability to predict changes in the competitiveness of the Canadian federal electoral system.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.