skip to content
An empirical model of the medical match Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

An empirical model of the medical match

Author: Nikhil Agarwal; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 20767.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility using only data on observed matches. Unlike single-agent choices, matches depend on the preferences of other agents in the market. I use pairwise stability together with a vertical preference restriction on one side of the market to identify preference parameters for both sides of the market.  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Nikhil Agarwal; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 900645461
Notes: "December 2014"
Includes online appendix (pages 72-113).
Description: 1 online resource (71 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 20767.
Responsibility: Nikhil Agarwal.

Abstract:

This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility using only data on observed matches. Unlike single-agent choices, matches depend on the preferences of other agents in the market. I use pairwise stability together with a vertical preference restriction on one side of the market to identify preference parameters for both sides of the market. Recovering the distribution of preferences is only possible in an environment with many-to-one matching. These methods allow me to investigate two issues concerning the centralized market for medical residents. First, I examine the antitrust allegation that the clearinghouse restrains competition, resulting in salaries below the marginal product of labor. Counterfactual simulations of a competitive wage equilibrium show that residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs results in estimated salary markdowns ranging from $23,000 to $43,000 below the marginal product of labor, with larger markdowns at more desirable programs. Therefore, a limited number of positions at high quality programs, not the design of the match, is the likely cause of low salaries. Second, I analyze wage and supply policies aimed at increasing the number of residents training in rural areas while accounting for general equilibrium effects from the matching market. I find that financial incentives increase the quality, but not the number of rural residents. Quantity regulations increase the number of rural trainees, but the impact on resident quality depends on the design of the intervention.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/900645461> # An empirical model of the medical match
    a schema:MediaObject, schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book ;
    library:oclcnum "900645461" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Topic/residents_medicine_selection_and_appointment_economic_aspects> ; # Residents (Medicine)--Selection and appointment--Economic aspects
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Topic/wages> ; # Wages
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Topic/matching_theory> ; # Matching theory
    schema:author <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Person/agarwal_nikhil> ; # Nikhil Agarwal
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:datePublished "2014" ;
    schema:description "This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility using only data on observed matches. Unlike single-agent choices, matches depend on the preferences of other agents in the market. I use pairwise stability together with a vertical preference restriction on one side of the market to identify preference parameters for both sides of the market. Recovering the distribution of preferences is only possible in an environment with many-to-one matching. These methods allow me to investigate two issues concerning the centralized market for medical residents. First, I examine the antitrust allegation that the clearinghouse restrains competition, resulting in salaries below the marginal product of labor. Counterfactual simulations of a competitive wage equilibrium show that residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs results in estimated salary markdowns ranging from $23,000 to $43,000 below the marginal product of labor, with larger markdowns at more desirable programs. Therefore, a limited number of positions at high quality programs, not the design of the match, is the likely cause of low salaries. Second, I analyze wage and supply policies aimed at increasing the number of residents training in rural areas while accounting for general equilibrium effects from the matching market. I find that financial incentives increase the quality, but not the number of rural residents. Quantity regulations increase the number of rural trainees, but the impact on resident quality depends on the design of the intervention."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/2262755033> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:name "An empirical model of the medical match"@en ;
    schema:productID "900645461" ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research,
    schema:url <http://VH7QX3XE2P.search.serialssolutions.com/?V=1.0&L=VH7QX3XE2P&S=AC_T_B&C=Empirical%20Model%20of%20the%20Medical%20Match&T=marc&tab=BOOKS> ;
    schema:url <http://www.nber.org/papers/w20767> ;
    schema:url <http://www.library.yorku.ca/e/resolver/id/2596395> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/900645461> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research,
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research," ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Person/agarwal_nikhil> # Nikhil Agarwal
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Agarwal" ;
    schema:givenName "Nikhil" ;
    schema:name "Nikhil Agarwal" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/900645461> ; # An empirical model of the medical match
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/900645461> ; # An empirical model of the medical match
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2262755033#Topic/residents_medicine_selection_and_appointment_economic_aspects> # Residents (Medicine)--Selection and appointment--Economic aspects
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Residents (Medicine)--Selection and appointment--Economic aspects"@en ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.