Find a copy in the library
Finding libraries that hold this item...
Details
Genre/Form: | Thèses et écrits académiques |
---|---|
Material Type: | Thesis/dissertation, Manuscript |
Document Type: | Book, Archival Material |
All Authors / Contributors: |
Philippe Bonnetain; Jean-Dominique Lafay; Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. |
OCLC Number: | 490468873 |
Description: | 1 vol. (262 f.) |
Responsibility: | Philippe Bonnetain ; sous la direction de Jean-Dominique Lafay. |
Abstract:
This thesis extends the traditionnal economic literature on pollution control regulations by introducing regulatory choice in an environment of interactions between pressure groups and regulators. Economists have tended to treat the issue of pollution through normative theories of public goods and externalities. This thesis is aimed at capturing to what extent French environmental protection policy is subjected to pressures from different groups of agents affected by this policy. We develop a theoritical model of pressure groups in order to explain the effects of key features of pressure groups on regulators choice of economico-environmental instruments like quotas, taxes and subsidies. the latter measures have different redistributive impacts on economic agents. the groups of agents with higher losses tend to lessen the developpment and the enforcement of environmental policy and vice versa for the groups of agents with lower costs. comparative statics results are linked to econometrical treatment. It is shown that french environmental policy is partially influenced by pressure groups. In particular, ecologist parties results and penalties against firms violating pollution regulation are founded lower in departments where unemployment rate is high.
Reviews

