Fatality uncertainties in limited nuclear war (Book, 1977) [WorldCat.org]
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Fatality uncertainties in limited nuclear war

Author: Bruce W Bennett; Rand Corporation.
Publisher: Santa Monica : Rand, 1977.
Series: R, 2218-AF.; R (Rand Corporation), R-2218-AF.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Presents counterarguments to the article "Limited Nuclear War," by S.D. Drell and F. von Hippel, [Scientific American], November 1976. The article concludes that any Soviet limited counterforce attack, if strategically effective, would inflict very high fatality levels; and because the USSR is not pondering such attacks, the United States should not inflame the situation by building up flexible counterforce  Read more...
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Additional Physical Format: Online version:
Bennett, Bruce W., 1952-
Fatality uncertainties in limited nuclear war.
Santa Monica : Rand, 1977
(OCoLC)621632472
Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Bruce W Bennett; Rand Corporation.
OCLC Number: 3880118
Notes: This report illustrates the usefulness of the analytic techniques of the SNAPPER damage assessment model.
A Project Air Force report prepared for the United States Air Force.
Description: ix, 20 pages ; 28 cm.
Series Title: R, 2218-AF.; R (Rand Corporation), R-2218-AF.
Other Titles: SNAPPER damage assessment model
Responsibility: Bruce Bennett.

Abstract:

Presents counterarguments to the article "Limited Nuclear War," by S.D. Drell and F. von Hippel, [Scientific American], November 1976. The article concludes that any Soviet limited counterforce attack, if strategically effective, would inflict very high fatality levels; and because the USSR is not pondering such attacks, the United States should not inflame the situation by building up flexible counterforce capabilities as recommended by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in 1974. The report argues that Drell and von Hippel neglect the importance of the assumptions underlying attack scenarios and the wide-ranging effects of uncertainty on fatality calculations. Using RAND's new SNAPPER model for assessing nuclear damage, the report concludes that the USSR could launch potentially effective limited counterforce attacks while causing only a one to three million U.S. fatalities, exactly the range suggested by Schlesinger. It therefore would be unwise to dismiss such attacks from the realm of possibility.

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