skip to content
Fiscal rules and discretion under self-enforcement Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Fiscal rules and discretion under self-enforcement

Author: Marina Halac; Pierre Yared; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 23919.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. Unlike prior work, we characterize rules that are self-enforcing: the government must prefer to comply with  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Links to this item

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Marina Halac; Pierre Yared; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 1005934400
Notes: "October 2017"
Description: 1 online resource (56 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 23919.
Responsibility: Marina Halac, Pierre Yared.

Abstract:

We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. Unlike prior work, we characterize rules that are self-enforcing: the government must prefer to comply with the rule rather than face the punishment that follows a breach, where any such punishment must also be self-enforcing. We show that the optimal rule is a maximally enforced deficit limit, which, if violated, leads to the worst punishment for the government. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the government to violate the deficit limit following sufficiently high shocks. Punishment takes the form of a maximally enforced surplus limit that incentivizes overspending; fiscal discipline is restored when the government respects it.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1005934400> # Fiscal rules and discretion under self-enforcement
    a schema:MediaObject, schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book ;
    library:oclcnum "1005934400" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Topic/fiscal_policy_econometric_models> ; # Fiscal policy--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Topic/government_spending_policy_econometric_models> ; # Government spending policy--Econometric models
    schema:author <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Person/yared_pierre> ; # Pierre Yared
    schema:author <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Person/halac_marina> ; # Marina Halac
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:datePublished "2017" ;
    schema:description "We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. Unlike prior work, we characterize rules that are self-enforcing: the government must prefer to comply with the rule rather than face the punishment that follows a breach, where any such punishment must also be self-enforcing. We show that the optimal rule is a maximally enforced deficit limit, which, if violated, leads to the worst punishment for the government. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the government to violate the deficit limit following sufficiently high shocks. Punishment takes the form of a maximally enforced surplus limit that incentivizes overspending; fiscal discipline is restored when the government respects it."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/4545254258> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:name "Fiscal rules and discretion under self-enforcement"@en ;
    schema:productID "1005934400" ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research,
    schema:url <http://www.nber.org/papers/w23919> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/1005934400> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research,
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research," ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Person/halac_marina> # Marina Halac
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Halac" ;
    schema:givenName "Marina" ;
    schema:name "Marina Halac" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Person/yared_pierre> # Pierre Yared
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Yared" ;
    schema:givenName "Pierre" ;
    schema:name "Pierre Yared" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1005934400> ; # Fiscal rules and discretion under self-enforcement
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1005934400> ; # Fiscal rules and discretion under self-enforcement
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Topic/fiscal_policy_econometric_models> # Fiscal policy--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Fiscal policy--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/4545254258#Topic/government_spending_policy_econometric_models> # Government spending policy--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Government spending policy--Econometric models"@en ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.