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From a rational point of view : how we represent subjective perspectives in practical discourse

Author: Tim Henning
Publisher: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : English : First editionView all editions and formats
Summary:
"When discussing normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, motivating reasons, and so on, we often have to use verbs like "believe" and "want" to capture a relevant subject's perspective. According to the received view about sentences involving these verbs, what they do is describe the subject's mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental states
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version :
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Tim Henning
ISBN: 9780192517425 0192517422 9780191860850 0191860859
OCLC Number: 1035556625
Description: 1 online resource
Contents: Cover; From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse; Copyright; Dedication; Acknowledgments; Contents; Introduction; 1: Parentheticalism about "Believe"; 1.1 The Puzzle of Transparency; 1.2 Indirect Accounts and the Problem from Gricean Maxims; 1.3 Introducing Parentheticalism; 1.4 Transparency as a Special Case of a More General Phenomenon; 1.5 Compositionality and the Embedding Problem; 1.6 Parentheticalism about "Believe" in Some More Detail; 1.7 Parenthetical Statements, Perspective-Shifting, and Indicative Conditionals. 2: Parentheticalism about "Want"2.1 In Favor of Parentheticalism about "Want"; 2.2 Parentheticalism about "Want" in Some More Detail; 2.3 Parentheticalism and Hypothetical Imperatives; 2.4 "Want" and Practical Reasoning; 3: Parentheticalism and Normative Reasons; 3.1 Normative Reasons and Psychological Specifications; 3.2 Contextualism about "Ought" and "Reason(s)"; 3.3 The Role of Parenthetical Statements in Reasons-Discourse in General; 3.4 Parentheticalism and Psychological Views of Normative Reasons; 4: Parentheticalism, Normative Reasons, and Error Cases. 4.1 Gin, Gasoline, and Hotel Fires-The Problem of Error Cases4.2 On the Ontology of Normative Reasons; 4.3 Parentheticalism and Quasi-Factivity; 4.4 Parentheticalism and a Unified Account of Normative Reasons; 5: Parentheticalism and Requirements of Rationality; 5.1 Parentheticalism and a Reductive Account of Rationality; 5.2 Structural Rationality, Reasons, and the Bootstrapping Problem; 5.3 Parentheticalism and the Myth of Structural Requirements of Rationality; 5.4 Parentheticalism and Trying on the Agent's Point of View; 5.5 Pseudo-Detachment and Reasoning from a Point of View. 5.6 Conclusion6: Parentheticalism and Action Explanation; 6.1 How Do We Explain Actions in Terms of the Agent's Reasons?; 6.2 Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism; 6.3 Psychologism and the Intentio Obliqua Problem; 6.4 Anti-Psychologism and the Factivity Problem; 6.5 Parentheticalism, Motivating Reasons, and Quasi-Factivity; 6.6 A Further Problem for Anti-Psychologism, and More Support for Parentheticalism; 6.7 Action Explanation and Parenthetical "Want"-Statements; 6.8 Where Parenthetical Explanantia Give Out; 7: Parentheticalism and (Ir)rational Agency; 7.1 The Problem of Akrasia. 7.2 Akrasia, the Paradox of Self-Control, and Two Kinds of "Want"-Statements7.3 Epistemic Akrasia and Parentheticalism about "Believe"; 7.4 Two Aspects of Agency and the Rationale behind Parentheticalism; 7.5 The Problem of the Missing Agent; 7.6 The Agent as Author: Frankfurt, Bratman, Velleman, and Korsgaard; 7.7 Parentheticalism and the Agent as Author; Epilogue; References; Index of Names; Subject Index.
Responsibility: Tim Henning.

Abstract:

Tim Henning applies insights from the philosophy of language and formal semantics to problems in practical philosophy, and solves notorious puzzles about the reasons we have, what it is rational for  Read more...

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