skip to content
How cartels endure and how they fail : studies of industrial collusion Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

How cartels endure and how they fail : studies of industrial collusion

Author: Peter Z Grossman
Publisher: Cheltenham, UK ; Northhampton, MA : Edward Elgar, ©2004.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This book looks at the experience of actual cartels and challenges their portrayal as found in the existing literature." "The eleven chapters by leading researchers of industrial organization study real examples of industrial  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Peter Z Grossman
ISBN: 1858988306 9781858988306
OCLC Number: 53963100
Description: vi, 324 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Contents: What do we mean by cartel success? / Peter Z. Grossman --
Studies of cartel stability : a comparison of methodological approaches / Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow --
Decreasing average cost and competition : a new look at the Addyston Pipe case / George Bittlingmayer --
Stability of ocean shipping cartels / William Sjostrom --
Why one cartel fails and another endures : the Joint Executive Committee and the Railroad Express / Peter Z. Grossman --
Practice without defenders : the price effects of cartelization / Janice Rye Kinghorn and Randall Nielsen --
If cartels were legal, when would firms fix prices? / Andrew R. Dick --
Difference government policy makes : the case of Japan / Mark Tilton --
Political constraints on government cartelization : the case of oil production regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia / Gary D. Libecap and James L. Smith --
International commodity agreements as internationally sanctioned cartels / Christopher L. Gilbert --
Response to decline in the Western European synthetic fibre industry : an investigation of a crisis cartel / P. Simpson --
Collaborate to collude? Multimarket and multiproject contact in R & D / Nicholas S. Vonortas and Yongsuk Jang.
Responsibility: edited by Peter Z. Grossman.
More information:

Abstract:

Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This book  Read more...

Reviews

Editorial reviews

Publisher Synopsis

`The book is indispensable reading for economic historians, policymakers, and economists, including those committed to the free market ideal.' -- Kwan Man Bun, Enterprise & Society `The volume . . . Read more...

 
User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53963100> # How cartels endure and how they fail : studies of industrial collusion
    a schema:Book, schema:CreativeWork ;
   library:oclcnum "53963100" ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Place/northhampton_ma> ; # Northhampton, MA
   library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Place/cheltenham_uk> ; # Cheltenham, UK
   library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/enk> ;
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/droit_de_la_concurrence> ; # Droit de la concurrence
   schema:about <http://dewey.info/class/338.87/e22/> ;
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/ententes> ; # Ententes
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/concurrence> ; # Concurrence
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/pays_developpes> ; # Pays développés
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/kartels> ; # Kartels
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/concurrence_internationale> ; # Concurrence internationale
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/ue_ce_droit> ; # UE/CE Droit
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/prijsbeheersing> ; # Prijsbeheersing
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/847991> ; # Cartels
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1076167> ; # Price fixing
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/concurrentie> ; # Concurrentie
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/871464> ; # Competition
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/fixation_des_prix> ; # Fixation des prix
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/prix_fixation> ; # Prix--Fixation
   schema:bookFormat bgn:PrintBook ;
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/109196030> ; # Peter Z. Grossman
   schema:copyrightYear "2004" ;
   schema:datePublished "2004" ;
   schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/839003217> ;
   schema:inLanguage "en" ;
   schema:name "How cartels endure and how they fail : studies of industrial collusion"@en ;
   schema:productID "53963100" ;
   schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/53963100#PublicationEvent/cheltenham_uk_northhampton_ma_edward_elgar_2004> ;
   schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Agent/edward_elgar> ; # Edward Elgar
   schema:reviews <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/53963100#Review/-121186238> ;
   schema:url <http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz109044533inh.htm> ;
   schema:url <http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=012907162&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA> ;
   schema:workExample <http://worldcat.org/isbn/9781858988306> ;
   umbel:isLike <http://bnb.data.bl.uk/id/resource/GBA4Z6971> ;
   wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/53963100> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Place/northhampton_ma> # Northhampton, MA
    a schema:Place ;
   schema:name "Northhampton, MA" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/concurrence_internationale> # Concurrence internationale
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Concurrence internationale"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/839003217#Topic/droit_de_la_concurrence> # Droit de la concurrence
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Droit de la concurrence"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1076167> # Price fixing
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Price fixing"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/847991> # Cartels
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Cartels"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/871464> # Competition
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Competition"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/109196030> # Peter Z. Grossman
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:birthDate "1948" ;
   schema:familyName "Grossman" ;
   schema:givenName "Peter Z." ;
   schema:name "Peter Z. Grossman" ;
    .

<http://worldcat.org/isbn/9781858988306>
    a schema:ProductModel ;
   schema:isbn "1858988306" ;
   schema:isbn "9781858988306" ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/53963100#Review/-121186238>
    a schema:Review ;
   schema:itemReviewed <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53963100> ; # How cartels endure and how they fail : studies of industrial collusion
   schema:reviewBody ""Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This book looks at the experience of actual cartels and challenges their portrayal as found in the existing literature." "The eleven chapters by leading researchers of industrial organization study real examples of industrial collusion. The authors investigate the formation, behaviour, activity and purpose of cartels, and illustrate the intricacies of collusive relationships. In the process they question the existing economic theory surrounding the operation of cartels, which in practice do not always adhere to the textbook models or to complex game theoretic rules. Although much economic research suggests that cartels are doomed to failure, the authors find that there are many examples of industries where cartels have succeeded in controlling prices and output over a prolonged period of time." "The book is a groundbreaking attempt to study empirically a range of cartels throughout the world, providing both historical and contemporary examples of collusion to enrich the arguments. This book is written for academics, policymakers, lawyers and economists working in the fields of industrial organization and competition policy."--Jacket." ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.