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How do legal differences and learning affect financial contracts?

Author: Steven N Kaplan; Frédéric Martel; Per Strömberg; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2003.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 10097.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"We analyze venture capital (VC) investments in twenty-three non-U.S. countries and compare them to VC investments in the U.S. We describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes. At the same time, however, more experienced VCs implement U.S.-style contracts regardless of legal regime. In most specifications,  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Steven N Kaplan; Frédéric Martel; Per Strömberg; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 54506331
Notes: "November 2003."
Description: 1 online resource (25, [10] pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 10097.
Responsibility: Steven Kaplan, Frederic Martel, Per Stromberg.

Abstract:

"We analyze venture capital (VC) investments in twenty-three non-U.S. countries and compare them to VC investments in the U.S. We describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes. At the same time, however, more experienced VCs implement U.S.-style contracts regardless of legal regime. In most specifications, legal regime becomes insignificant controlling for VC sophistication. VCs who use U.S.-style contracts fail significantly less often. Financial contracting theories in the presence of fixed costs of learning, therefore, appear to explain contracts along a wide range of legal regimes"--NBER website.

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