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In Contradiction.

Author: Graham Priest
Publisher: Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2006. ©2006
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : English : 2nd edView all editions and formats
Summary:
In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the centre of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in 1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Priest, Graham.
In Contradiction.
Oxford : Clarendon Press, ©2006
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Graham Priest
ISBN: 9780191532481 0191532487 9780199263295 0199263299
OCLC Number: 1030899022
Notes: Restrictions on access to electronic version: access available to SOAS staff and students only, using SOAS id and password.
Description: 1 online resource (351 pages)
Contents: Table of Contents --
Acknowledgements of First Edition --
Preface of First Edition --
Preface of Second Edition --
INTRODUCTION --
0 Dialetheism --
PART I: THE LOGICAL PARADOXES --
1 Semantic Paradoxes --
1.1 Logical Paradoxes --
1.2 Semantical Paradoxes: The Tarski Conditions --
1.3 Truth Value Gaps --
1.4 In Defence of the T-scheme --
1.5 The Demise of a Hierarchy --
1.6 ... or Two --
1.7 Extended Semantic Paradoxes and Semantic Ascent --
1.8 Appendix: Berry's Paradox --
2 Set Theoretic Paradoxes --
2.1 Set Theoretic Paradoxes --
2.2 The Cumulative Hierarchy: Its Lack of Rationale --
2.3 ... and its Inadequacy in Category Theory --
2.4 ... and Logic --
2.5 Semantics and Set Theory --
3 Gödel's Theorem --
3.1 Gödel's Theorem --
3.2 Naive Proof --
3.3 ... and Dialetheism --
3.4 Inconsistency volume Incompleteness --
3.5 Appendix: Proof of Gödel's Theorem --
PART II: DIALETHEIC LOGICAL THEORY --
4 Truth and Falsity --
4.1 Preliminary Issues --
4.2 The T-scheme --
4.3 ... and Meaning --
4.4 But Truth is More than This --
4.5 The Teleological Account of Truth --
4.6 Assertion --
4.7 Truth or Falsity: Truth Value Gaps --
4.8 Truth and Falsity: Dialetheism --
4.9 Untruth --
5 Dialetheic Semantics for Extensional Connectives --
5.1 Formal Languages: Abstraction --
5.2 Extensional Sentential Connectives --
5.3 Quantifiers and Identity --
5.4 The Truth Predicate --
5.5 Appendix: Proofs of Theorems --
6 Entailment --
6.1 Preliminary Issues --
6.2 Curry Paradoxes --
6.3 Entailment --
6.4 The Omniscience of G --
6.5 Non-Contraposible Implications --
6.6 Relevant Logic --
6.7 Quantification and Identity --
7 Pragmatics --
7.1 Pragmatics --
7.2 Assertion: Content --
7.3 Belief: Acceptance and Rejection --
7.4 Rational Belief --
7.5 Rational Change of Belief --
7.6 Appendix: Probability Theory --
8 The Disjunctive Syllogism and Quasi-Validity. 8.1 The Disjunctive Syllogism --
8.2 What it is Not --
8.3 ... and What it is --
8.4 The Improbability of Inconsistency --
8.5 The Classical Recapture --
8.6 Appendix: *Consequence --
PART III: APPLICATIONS --
9 Semantic Closure and the Philosophy of Language --
9.1 Applications of Dialetheism --
9.2 A Semantically Closed Theory --
9.3 Comments on the Construction --
9.4 Truth and Meaning --
9.5 Appendix: Proofs of Theorems --
10 Set Theory and the Philosophy of Mathematics --
10.1 Naive Set Theory --
10.2 Substitutional Semantics --
10.3 Analyticity and Paradoxicality --
10.4 Mathematical Realism --
10.5 ... and Anti-Realism --
10.6 Cardinality and Syntax --
11 The Metaphysics of Change I: The Instant of Change --
11.1 Contradictions in the World --
11.2 The Instant of Change --
11.3 Dialectical Tense Logic --
11.4 The Leibniz Continuity Condition --
11.5 The LCC and Contradiction --
12 The Metaphysics of Change II: Motion --
12.1 Change and Motion --
12.2 The Orthodox Account of Motion --
12.3 The Hegelean Account of Motion --
12.4 ... and its Consequences --
13 Norms and the Philosophy of Law --
13.1 Inconsistent Obligations --
13.2 Legal Dialetheias --
13.3 Deontic Semantics --
13.4 Some Semantic Invalidities --
13.5 Other Norms, Rules and Games --
13.6 The Resolution of Dialetheias --
13.7 Language Games --
CONCLUSION --
14 The Transconsistent --
PART IV: MATERIAL NEW TO THE SECOND EDITION --
15 The Metaphysics of Change III: Time --
15.1 The Spread Hypothesis and the Hegelean Definition of Change --
15.2 The Flow of Time --
15.3 The Direction and Duration of Time --
15.4 Some Variations and Extensions --
16 Minimally Inconsistent LP --
16.1 The Classical Recapture --
16.2 Limiting the Models --
16.3 Semantics for LP --
16.4 Semantics for LPm --
16.5 Properties of LPm --
16.6 Reassurance: the Propositional Case. 16.7 Reassurance: the First Order Case --
16.8 Appendix Proofs of Lemmas --
17 Inconsistent Arithmetic --
17.1 Some History --
17.2 Collapsed Models of Arithmetic --
17.3 Consistent volume Inconsistent Arithmetics --
17.4 Gödel's Theorems --
17.5 The Naive Notion of Proof --
17.6 Shapiro's Criticisms --
17.7 The Inconsistency of Peano Arithmetic --
17.8 The Incredulous Stare --
17.9 Appendix: The Structure of Inconsistent Models of Arithmetic --
18 Paraconsistent Set Theory --
18.1 Paraconsistent Set Theory: Background --
18.2 The Material Strategy --
18.3 The Relevant Strategy --
18.4 The Model-Theoretic Strategy --
18.5 Metatheory of Paraconsistent Logic --
18.6 Technical Appendix --
19 Autocommentary on the First Edition --
19.1 Twenty Years On --
19.2 Chapter 0 --
19.3 Chapter 1 --
19.4 Chapter 2 --
19.5 Chapter 3 --
19.6 Chapter 4 --
19.7 Chapter 5 --
19.8 Chapter 6 --
19.9 Chapter 7 --
19.10 Chapter 8 --
19.11 Chapter 9 --
19.12 Chapter 10 --
19.13 Chapter 11 --
19.14 Chapter 12 --
19.15 Chapter 13 --
19.16 Chapter 14 --
20 Comments on Some Critics --
20.1 The Empire Strikes Back --
20.2 Dialetheic Logic --
20.3 The Extended Liar Paradox --
20.4 Expressability --
20.5 Motion --
20.6 Contradictions in the World --
Bibliography --
Index --
A --
B --
C --
D --
E --
F --
G --
H --
I --
K --
L --
M --
N --
O --
P --
Q --
R --
S --
T --
U --
V --
W --
Z.

Abstract:

In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the centre of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in 1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in the companion volume, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, also published by Oxford University Press in 2006.

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