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Instrument-based vs. target-based rules

Author: Marina Halac; Pierre Yared; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 24496.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We develop a simple delegation model to study rules based on instruments vs. targets. A principal faces a better informed but biased agent and relies on joint punishments as incentives. Instrument-based rules condition incentives on the agent's observable action; target-based rules condition incentives on outcomes that depend on the agent's action and private information. In each class, an optimal rule takes a  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Marina Halac; Pierre Yared; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 1031379889
Notes: "April 2018."
Description: 1 online resource (28 pages)
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 24496.
Other Titles: Instrument-based versus target-based rules
Responsibility: Marina Halac, Pierre Yared.

Abstract:

We develop a simple delegation model to study rules based on instruments vs. targets. A principal faces a better informed but biased agent and relies on joint punishments as incentives. Instrument-based rules condition incentives on the agent's observable action; target-based rules condition incentives on outcomes that depend on the agent's action and private information. In each class, an optimal rule takes a threshold form and imposes the worst punishment upon violation. Target-based rules dominate instrument-based rules if and only if the agent's information is sufficiently precise. An optimal hybrid rule relaxes the instrument threshold whenever the target threshold is satisfied.

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