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  E-mail Message: I thought you might be interested in this item at http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/34832654 Title: Intensionality and truth : an essay on the philosophy of A.N. Prior Author: Philip Hugly; Charles Sayward Publisher: Dordrecht ; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, ©1996. ISBN/ISSN: 0792341198 9780792341192 OCLC:34832654

  
  

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Intensionality and truth : an essay on the philosophy of A.N. Prior

Author:	Philip Hugly; Charles Sayward
Publisher:	Dordrecht ; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, ©1996.
Series:	Synthese library, v. 255.
Edition/Format:	Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:	Prior claimed that sentences never name, that what sentences say cannot be otherwise signified, that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence, and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The text develops the first three of these views so as to bring out their strengths, clarify their consequences for intensionality and truth, and contrast them with related views of such philosophers as Frege, Geach, and Davidson. The text also seeks to defend the fourth of these views against the sorts of strictures on quantification familiar from the work of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson. More particularly, the text argues that Prior was right in viewing Quine's 'commitment to entities' conception of quantification as an undefended dogma, and seeks to meet Davidson's main 'coherence condition' for quantification by providing a recursive definition of truth for sentential quantifications which accords with the fourth of the claims listed above.  Read more...
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Subjects	Prior, A. N. -- (Arthur N.), -- 1914-1969. Prior, Arthur N. -- 1914-1969 Prior, Arthur N. View all subjects
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