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Naked Exclusion : An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

Author: Claudia M Landeo; Kathryn E Spier
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w14115.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Claudia M Landeo; Kathryn E Spier
OCLC Number: 1027352999
Notes: June 2008.
Description: 1 online resource.
Details: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w14115.
Responsibility: Claudia M. Landeo, Kathryn E. Spier.

Abstract:

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude.

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Primary Entity<\/h3>\n
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Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers\' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. 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<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/198418654#Person\/landeo_claudia_m<\/a>> # Claudia M. Landeo<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Person<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:familyName<\/a> \"Landeo<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:givenName<\/a> \"Claudia M.<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"Claudia M. Landeo<\/span>\" ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
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<http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/198418654#Topic\/k41_litigation_process<\/a>> # K41 - Litigation Process<\/span>\n\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0a \nschema:Intangible<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\nschema:name<\/a> \"K41 - Litigation Process<\/span>\"@en<\/a> ;\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0\u00A0.\n\n\n<\/div>\n
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Content-negotiable representations<\/p>\n