Neither brain nor ghost : a nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory (eBook, 2005) [WorldCat.org]
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Neither brain nor ghost : a nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory

Author: W Teed Rockwell
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2005.
Series: Bradford book.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the  Read more...
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Details

Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Rockwell, W. Teed.
Neither brain nor ghost.
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2005
(DLC) 2004062535
(OCoLC)57193332
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: W Teed Rockwell
ISBN: 0262681676 9780262681674 9780262316255 0262316250 0262264374 9780262264372
OCLC Number: 652441852
Language Note: English.
Reproduction Notes: Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL
Description: 1 online resource (xxii, 231 pages) : illustrations
Details: Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Contents: 1. Minds, brains, and behavior --
2. Beyond the cranium --
3. Beyond the neuronal mind --
4. Causation and embodiment --
5. The myth of the autonomous mind¿brain --
6. Experience, sense data, and language : putting experience back into the environment --
7. The return of the zombies --
8. The "frame problem" and the "background" --
9. Dreams, illusions, and errors --
10. Dewey and the dynamic alternative.
Series Title: Bradford book.
Responsibility: W. Teed Rockwell.

Abstract:

In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory--which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name)--and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems. Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST)

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