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| Genre/Form: | Textbooks |
|---|---|
| Document Type: | Book |
| All Authors / Contributors: |
João P Hespanha |
| ISBN: | 9780691175218 0691175217 |
| OCLC Number: | 962553139 |
| Description: | xiv, 228 pages ; 27 cm |
| Contents: | Introduction : Noncooperative games : Elements of a game ; Cooperative vs. noncooperative games: rope-pulling ; Robust designs: resistive circuit ; Mixed policies: network routing ; Nash equilibrium -- Policies : Action vs. policies: advertising campaign ; Multi-stage games: war of attrition ; Open vs. closed-loop: Zebra in the lake -- Zero-sum games : Zero-sum matrix games : Zero-sum matrix games ; Security levels and policies ; Computing security levels and policies with MATLAB® ; Security vs. regret: alternate play ; Security vs. regret: simultaneous plays ; Saddle-point equilibrium ; Saddle-point equilibrium vs. security levels ; Order interchangeability ; Computational complexity -- Mixed policies : Mixed policies: rock-paper-scissor ; Mixed action spaces ; Mixed security policies and saddle-point equilibrium ; Mixed saddle-point equilibrium vs. average security levels ; General zero-sum games -- Minimax theorem : Theorem statement ; Convex hull ; Separating hyperplane theorem ; On the way to prove the minimax theorem ; Proof of the minimax theorem ; Consequences of the minimax theorem -- Computation of mixed saddle-point equilibrium policies : Graphical method ; Linear program solution ; Linear programs with MATLAB® ; Strictly dominating policies ; “Weakly” dominating policies -- Games in extensive form : Motivation ; Extensive form representation ; Multi-stage games ; Pure policies and saddle-point equilibria ; Matrix form for games in extensive form ; Recursive computation of equilibria for single-stage games ; Feedback games ; Feedback saddle-point for multi-stage games ; Recursive computation of equilibria for multi-stage games -- Stochastic policies for games in extensive form : Mixed policies and saddle-point equilibria ; Behavioral policies fir games in extensive form ; Behavioral saddle-point equilibria ; Behavioral vs. mixed policies ; Recursive computation of equilibria for feedback games ; Mixed vs. behavioral order interchangeability ; Non-feedback games -- Non-zero-sum games : Two player non-zero-sum games : Security policies and Nash equilibria ; Bimatrix games ; Admissible Nash equilibria ; Mixed policies ; Best-response equivalent games and order interchangeability -- Computation of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games : Completely mixed Nash equilibria ; Computation of completely mixed Nash equilibria ; Numerical computation of mixed Nash equilibria -- N-player games : N-player games ; Pure N-player games in normal form ; Mixed policies for N-player games in normal form ; Completely mixed policies -- Potential games : Identical interests games ; Potential games ; Characterization of potential games ; Potential games with interval action spaces -- Classes of potential games : Identical interests plus dummy games ; Decoupled plus dummy games ; Bilateral symmetric games ; Congestion games ; Other potential games ; Distributed resource allocation ; Computation of Nash equilibria for potential games ; Fictitious play -- Dynamic games : Dynamic games : Game dynamics ; Information structures ; Continuous-time differential games ; Differential games with variable termination time -- One-player dynamic games : One-player discrete-time games ; Discrete-time cost-to-go ; Discrete-time dynamic programming ; Computational complexity ; Solving finite one-player games with MATLAB® ; Linear quadratic dynamic games -- One-player differential games : One-player continuous-time differential games ; Continuous time cost-to-go ; Continuous-time dynamic programming ; Linear quadratic dynamic games ; Differential games with variable termination time -- State-feedback zero-sum dynamic games : Zero-sum dynamic games in discrete time ; Discrete-time dynamic programming ; Solving finite zero-sum games with MATLAB® ; Linear quadratic dynamic games -- State-feedback zero-sum differential games : Zero-sum dynamic games in continuous time ; Linear quadratic dynamic games ; Differential games with variable termination time ; Pursuit-evasion. |
| Responsibility: | João P. Hespanha. |
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Publisher Synopsis
"Noncooperative Game Theory offers students a fresh way of approaching engineering and computer science applications." * Mathematical Reviews *
