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On evidence in philosophy

Author: William G Lycan
Publisher: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Edition/Format:   Print book : English : First editionView all editions and formats
Summary:
This book offers an epistemology of philosophy itself, a partial method for philosophical inquiry. The epistemology features three ultimate sources of justified philosophical belief. First, common sense, in a carefully restricted sense of the term--the sorts of contingent propositions Moore defended against idealists and skeptics. Second, the deliverances of well confirmed science. Third, and more fundamentally,  Read more...
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Additional Physical Format: Electronic version:
Lycan, William G.
On evidence of philosophy.
New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2019
(OCoLC)1083522758
Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: William G Lycan
ISBN: 9780198829720 0198829728
OCLC Number: 1048447257
Description: x, 149 pages ; 23 cm
Contents: Introduction --
A version of Moore's method --
Moore against the new skeptics --
A novel refutation of eliminative materialism --
Free will and the burden of proof --The poverty of philosophical method: a case study --
Philosophical knowledge --
The evidential status of intuitions --
Intuitions and coherentism --
Conclusion.
Responsibility: William G. Lycan.

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William G. Lycan offers an epistemology of philosophy itself, a partial method for philosophical inquiry. In sum, he advocates a picture of philosophy as a very wide explanatory reflective  Read more...

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William G. Lycan has written a short but action-packed book about why philosophical arguments don't establish skeptical or radically revisionary claims concerning the nature of reality or our Read more...

 
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