skip to content
Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods : evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods : evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects

Author: Brian Knight; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2003.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 9748.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Abstract: Local public goods financed from a national tax base provide concentrated benefits to receipient jurisdictions but disperse costs, creating incentives for legislators to increase own-district spending but to restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax costs. While these common pool incentives underpin a variety of theoretical analyses, which tend to predict inefficiencies in the allocation of  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Brian Knight; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 53067710
Notes: "June 2003."
Description: 1 online resource (29 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 9748.
Responsibility: Brian Knight.

Abstract:

Abstract: Local public goods financed from a national tax base provide concentrated benefits to receipient jurisdictions but disperse costs, creating incentives for legislators to increase own-district spending but to restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax costs. While these common pool incentives underpin a variety of theoretical analyses, which tend to predict inefficiencies in the allocation of public goods, there is little direct evidence that individual legislators respond to such incentives. To test for reactions to such incentives, this paper analyzes 1998 Congressional votes over transportation project funding. The empirical results provide evidence that legislators respond to common pool incentives: the probability of supporting the projects is increasing in own-district spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending. Having found that legislators do respond to such incentives, I use the parameter estimates to calculate the efficient level of public goods, which suggest over-spending in aggregate, especially in politically powerful districts, and large associated deadweight loss.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53067710> # Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods : evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects
    a schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book, schema:MediaObject ;
    library:oclcnum "53067710" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Place/cambridge_mass> ; # Cambridge, Mass.
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1082234> ; # Public goods--Mathematical models
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Topic/voting_mathematical_models> ; # Voting--Mathematical models
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1169244> ; # Voting--Mathematical models
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/922296> ; # Federal aid to transportation
    schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2010108853> ; # Public goods--Mathematical models
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    schema:copyrightYear "2003" ;
    schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/19168756> ; # Brian Knight
    schema:datePublished "2003" ;
    schema:description "Abstract: Local public goods financed from a national tax base provide concentrated benefits to receipient jurisdictions but disperse costs, creating incentives for legislators to increase own-district spending but to restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax costs. While these common pool incentives underpin a variety of theoretical analyses, which tend to predict inefficiencies in the allocation of public goods, there is little direct evidence that individual legislators respond to such incentives. To test for reactions to such incentives, this paper analyzes 1998 Congressional votes over transportation project funding. The empirical results provide evidence that legislators respond to common pool incentives: the probability of supporting the projects is increasing in own-district spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending. Having found that legislators do respond to such incentives, I use the parameter estimates to calculate the efficient level of public goods, which suggest over-spending in aggregate, especially in politically powerful districts, and large associated deadweight loss."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/10576754> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:name "Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods : evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects"@en ;
    schema:productID "53067710" ;
    schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/53067710#PublicationEvent/cambridge_mass_national_bureau_of_economic_research_2003> ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
    schema:url <http://www.library.yorku.ca/e/resolver/id/1956694> ;
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9748.pdf> ;
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9748> ;
    schema:url <http://VH7QX3XE2P.search.serialssolutions.com/?V=1.0&L=VH7QX3XE2P&S=AC_T_B&C=Parochial%20Interests%20and%20the%20Centralized%20Provision%20of%20Local%20Public%20Goods%20%3A%20Evidence%20from%20Congressional%20Voting%20on%20Transportation%20Projects&T=marc&tab=BOOKS> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/53067710> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Place/cambridge_mass> # Cambridge, Mass.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "Cambridge, Mass." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53067710> ; # Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods : evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/10576754#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53067710> ; # Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods : evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2010108853> # Public goods--Mathematical models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Public goods--Mathematical models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1082234> # Public goods--Mathematical models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Public goods--Mathematical models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1169244> # Voting--Mathematical models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Voting--Mathematical models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/922296> # Federal aid to transportation
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Federal aid to transportation"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/19168756> # Brian Knight
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:birthDate "1941" ;
    schema:familyName "Knight" ;
    schema:givenName "Brian" ;
    schema:name "Brian Knight" ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/53067710>
    a genont:InformationResource, genont:ContentTypeGenericResource ;
    schema:about <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53067710> ; # Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods : evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects
    schema:dateModified "2018-12-06" ;
    void:inDataset <http://purl.oclc.org/dataset/WorldCat> ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.