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Genre/Form: | Electronic books |
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Additional Physical Format: | (DLC) 2013953490 |
Material Type: | Document, Internet resource |
Document Type: | Internet Resource, Computer File |
All Authors / Contributors: |
Joëlle Proust; Oxford University Press. |
ISBN: | 9780191758096 0191758094 |
OCLC Number: | 1065840815 |
Description: | 1 online resource (366 pages) : illustrations |
Contents: | Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction -- 2. An Evaluativist Proposal: Cognitive Control and Metacognition -- 3. Metacognition as Cognition about Cognition: Attributive Views -- 4. Metacognition or Metarepresentation? A Critical Discussion of Attributivism -- 5. Primate Metacognition -- 6. A Representational Format for Procedural Metacognition -- 7. Mental Acts as Natural Kinds -- 8. The Norms of Acceptance -- 9. Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View -- 10. Is There a Sense of Agency for Thought? -- 11. Thinking of Oneself as the Same -- 12. Experience of Agency in Schizophrenia -- 13. Conversational Metacognition -- 14. Dual-system Metacognition and New Challenges. |
Other Titles: | Philosophy of metacognition (Online) |
Responsibility: | Joëlle Proust. |
Abstract:
Does metacognition, i.e. the capacity to form epistemic self-evaluations about one's current cognitive performance, derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely, at least in part, on sui generis informational processes? In The Philosophy of Metacognition Joëlle Proust provides a powerful defense of the second position. Drawing on discussions of empirical evidence from comparative, developmental, and experimental psychology, as well as from neuroscience, and on conceptual analyses, she purports to show that, in contrast with analytic metacognition, procedural metacognition does not need to involve metarepresentations. Procedural metacognition seems to be available to some non-humans (some primates and rodents). Proust further claims that metacognition is essentially related to mental agency, i.e. cognitive control and monitoring. "Self-probing" is equivalent to a self-addressed question about the feasibility of a mental action ('Am I able to remember this word?'). "Post-evaluating" is a way of asking oneself whether a given mental action has been successfully completed "'Is this word the one I was looking for?"). Neither question need be articulated conceptually for a feeling of knowing or of being right to be generated, or to drive epistemic control. Various issues raised by the contrast of a procedural, experience-based metacognition, with an analytic, concept-based metacognition are explored, such as whether each is expressed in a different representational format, their sensitivity to different epistemic norms, and the existence of a variety of types of epistemic acceptance.
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