skip to content
The political economy of immigration enforcement : conflict and cooperation under Federalism Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

The political economy of immigration enforcement : conflict and cooperation under Federalism

Author: Alberto Ciancio; Camilo García Jimeno; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 25766.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We study how the shared responsibilities over immigration enforcement by local and federal levels in the US shape immigration enforcement outcomes, using detailed data on the Secure Communities program (2008-2014). Tracking the movement of arrested unlawfully present immigrants along the several steps of the immigration enforcement pipeline, and exploiting a large shift in federal enforcement priorities in mid 2011,  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Links to this item

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Alberto Ciancio; Camilo García Jimeno; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 1099182860
Notes: "April 2019"
Description: 1 online resource (66 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 25766.
Responsibility: Alberto Ciancio, Camilo García-Jimeno.

Abstract:

We study how the shared responsibilities over immigration enforcement by local and federal levels in the US shape immigration enforcement outcomes, using detailed data on the Secure Communities program (2008-2014). Tracking the movement of arrested unlawfully present immigrants along the several steps of the immigration enforcement pipeline, and exploiting a large shift in federal enforcement priorities in mid 2011, we disentangle the three key components of the variation in deportation rates: federal enforcement efforts, local enforcement efforts, and the composition of the pool of arrestees. This decomposition allows us to recover the local (county) level response to changes in federal enforcement intensity. Among urban counties, 80 percent, mostly Democratic but with small shares of Hispanics, exhibit strategic substitutabilities. The inverse relationship between federal and local efforts allowed most counties to reduce opposition to the policy, and was accompanied by an increased alignment of local and federal preferences. The federal level was very effective in directing its enforcement efforts towards counties where it expected local collaboration, but conflict was mostly driven by a change in the types of unlawfully present immigrants it prioritized for removal.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1099182860> # The political economy of immigration enforcement : conflict and cooperation under Federalism
    a schema:Book, schema:CreativeWork, schema:MediaObject ;
    library:oclcnum "1099182860" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Topic/immigration_enforcement> ; # Immigration enforcement
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Topic/emigration_and_immigration_government_policy> ; # Emigration and immigration--Government policy
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Topic/immigration_enforcement_united_states> ; # Immigration enforcement--United States
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Place/united_states> ; # United States.
    schema:author <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Person/garcia_jimeno_camilo> ; # Camilo García Jimeno
    schema:author <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Person/ciancio_alberto> ; # Alberto Ciancio
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:datePublished "2019" ;
    schema:description "We study how the shared responsibilities over immigration enforcement by local and federal levels in the US shape immigration enforcement outcomes, using detailed data on the Secure Communities program (2008-2014). Tracking the movement of arrested unlawfully present immigrants along the several steps of the immigration enforcement pipeline, and exploiting a large shift in federal enforcement priorities in mid 2011, we disentangle the three key components of the variation in deportation rates: federal enforcement efforts, local enforcement efforts, and the composition of the pool of arrestees. This decomposition allows us to recover the local (county) level response to changes in federal enforcement intensity. Among urban counties, 80 percent, mostly Democratic but with small shares of Hispanics, exhibit strategic substitutabilities. The inverse relationship between federal and local efforts allowed most counties to reduce opposition to the policy, and was accompanied by an increased alignment of local and federal preferences. The federal level was very effective in directing its enforcement efforts towards counties where it expected local collaboration, but conflict was mostly driven by a change in the types of unlawfully present immigrants it prioritized for removal."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/9077783854> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:name "The political economy of immigration enforcement : conflict and cooperation under Federalism"@en ;
    schema:productID "1099182860" ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research,
    schema:url <http://www.nber.org/papers/w25766> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/1099182860> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research,
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research," ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Person/ciancio_alberto> # Alberto Ciancio
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Ciancio" ;
    schema:givenName "Alberto" ;
    schema:name "Alberto Ciancio" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Person/garcia_jimeno_camilo> # Camilo García Jimeno
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "García Jimeno" ;
    schema:givenName "Camilo" ;
    schema:name "Camilo García Jimeno" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Place/united_states> # United States.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "United States." ;
    schema:name "United States" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1099182860> ; # The political economy of immigration enforcement : conflict and cooperation under Federalism
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1099182860> ; # The political economy of immigration enforcement : conflict and cooperation under Federalism
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Topic/emigration_and_immigration_government_policy> # Emigration and immigration--Government policy
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Emigration and immigration--Government policy"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Topic/immigration_enforcement> # Immigration enforcement
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Immigration enforcement"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/9077783854#Topic/immigration_enforcement_united_states> # Immigration enforcement--United States
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Immigration enforcement--United States"@en ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/1099182860>
    a genont:InformationResource, genont:ContentTypeGenericResource ;
    schema:about <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1099182860> ; # The political economy of immigration enforcement : conflict and cooperation under Federalism
    schema:dateModified "2019-06-20" ;
    void:inDataset <http://purl.oclc.org/dataset/WorldCat> ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.