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Probabilistic knowledge

Author: Sarah Moss
Publisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents.
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version :
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Sarah Moss
ISBN: 9780192510587 0192510584 9780191861260 019186126X
OCLC Number: 1022945279
Description: 1 online resource
Contents: Cover; Probabilistic Knowledge; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; 1: The case for probabilistic contents; 1.1 Probabilistic beliefs; 1.2 An argument for probabilistic contents of belief; 1.3 The roles played by contents of belief; 1.4 Full beliefs; 1.5 Alternative roles for contents of belief; 2: The case for probabilistic assertion; 2.1 Familiar arguments against propositional contents of assertion; 2.2 Foundational arguments for probabilistic contents of assertion; 2.3 Modeling communication; 2.4 Epistemic modals and indicative conditionals. 2.5 A test battery for probabilistic content3: Epistemic modals and probability operators; 3.1 Motivations for my semantics; 3.2 Embedded epistemic vocabulary; 3.3 Challenges for other theories; 3.4 A semantics for epistemic modals and probability operators; 3.5 A semantics for simple sentences; 3.6 The relationship between credence and full belief; 4: Indicative conditionals; 4.1 Probabilities of conditionals as conditional probabilities; 4.2 A semantics for conditionals; 4.3 Why probabilities of conditionals are not conditional probabilities; 4.4 A semantics for other logical operators. 4.5 The pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary5: The case for probabilistic knowledge; 5.1 The thesis that probabilistic beliefs can be knowledge; 5.2 Testimony; 5.3 Perception; 5.4 Arguments for probabilistic contents of experience; 5.5 Other sources of knowledge; 5.6 Justified true belief without knowledge; 5.7 Traditional theories of knowledge; 5.8 An alternative mental state?; 5.9 Applications; 6: Factivity; 6.1 Alternatives to probabilistic knowledge?; 6.2 The contents of knowledge ascriptions; 6.3 Frequently asked questions; 6.4 Relativism; 6.5 Objective chance; 7: Skepticism. 7.1 A skeptical puzzle7.2 The argument from inconsistency; 7.3 The argument from closure; 7.4 The argument from disjunction; 7.5 The argument from safety; 8: Knowledge and belief; 8.1 The knowledge norm of belief; 8.2 Peer disagreement; 8.3 Applying the knowledge norm of belief; 8.4 Statistical inference; 8.5 Responses to skepticism about perceptual knowledge; 9: Knowledge and action; 9.1 Knowledge norms of action; 9.2 Addressing objections; 9.3 Applying knowledge norms of action; 9.4 Pragmatic encroachment; 9.5 Transformative experience; 10: Knowledge and persons; 10.1 Statistical evidence. 10.2 An account of legal proof10.3 Applying knowledge standards of proof; 10.4 Racial and other profiling; 10.5 Applying the rule of consideration; Appendix: A formal semantics for epistemic vocabulary; A.1 Background; A.2 Epistemic modals and probability operators; A.3 Simple sentences; A.4 Indicative conditionals; A.5 Other logical operators; References; Index.
Responsibility: Sarah Moss.

Abstract:

Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in  Read more...

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