skip to content
Public choice theory / 2 : the characteristics of political equilibrium. Preview this item
ClosePreview this item

Public choice theory / 2 : the characteristics of political equilibrium.

Publisher: Aldershot : Elgar, 1993.
Series: International library of critical writings in economics, 24.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats

The first volume of this important reference collection focuses on the economics of politics. The selection of papers and the introductory essay both emphasize the importance of institutional  Read more...


(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...


Document Type: Book
ISBN: 1852781602 9781852781606
OCLC Number: 311697272
Description: VIII, 477 Seiten : Diagramme.
Contents: PROVISIONAL CONTENTSINTRODUCTIONVOLUME I: HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE POLITICAL MARKET-PLACEPART I: EARLY BEGINNINGSH. Hotelling (1929), `Stability in Competition'A. Smithies (1941), `Optimum Location in Spatial Competition'D. Black (1948), `On the Rationale of Group Decision-making'G. Tullock (1959), `Problems of Majority Voting'J. M. Buchanan (1959), `Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy'A. Downs (1957), `A Comment on Economic Theories of Government Behavior'PART II: THE VOTE MOTIVEC. R. Plott (1967), `A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule'M. J. Hinich and P. C. Ordeshook (1969), `Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process'M. J. Hinich and P. C. Ordeshook (1970), `Plurality Maximixation vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation'T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1978), `Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo'T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1979), The Elusive Median Voter'C. K. Rowley (1984), `The Relevance of the Median Voter Theorem'R. G. Holcombe (1980), `An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model'W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook (1968), `A Theory of the Calculus of Voting'G. J. Stigler (1971), `Economic Competition and Political Competition'Y. Barzel and E. Silberberg (1973), `Is the Act of Voting Rational?'S. Peltzman (1990), `How Efficient is the Voting Market?'PART III: INTEREST GROUPSM. Olson (1982), `The Logic'M. Olson (1984), `Interview: Why Nations Rise and Fall'M. Olson (1984), `Collective Action'G. J. Stigler (1974), `Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation'D. Austin-Smith (1981), `Voluntary Pressure Groups'G. S. Becker (1983), `A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence'W. C. Mitchell and M. C. Munger (1991), `Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey'VOLUME II: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUMPART I: THE RENT-SEEKING INSIGHTG. Tullock (1967), `The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft'A. O. Kruger (1974), `The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society'R. A. Posner (1975), `The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation'G. Tullock (1975), `The Transitional Gains Trap'R. D. Tollison (1982), `Rent-seeking: A Survey'F. S. McChesney (1987), `Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation'PART II: THE LEGISLATUREG. J. Stigler (1971), `The Theory of Economic Regulation'S. Peltzman (1976), `Toward a More General Theory of Regulation'G. Becker (1976), `Comment'S. Peltzman (1985), `An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century'S. Peltzman (1984), `Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting'J. B. Kau and P. H. Rubin (1979), `Self-interest, Ideology and Logrolling in congressional Voting'J. P. Kalt and M. A. Zupan (1984), `Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics'D. Nelson and E. Silberberg (1987), `Ideology and Legislator Shirking'G. J. Stigler (1976), `The Sizes of Legislatures'R. D. Tollison (1988), `Public Choice and Legislation'M. A. Crew and C. K. Rowley (1988), `Toward a Public Choice Theory of Monopoly Regulation'PART III: THE DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE EQUILIBRIUMG. Tullock (1981), `Why so Much Stability'K. A. Shepsle and B. R. Weingast (1981), `Structure-induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice'T. M. Moe (1987), `An Assessment of the Positive Theory of "Congressional Dominance"'K. A. Shepsle;e and B. R. Weingast (1987), `The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power'B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall (1988), `The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislature Like Firms, are Not Organized as Markets'VOLUME III: THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYPART I: THE EXECUTIVEW. M. Crain and R. D. Tollison (1979), `The Executive Branch in the Interest-group Theory of Government'B. R. Weingast (1981), `Regulation, Reregulations, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships'J. R. Carter and D. Schap (1987), `Executive Veto Legislative Override, and Structure-induced Equilibrium'T. M. Moe (1990), `Political Institutions: The Neglected Side if the Story'PART II: THE JUDICIARYW. E. Landes and R. A. Posner (1975), `The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-group Perspective'J. M. Buchanan (1975), `Comment'M. S. Kimenyi, W. F. Shugart and R. D. Tollison (1985), `What do Judges Maximize?'C. K. Rowley (1989), `The common Law in Public Choice Perspective: A Theoretical and Institutional Critique'R. Gely and P. T. Spiller (1990), `A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases'PART III: THE BUREAUCRACYW. A. Niskanen (1975), `Bureaucrats and Politicians'J. Margolis (1975), `Comment'A. Breton and R. Wintrobe (1975), `The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy'B. R. Weingast and M. J. Moran (1983), `Bureacratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission'J. Tirole (1986), `Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations'J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan (1990), `Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy'PART IV: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYJ. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock (1962), `The Calculus of Consent: A Generalized Economic Theory'J. M. Buchanan (1987), `The Constitution of Economic Policy'J. M. Buchanan (1990). `The Domain of Constitutional Economics'R. E. Wagner (1988), `The Calculus of Consent: A Wicksellian Retrospective'W. C. Mitchell (1989), `The Calculus of Consent: Enduring Contributions to Public Choice and Political Science'C. K. Rowley (1990), `The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Contract versus Political Market Conflict'D. C. Mueller (1991), `Constitutional Rights'PART V: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICED. C. Mueller (1976), `Public Choice: A Survey'J. M. Buchanan (1983), `The Public Choice Perspective'D. Wittman (1989), `Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results'C. K. Rowley and M. A. Vachris (1993), `Snake Oil Economics versus Public Choice'C. K. Rowley (1991), `A Changing of the Guard'
Series Title: International library of critical writings in economics, 24.
Responsibility: ed. by Charles K. Rowley.


Editorial reviews

Publisher Synopsis

`The most important essays of renowned scholars of public choice are present and bear witness to the editors' subtle taste. . . . these volumes represent an excellent choice.' -- C. Seidl, Journal of Read more...

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...


Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data

Primary Entity

<> # Public choice theory 2 : the characteristics of political equilibrium.
    a schema:Book, schema:CreativeWork ;
    library:oclcnum "311697272" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <> ; # Aldershot
    schema:bookFormat bgn:PrintBook ;
    schema:datePublished "1993" ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <> ; # The international library of critical writings in economics ;
    schema:isPartOf <> ; # International library of critical writings in economics ;
    schema:name "Public choice theory 2 : the characteristics of political equilibrium." ;
    schema:productID "311697272" ;
    schema:publication <> ;
    schema:publisher <> ; # Elgar
    schema:workExample <> ;
    wdrs:describedby <> ;

Related Entities

<> # International library of critical writings in economics ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <> ; # Public choice theory 2 : the characteristics of political equilibrium.
    schema:name "International library of critical writings in economics ;" ;

<> # The international library of critical writings in economics ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <> ; # Public choice theory 2 : the characteristics of political equilibrium.
    schema:name "The international library of critical writings in economics ;" ;

    a schema:ProductModel ;
    schema:isbn "1852781602" ;
    schema:isbn "9781852781606" ;

Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.