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Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

Author: Joshua May
Publisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
La science naissante de l'éthique a favorisé le pessimisme à propos de la pensée et de l'action morales : on nous dit qu'elles sont motivées par des facteurs arbitraires et des sentiments irrationnels. Joshua May affirme de manière convaincante que ce pessimisme n'est pas justifié : le jugement moral et la motivation sont des entreprises fondamentalement rationnelles qui ne sont pas redevables aux passions.
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Additional Physical Format: Regard for reason in the moral mind / Joshua May
[Oxford] : Oxford University Press, 2018. (@Oxford Scholarship Online)
978-0-19-184845-2
(ABES)228939135
Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Joshua May
ISBN: 9780198811572 0198811578
OCLC Number: 1086176958
Description: 1 volume (288 p.) : jaquette ill. en coul. ; 24 cm.
Contents: Introduction1: Empirical PessimismPart A: Moral Judgement and Knowledge2: The Limits of Emotion3: Reasoning Beyond Consequences4: Defending Moral Judgment5: The Difficulty of Moral KnowledgePart B: Moral Motivation and Virtue6: Beyond Self-Interest7: The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs8: Freeing Reason from Desire9: Defending Virtuous MotivationConclusion10: Cautious Optimism
Responsibility: Joshua May.

Abstract:

The burgeoning science of ethics has fostered pessimism about moral thought and action: we're told that they are driven by arbitrary factors and unreasoned feelings. Joshua May argues compellingly  Read more...

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Recommended. * CHOICE * ...a systematic, impressively thorough, and convincing defence of the viability of moral rationalism. It excels in a detailed discussion of the experimental record, coupled Read more...

 
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