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Regulation Versus Taxation

Author: Alberto F Alesina; Francesco Passarelli
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w16413.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We study which policy tool and at what level would be chosen by majority voting to reduce negative externalities, such as pollution. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the polluting activity, a quota that obliges to proportional reduction, and a tax on the activity. For all instruments the majority chooses too restrictive levels when pollution is mainly due to a small fraction of the  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Alberto F Alesina; Francesco Passarelli
OCLC Number: 1027332862
Notes: September 2010.
Description: 1 online resource.
Details: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w16413.
Responsibility: Alberto F. Alesina, Francesco Passarelli.

Abstract:

We study which policy tool and at what level would be chosen by majority voting to reduce negative externalities, such as pollution. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the polluting activity, a quota that obliges to proportional reduction, and a tax on the activity. For all instruments the majority chooses too restrictive levels when pollution is mainly due to a small fraction of the population, and when costs for reducing activities or paying taxes are convex, and viceversa. Even though a tax is in general superior to the other two instruments, the majority may strategically choose a rule in order to charge the minority a larger share of the cost for the externality reduction.

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